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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis, we conduct an experimental study with human decision makers, on 
dual sales channel coordination. We aim to determine dual channel strategies for a 
manufacturer who sells its product thorough both an independent retailer channel 
and its totally owned direct online channel. The two channels compete on service, 
where the service level of the retailer channel is measured with its product 
availability level, and the service level of the direct channel is measured with its 
delivery lead time. This multi-stage game-theoretical model was previously solved 
for the wholesale price contract (Chen et al. 2008) and buyback contract (Gökduman 
and Kaya 2009) cases. We compare these models’ theoretical predictions with the 
outcome of our experiments with human decision makers. In particular, we analyze 
the theoretical and observed coordination performance of the wholesale price and 
buyback contracts between the two firms. We identify deviations from theoretical 
predictions that can be attributed to behavioral factors, such as risk aversion.  
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Özet 
 
 
Bu tezde, insan karar vericilerle ikili satış kanallarının koordinasyonu üzerine 
deneysel bir çalışma gerçekleştirdik. Ürünlerini hem bağımsız bir perakendeci kanalı 
hem de kendisine ait doğrudan internet kanalı ile satan bir üretici için ikili kanal 
stratejileri belirlemeyi amaçladık. Kanallar arasında hizmet tabanlı bir rekabet 
varsayan modelimizde perakendecinin hizmet düzeyi ürün bulunabilirlik seviyesi ile 
belirlenirken üreticinin hizmet düzeyi ise müşteriye teslimat süresi ile ölçülmüştür. 
Bu çok aşamalı oyun teorisi modeli daha önce toptan satış kontratı (Chen et al. 
2008) ve geri alım kontratı (Gökduman ve Kaya 2009) için çözülmüştür. Biz bu 
modellerin teorik tahminlerini insan karar vericiler ile yaptığımız deneylerin 
sonuçları ile kıyasladık. Özel olarak, iki şirket arasındaki toptan satış ve geri alım 
kontratlarının teorik ve gözlemlenen koordinasyon performanslarını analiz ettik. 
Teorik tahminler ve gözlemlenen veriler arasında riskten kaçınma gibi davranışsal 
faktörlerden kaynaklanabilecek sapmalar belirledik. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 : I"TRODUCTIO" 
 
Technological improvements change many aspects of the human life. One effect of 
these improvements can be observed in the changing shopping behavior of consumers. 
Today most consumers prefer shopping from home via the Internet instead of going to a 
shopping mall and interacting with the products physically. As a result, sellers have 
been using the Internet (i.e., engage in e-commerce) as a sales channel. Forrester 
Research forecasts the increase of online retail sales in US from 2005 to 2010 as $157 
billion, rate of e-commerce as 13% of US retail sales in 2010, and the European e-
commerce amount as € 263 billion in 2011 (Forrester Resarch 2005, Yan 2008). Ease of 
selling via the Internet, the growing role of the Internet in human life, and economics of 
third party shipping apparently make e-selling more desirable to sellers. Increasing 
popularity of the Internet sales have caused thousands of companies such as IBM, Cisco 
and Nike to build their online sales channels besides distributing and selling products 
via offline sales channels (Cai et al. 2009).  
 
1.1. Online versus Offline Channels  
One characteristic of sales channels is the “structure”. We refer to physical stores as 
“offline sales channel” and the Internet stores as “online sales channel”. Examples of 
offline sales channel include retail stores such as Carrefour and Wal-Mart, manufacturer 
owned outlet stores such as Dell Outlet Store and HP Outlet Store, retail owned outlet 
stores such as Home Depot Retail Outlet Store, discount stores and resale stores such as 
Wal-Mart Discount Stores and The Computer Resale Store. The Internet bookseller 
“amazon.com” and the Internet retail store “ebay.com” are some examples of online 
2 
 
sales channel. An online channel may offer advantages and disadvantages to both 
consumers and the sellers. Next, we outline these.  
Some advantages of online channel for consumers are lower price, high availability 
levels, enhanced product options including customization, shopping comfortably 
without location and time restriction, no travel costs, and reduced search costs 
(Cairncross 1997, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Ghose et al. 2006). Online channel has 
disadvantages for consumers as well. Not interacting with the product before buying, 
delay of gratification, high shipping cost, problems in returning or exchanging goods, 
and information security issues such as sharing credit-card information are some of 
these.  
Consumers’ channel preference between online and offline channel depends on 
some factors. Important factors include offline shopping transportation cost, distance to 
offline store, online shopping disutility cost, and the prices of the offline and online 
channel shopping. Product attributes may affect channel preference for consumers, too. 
The online channel may not be preferable for “experience goods” which are defined as 
the products that consumers prefer to experience before buying. The offline channel 
may not be preferable for “search goods” which are defined as the products that 
consumers require no experience before buying.  
The advantages of online channel for sellers include increased profit margins, 
interaction with consumers, inexpensive data gathering, increased market coverage, 
providing better information on products, dynamic pricing, ease of customer 
segmentation and targeting, reduced inventory levels, and ease of cross selling products 
(Keck et al. 1998, Asdemir et al. 2002, Viswanathan 2005, Akcura and Srinivasan 2005, 
Guo and Liu 2008, Chiang 2010). The main disadvantage of online channel for sellers is 
the high cost of setting up a new channel. In addition, sellers need to coordinate the 
sales activities through multiple channels. When companies engage in e-commerce, 
they need to organize a delivery service besides product offering. To be competitive, 
this delivery service has to offer reasonable delivery times to consumer, which is costly 
to operate. In addition, there might be problems in returns. Since products cannot be 
tried or examined by consumers before receiving, returns in online channels are more 
frequent than returns in offline channels. For instance, online apparel retailers are 
reported to face a total return rate of 45% from customer orders (Tarn et al. 2003). The 
return operation is significantly more difficult for online sales than it is for offline sales 
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as well. In addition to creating logistical difficulties, the high return volume also 
complicates the inventory planning process.  
 
1.2. Direct versus Retail Channels 
So far, we have discussed online versus offline channels. Another characteristic of 
channels is “ownership”. Manufacturers sell their products traditionally through 
intermediaries. We will use the term “retailer”, or the “retail channel” to refer to this 
intermediary. The retailer channel can be in online or offline structure. Retailer-owned 
traditional stores, discount stores, and resale stores are examples of retailer-offline 
channel; whereas, retailer-owned Internet stores are example of retailer-online channel. 
An alternative for manufacturers is to sell directly to consumers without any 
intermediary. This is referred to as the “direct channel”. The direct channel can also be 
in online or offline structure. Manufacturer-owned outlet stores and company stores are 
examples of direct-offline channel; whereas, manufacturer-owned Internet stores are 
examples of direct-online channel.  
Figure 1.1 shows the sales channel matrix that illustrates the “ownership” and 
“structure” characteristics of the channels.  
 
Ownership 
Direct Retailer 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
O
ff
li
n
e 
Company Stores and Outlets   
(Sony Factory Outlet Store, 
Apple Company Store,  
Nike Outlet Store,  
Hotiç Outlet Store) 
Traditional Retail Stores 
(Carrefour,  
Home Depot,  
Marks and Spencer,  
Migros) 
O
n
li
n
e 
Online Company Stores 
(dell.com,  
shopping.hp.com,  
us.levi.com,  
shop.vakko.com) 
Online Retail Stores 
(amazon.com,  
ebay.com,  
walmart.com, 
hepsiburada.com ) 
 
Figure 1.1. Sales Channel Matrix 
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Establishing a direct channel offers certain advantages to a manufacturer. These 
include higher profit margins, direct contact to end consumers, controlling the service 
level, improving the company image, collecting sales data, improved demand 
forecasting and operations planning. On the other hand, the direct channel might be 
costly to set up. In addition, it requires the manufacturer to learn new skills in sales, 
marketing and distribution.  
There are advantages and disadvantages of direct versus retail channel for 
consumers. Consumers make their choices between these two channels based on some 
factors. Consumers’ search rates (i.e., the willingness to search the product in the other 
channel when there is a stock out in the desired channel) and consumers’ sensitivity to 
price variations in different channels are some of these. Another important factor is 
whether the consumers are loyal to the brand or to the retail store. Store-loyal 
consumers value sales support and retailer advice, whereas, brand-loyal consumers 
value buying their favorite brand with the most advantageous price. 
 
1.3. Dual Channel Strategy 
A manufacturer need not use only the “retail channel” or only the “direct channel” to 
reach consumers. He may sell through both channels at the same time, which is known 
as a “dual channel” strategy1. The material and information flows in these three types of 
channel strategies are shown in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Types of Channel Strategies (Chiang and Monahan 2005) 
                                                 
1 Some marketing researchers study the case of at least two different channels, which is known as “multi 
channel” distribution. We will simply focus on the two-channel version, the dual channel case. 
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We discussed that both the direct and the retail channels can be either in online (i.e., 
through the Internet) or offline (i.e., through physical stores) structure. In the rest of this 
thesis, we will focus on a manufacturer’s dual channel strategy in which the direct 
channel is in online structure and the retail channel is in offline structure. Other 
combinations are also observed in practice, and these can be studied as extensions to our 
work. 
Consumers derive certain benefits from a manufacturer’s dual channel strategy. 
Increased options for shopping, improved customer service levels and reduced prices 
are some of these (Rhee and Park 2000, Hendershott and Zheng 2006, Agatz and 
Fleischmann 2008).     
The advantages of using a dual channel for the manufacturer include serving to the 
customers from different segments, creating economies of scale and synergies, 
increased profit, negotiation power, recognition and brand loyalty, reduced double 
marginalization, better understanding of customer needs and shopping patterns, and 
improved channel efficiency (Chiang et al. 2003, Driver and Evans 2004, Boyacı 2005, 
Kumar and Ruan 2006, Agatz and Fleischmann 2008, Chiang 2010). In some cases, 
manufacturers may prefer to use dual channel strategy not for increasing the share of 
their own channels’ profit, but for promoting the existing retail channel to increase its 
sales volume and profit. Chiang et al. (2003) report that even if manufacturers do not 
sell anything online and just open a direct channel to provide information on their 
products; they have an indirect profit growth of 7% due to increased sales in their retail 
channels.  
Although many manufacturers select dual channel as their optimal sales channel 
strategy, few of them achieve success. When manufacturers establish direct channels, 
they become competitors to their retail channels. Manufacturers and retailers may 
compete in price and service (Boyacı 2005, Geng and Mallik 2007, Ryan et al. 2008, 
Chen et al. 2008, Chiang 2010). Retail channels might react to this, leading to “channel 
conflict” (Tsay and Agrawal 2004). In this case, both the retailers and the manufacturers 
might be worse off. Next, we study channel conflict in detail. 
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1.3.1. Channel Conflict 
A research conducted by MIT (2001) states that channel conflict issues faced by 
manufacturers when introducing a direct-online channel can be grouped under three 
categories. These are threatening the relationship with the current channel, coordination 
problems between channels, and destroying the traditional consumer segmentation 
criteria. Next, we discuss these in detail.  
First, retailers may threaten manufacturers with not selling their products. For 
example, the retailer Home Depot warned its thousands of suppliers by sending letters 
about not competing with the company via their online channels, otherwise the 
company would be hesitant to make business with its competitors (Brooker 1999). In 
particular, the retailers’ reaction against the online channel might be aggressive when 
retailers’ sales support to consumers is high. That is the reason why Levi Strauss and 
Liz Claiborne stopped investing in their direct online channels.  
Second, coordination problems arise due to decentralized decision-making, 
communication difficulties, lack of information management and standardization, and 
language differences between channels. For instance, Citibank and Nomura Securities 
are reported to suffer from lack of integration and standardization between different 
sales channels (MIT 2001).  
Third, when consumers are faced with multiple channels (one being retailer-offline 
and the other being direct-online), consumer segmentation and differentiation becomes 
difficult. The differences in prices or service levels between the channels may cause one 
channel to capture the sales of the other channel, which is known as “cannibalization”. 
For example, consumers may take advantage of the retail-offline channel by receiving 
pre-sales service and advice from sales personnel, before buying from the direct-online 
channel. To understand these issues better, one first needs to determine the factors that 
affect consumers’ channel choice. In their purchase decision, consumers choose the 
channel that provides them with the highest utility. In case of a stock out, they may 
choose to buy from the other channel(s), which is known as “channel switching”. There 
are more specific reasons for why customers switch channels. Consumers’ online 
purchase versus offline purchase intentions, price search intention, search and 
evaluation efforts, and products’ search and experience attributes are the most important 
ones (Gupta et al. 2004). For example, Gupta et al. (2004) argue that consumers who 
prefer to purchase online have perceptions of less channel risk, search effort, and 
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evaluation effort; but, more price search intention in comparison to the consumers who 
purchase offline. 
Results of channel conflict can be grouped in two as retailer-related results and 
consumer-related results. Retailer-related problems may cause big losses for both 
manufacturers and retailers. Main retailer-related problems are retailers’ unwillingness 
to share information with manufacturers, retailers not responding to online customers’ 
complaints, and retailers’ reduced sales efforts and future investments (MIT 2001, 
Kumar and Ruan 2006). For example, Kodak’s marketing strategy as being a supplier 
for its retailers and a direct seller to its end customers lead to retailers being unwilling to 
share customer information and choices with the firm (MIT 2001). Consumer-related 
problems include consumer dissatisfaction and confusion, and changing consumer 
behavior. For example, J.Crew promoted the same products cheaper with special 
offerings in their online store in comparison to their retail stores. As a result, consumers 
who used both channels are confused and felt “cheated” (MIT 2001). In addition, 
consumers may show significantly different behaviors such as not having loyalty to 
both channel, and tending to buy from the cheapest channel or the one, which provides 
the most advantage. 
 
1.3.2. Dual Channel Coordination 
Many companies have to deal with dual channel problems. Companies such as Compaq, 
IBM, HP, Sun Microsystems, Ethan Allen Interiors Inc., Travelocity, Estee Lauder, 
Bobbi Brown Cosmetics, Mattel and Intuit manage to apply different strategies to make 
retailers involved in business while they are accompanied by the direct sales channels 
(Tsay and Agrawal 2004). The success of such firms lies on knowing how to avoid 
channel conflict. Some practical strategies for avoiding channel conflict are consistency 
in price and offerings, differentiating channels from each other, increased 
communication between channels, promoting channel partners, standardization of 
technologies and language through the whole supply chain, restricting the usage of the 
online channel (such as geographic restrictions), and redirecting online channel 
customers to retail channel for order fulfillment (Carlton and Chevalier 2001, Webb 
2002 cited by Driver and Evans 2004, Tsay and Agrawal 2004, Cattani et al. 2006, 
Dumrongsiri et al. 2008, Mukhopadhyay et al. 2008, Zhang 2009, MIT 2001). 
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Retailers should be well informed about changing customer needs and business 
structures and they should be convinced that the direct-online channel would not totally 
replace the traditional-retail channel. One strategy may be to “segment” the consumers 
such that the consumers who prefer to buy online will be served through the direct-
online channel; whereas, the consumers who prefer to shop from physical stores will be 
served through the retail-offline channel.  
Channel switching may be prevented by increasing the switching costs. To this end, 
customized services can be provided for consumers, and the channel value can be 
increased by differentiating the services provided. Firms are free to select the 
combination of different features to affect the consumer choices, and to position 
themselves in the market. The manufacturers’ direct-online channels may differentiate 
the information bundle, user interfaces, product representation, customized services, 
purchase support and flexibility, and transportation services to set themselves apart 
from the offline channels. The retail-offline channels, on the other hand, may 
differentiate themselves through selection of store location, design and ambiance, 
transfer method, customer service, product variety and organization. 
It is crucial to achieve “coordination” if a manufacturer is to benefit from the dual 
channel strategy. Coordination is aligning the incentives of individual supply chain 
members with the objectives of the whole supply chain. Three important coordination 
areas for a dual channel system are on pricing, procurement and distribution design 
(Cattani et al. 2004). Regarding the delivery options, for example, Men’s Warehouse 
uses its existing depots for meeting direct channel orders, while Home Depot allows 
consumers to pick up online orders from its stores, and J.C. Penney’s provides both 
options (Alptekinoglu and Tang 2005). Researchers investigate ways of coordinating 
the channels by using “supply chain contracts”. These contracts align the incentives of 
channel members, and help the chain achieve the efficiency of centralized decision-
making. We discuss the related contract types and their effectiveness in coordinating 
dual channels in Section 2.2.  
Retailers can be supported to use online solutions in order to add value to the 
distribution activities of online channel shopping. IBM recognizes that being successful 
in the long term with the direct channel strategy does not mean eliminating retailers and 
connecting with consumers only directly, but to encourage retailers to be included into 
the business with strong Internet technology (Keck et al. 1998). As a result, retailers 
will not be reacting to this new channel, and instead adapt themselves to the new 
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business model. For example, NuSkin, a company of health support, provides an 
extranet for its retailers. By using this technology, the company lets retailers check new 
product information, track their sales volume, and receive online selling support (Keck 
et al. 1998).  
Switching to a dual channel sales strategy also requires a change within the 
manufacturer’s own organization and sales processes. If the managers cannot foresee 
these requirements, the result may be a failure. Employees can be resistant to the 
changes, since they think that online sales would not require any sales representatives. 
Actually, however, the new system requires sales people with their changed roles and 
work definitions. Strategically thinking managers will play an important role in getting 
people involved and be adapted into these changes. 
 
1.3.3. Manufacturers’ Optimal Channel Strategy 
Manufacturers’ optimal channel strategies depend highly on how consumers choose 
between the two channels. In the marketing literature, this is captured as the 
“segmentation” of the consumer population. Segmentation refers to how the consumer 
population will be divided between the two channels. In Section 1.1. and Section 1.2., 
we discussed how the structure (i.e., online or offline) and the ownership (i.e., direct or 
retailer) of the channels affect the consumers’ channel choices. When customers are 
heterogeneously distributed in terms of their channel preferences, dual channel 
strategies may be successful in reaching all consumer types and increasing the market 
coverage.  
Manufacturers need to consider some other factors besides consumers’ channel 
preferences while deciding on their optimal channel strategies. These include product 
attributes (i.e., search vs. experience goods), marginal costs and profits, online order 
fulfillment, transaction and return costs, flexibilities of channels, competitors’ strategic 
decisions, attractiveness of other brands in the same product category to the retailers, 
and information provision function of the online channel (King et al. 2004, Hendershott 
and Zheng 2006, Kumar and Ruan 2006, Zhang 2009).  
Figure 1.3 presents the “Channel Conflict Strategy Matrix” developed by Accenture 
Consulting Group. This matrix allows one to determine the optimal change strategies 
for a manufacturer to minimize the channel conflict by analyzing the forces and 
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opportunities for change. Market power is about whether the product (i.e., the 
manufacturer) or the retailer is more important for consumers. Channel value can be 
considered as the additional value that a specific retailer provides to the consumer over 
what the manufacturer provides. If the retailer provides extra value to consumers, his 
channel value is defined as “significant”. 
 
M
ar
k
et
 P
ow
er
 
Retailer 
controls 
consumers 
Forward Integrate 
 
• Identify new value 
proposition 
• Act fast/independently 
• Fill gaps in channel 
coverage 
Cooperate 
 
• Look for win-win, grow 
the pie 
• Seek compromise 
• Look to sell new 
products through new 
channels 
Manufacturer 
controls 
consumers  
Compete 
 
• Create internet-enabled 
direct link to consumers 
• Shift volume to new 
channel through 
promotions                                         
 
Lead 
 
• Define appropriate 
approaches for the 
channel 
• Make initial investment                                             
 
Insignificant Significant 
Channel Value Added 
 
Figure 1.3. Channel Conflict Strategy Matrix (Driver and Evans 2004) 
 
 
When the market power of the retailer is high and its channel value is significant, 
this can result with the highest conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer. This 
is because the retailer positions himself equal to the manufacturer and demands 
cooperation. In such a situation, the manufacturer should cooperate with the retailer to 
maximize the total value created.   
 
1.3.4. The Integration Level of Channels 
In order to decide on the integration level of dual channel members, four business 
dimensions should be taken into consideration which are brand, management, 
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operations and equity (Gulati and Garino 2000). These are related to creating a new 
brand name for the online channel or not, managing the channels together or separately, 
operating the channels in the same way or not, and owning the online business or 
outsourcing it.  
The degree of vertical and horizontal integration determines the requirement for 
coordination and opportunities created. We discuss integration along two 
characteristics: structure (i.e., online vs. offline) and ownership (i.e., direct vs. retail). 
For online versus offline channels, there are two alternatives. The first is operating 
a separate (dedicated) supply chain for the online channel. The second is to include the 
online channel into the existing supply chain by cooperating with partners in the offline 
channel (Seifert et al. 2006). In the second option, offline stores may be serving as local 
distribution centers of the online channel since the excess inventory in offline stores can 
be used to meet orders from the online channel.  
For integration of channels, ownership plays important role. Below in Figure 1.4., 
four alternative supply chain models are presented. In model 1, an independent third 
company opens an online sales channel (e.g., Amazon.com). In model 2, the existing 
retailer opens an online channel to increase the options for consumers (e.g., Gap). In 
model 3, the manufacturer opens a direct-online channel to sell its products in addition 
to the existing retail channel (e.g., Nike). This alternative is what we study in this thesis. 
In model 4, full integration is achieved where the manufacturer owns both the online 
and the retail channels. 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Integration in Dual Channel Models (Cattani et al. 2004) 
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Although the integration of direct and retail channels increases total system 
performance, reduces channel inventory levels and lost sales for the whole supply chain, 
whether to integrate the retail channel with the direct channel has been a discussion for 
a long time. Gulati and Garino (2000) provide the example of Barnes and Noble. This 
company established its own online channel barnesandnoble.com as a separate firm. 
Even though this online company enjoyed many advantages such as quickness on 
decision-making, having flexibility, creating own culture and quality, Barnes and Noble 
suffered a lot due to the decentralized structure of the online business from its offline 
stores. Despite the advantages of integration, some managers continue to believe that 
direct operations should be distinguished from the retail operations. Viswanathan (2005) 
argues that when channels are different in any core parameters, instead of being tightly 
integrated with the same pricing and segmentation strategies across channels, firms 
would benefit by segmenting the consumers according to their channel preferences, and 
developing appropriate pricing strategies for each segment. Thus, to integrate or not 
should not be the only question. Instead, deciding on the degree of integration and 
method of integration specific to a company are more important. Gulati and Garino 
(2000) provide examples on different integration policies as follows: Rite Aid bought a 
part of  Drugstore.com’s equity and made a partnership, KB Toys bought 80% stakes of 
BrainPlay.com and changed its name to KBkids.com while using the expertise of the 
company as a joint venture, Office Depot created its own website and highly integrated 
its physical and virtual operations.  
So far, we discussed dual channel management, channel conflict, coordination and 
integration issues. By definition, these issues are related to the strategic interactions 
between multiple decision-makers. For instance, the dual channel problem involves the 
interaction between a manufacturer and a retailer where the profit of each firm depends 
on each other’s decisions. Researchers model and study such interactions using “game 
theory” (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), which has been extensively 
used in the supply chain literature (Cachon 2003). Although commonly employed in 
literature, it is known that the assumptions of game theory and economic decision-
making models are known not to hold when human beings make decisions in relevant 
real-world settings (Kahnemand and Tversky 1979). To this end, operations 
management researchers have started conducting “decision-making experiments” with 
human subjects to test the validity of theoretical models, and to understand the 
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behavioral factors leading to deviations from theoretical predictions. Next, we discuss 
these.  
 
1.4. Experiments 
Experiments with human decision-makers have been used to check the validity of 
theoretical outcomes. Growth and development of game theory in 1940s led to the 
growth in experimental studies because game theory provides human behavior 
predictions that are suitable for experimental validation. Especially, game theoretic 
models that have assumptions of price rules, information availability and individual 
reactions are very suitable for experimental analysis (Bendoly et al. 2006). After the 
acceptance of experimental studies by the economics community, experimental research 
expanded to analyze the gaps between established economics theory and experimental 
results (Bendoly et al. 2006). However, since experiments are used in very limited 
research areas, their usage has not reached to its full potential yet. Recent findings of 
human behavior and perception have influenced economics, finance, accounting, law, 
marketing and strategy fields significantly; however, their influence on operations field 
so far has been very limited (Gino and Pisano 2008).    
Even though behavioral studies take very limited place in the operations literature, 
they are expected to cover many areas of the operations management (OM) field in the 
future. Gino and Pisano (2008) propose five different research areas for the so called 
“behavioral operations” field. These are replication studies, theory-testing studies, 
theory-generating studies, adaptation studies and OM-specific studies. Replication 
studies are used to replicate or test the already existing behavioral theories with 
operations management data. Theory-testing studies are used to test operations 
management theories in a laboratory setting. Theory-generating studies are used to 
analyze existing operations management models with revised assumptions related to 
managers’ real decisions and biases. Adaptation studies are used to analyze operations 
management problems by focusing on behavioral reasons. Lastly, OM-specific studies 
are used to analyze important operations management problems by mixed 
methodologies of lab experiments, field-based research, modeling, and empirical 
analysis.  
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1.4.1. Methodology of Experiments 
The experimental methodology steps can be broadly defined as follows.  
 
1) Defining the Purpose of the Experiment 
 
In the first step, the purpose of the experiment should be clearly defined. Purpose of the 
experiment might include answering some questions about observable phenomena, to 
improve a mathematical model, to verify a prediction of the theory or to solve a 
problem.  
 
2) Setting the Hypothesis 
 
Next, the “hypotheses” of the experiment are formed. “Hypothesis” is a proposed 
explanation of a phenomenon, which can be tested to be proved. In statistical hypothesis 
testing, two hypotheses are compared. These are the “null hypothesis” and the 
“alternative hypothesis”. The null hypothesis is the hypothesis that rejects the relation 
between phenomena whose relation is to be investigated. The alternative hypothesis is 
the hypothesis that accepts the relation between phenomena whose relation is to be 
investigated.  
 
3) Experimental Design 
 
Experimental design includes the decisions on the instructions, the physical 
environment, the software (if any) and other decision parameters. The instructions must 
cover all information necessary for subjects (participants) to perform the experimental 
task. Instructions can be printed on a paper and distributed to subjects at the beginning 
of the experiment (game). They should be clear and well defined (not too long and not 
too short) to lead subjects to play in a desired way.  
At this step, the physical environment of the experiment is determined. 
Laboratories are usually selected as experiment facilities. Behavioral experiments do 
not require any specific machines and instruments; thus, a pencil and a paper might be 
sufficient in many cases. Recently, experiments are run mostly on computer networks. 
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This brings the advantages of quick information processing, quick interaction of 
subjects, standardization, reduced mistakes, and ease of data storage (Guala 2005).  
Deciding on the software for the experiment is another design issue. There are some 
standard software packages to be used in behavioral experiments; however, these might 
not perfectly fit to a specific experiment and usually requires some modification. To 
overcome this issue, special-purpose software can be developed for the experiment.  
In addition, other decision parameters such as the number of subjects or subject 
groups, subjects’ information levels, input parameters, the number of game replications 
and financial incentives should be specified at this step.  
Subjects are usually selected from university students. However, in some 
experimental games managers and business people are used as subjects to avoid bias 
due to using inappropriate subject groups. In contrast to this, according to a study of 
Bolton et al. (2008), when the games played with different subject groups (i.e., students, 
managers and employees) are compared, no significant difference is observed in the 
game results. In addition, students are observed to perform better than managers in 
learning the game and optimizing their decisions based on their experience in the game 
(Bolton et al. 2008).  
Economists believe that financial incentives are crucial for ensuring subjects to 
behave in the same manner as in the real world when they participate in the experiment. 
Hence, financial incentives are usually used to motivate subjects. Subjects’ financial 
incentive levels can be defined between some ranges and a limit value can be specified 
for the overall financial incentive amount. However, there is a trade-off between the 
number of subjects and financial incentive level of each subject. Hence, the number of 
subjects should be determined optimally.  
 
4) Conducting the Experiment 
 
This step includes pilot and original runs of the game. Before conducting the 
experiment, it should be tested on a small number of subjects, using a small number of 
replications. These runs will show if the experiment works smoothly and if data is 
generated properly. If there are problems related to processes and data generation, these 
can be eliminated before running the original experiment.  
Before running the original experiment, subjects are trained on the game, where the 
rules and steps of the game are clearly explained. Next, subjects’ understanding of the 
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game is tested with some pilot (warm-up) runs. Subjects need to be “matched” to each 
other in experiments that require interaction (such as experiments that deal with social 
factors). How this matching is done is an important experimental decision. For example, 
subjects can be matched randomly at each replication or they can play the whole game 
with the same partner; they can be matched against computers; they may or may not 
know their partner. Finally, the original experiment is conducted and data is created at 
each replication.  
 
5) Data Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
 
After data generation is completed, one moves to the analysis step. In this step, first, 
experimental data is cleaned by discarding questionable data and outliers. Next, one 
begins the statistical analysis of data. A characteristic or measure obtained from a 
sample is named a “statistic”. Statistics is divided into two types, which are 
“descriptive” and “inferential”. Descriptive statistics cover methods for summarizing 
data. Data can be summarized via “numerical descriptors” and “graphical tools”. 
Numerical descriptors include mean and standard deviation; whereas, graphical tools 
include various kinds of charts and graphs such as the scatter plot, histogram, bar chart, 
and box plot. Descriptive statistics are frequently used to summarize experimental 
output data in this step (Keser and Paleologo 2004, Corbett and Fransoo 2007, Loch and 
Wu 2008, Pavlov and Katok 2009).  
Inferential statistics let researchers make statements about some unknown aspect of 
a population from a sample. Inferential statistics are used to test hypothesis, to estimate 
parameters, to forecast future behavior, to describe association (correlation), and to 
model relationships (regression). Inferential statistics is divided into two types, which 
are “parametric” and “non-parametric”. Parametric inferential statistics models and tests 
assume that distributions of the assessed variables are in the families of the known 
parametric probability distributions. Some test examples include one-sample t-test, two- 
sample t-test, and Pearson’s correlation test. In the non-parametric inferential statistics 
models, the model structure is not defined from the beginning; however, it is determined 
from the data. Non-parametric statistical tests make no prior assumptions on the 
distributions of the assessed variables. Some test examples include Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, chi-square goodness of fit test, Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test, Spearman’s 
correlation test. As we stated before, hypotheses are set in the first step of an 
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experiment. In the analysis step, these hypotheses are statistically tested using 
experiment data via parametric and non-parametric statistical tests.  
Statistical tests are mainly classified in three categories with respect to their 
functionality. These are testing of differences between independent groups, testing of 
differences between dependent groups, and testing of relationships between variables. 
Table 1.1 (Statsoft 2010) presents the related parametric tests and their non-parametric 
counterparts used in each category. 
 
Table 1.1. Statistical Test Categories and Tests in Each Category 
 
Category When to Use 
Parametric 
Test 
"on-parametric Test 
Differences 
between 
independent 
groups 
Comparing two 
samples regarding 
the mean value of 
the variable 
analyzed 
T-test 
the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test, 
the Mann-Whitney U test, 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
two-sample test 
Comparing multiple 
samples regarding 
the mean value of a 
the variable 
analyzed 
ANOVA 
(analysis of 
variance)/ 
MANOVA 
(multiple 
analysis of 
variance) 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of ranks, 
the Median test 
Differences 
between 
dependent 
groups 
Comparing two 
variables measured 
in the same sample 
T-test for 
dependent 
samples 
Sign test, 
Wilcoxon's matched pairs test, 
McNemar's Chi-square 
Comparing multiple 
variables measured 
in the same sample 
repeated 
measures 
ANOVA 
Friedman's two-way analysis of 
variance, 
Cochran Q test 
Relationships 
between 
variables 
Defining 
relationship 
between  two 
variables standard 
correlation 
coefficient 
test 
Spearman R, 
coefficient Gamma, 
chi-square test, 
the Phi coefficient, 
the Fisher exact test 
Defining 
relationship 
between  multiple 
variables 
Kendall coefficient of 
concordance 
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1.4.2. Experimental Models 
In literature, experimental models are classified in different ways: 
• Environment (Bendoly et al. 2006): 
o Industrial experiments where subjects are real workers performing their 
own job. 
o Laboratory experiments where subjects are performing a controlled version 
of job. 
o Situational experiments where subjects are informed about situations and 
asked about their actions for each. 
• Research Process (Amaldoss et al. 2008):  
o Deviating from model’s equilibrium predictions and later converging to 
them: This can be used for observing the change in the results when each 
parameter is not set according to the equilibrium values. That shows the 
sensitivity of model to the each parameter.  
o Subjects’ not preserving their equilibrium position in repeated games: This 
is used to develop new models and predict strategic decisions better. 
o Testing the models’ validity with similar real world situations: This is used 
to better understand the specific points and their effects on the model 
predictions.  
• Target (adapted from Amaldoss et al. 2008):  
o Analysis of learning effect: Subjects’ choices may not show the equilibrium 
predictions at the beginning stages; however, they may agree on the 
equilibrium predictions at later stages. This changing behavior of subjects 
can be explained by the learning effect. 
 Population models: Population models investigate the populations’ 
behavior change due to experience. 
 Individual models: Individual models investigate the individuals’ 
behavior change due to their own experience.  
° Experienced learning models: The model focuses on the 
learning relation between subjects’ current decisions related 
to their previous decisions and experiences.  
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° Direct learning models: The model focuses on the learning 
relation between the latest strategy of the subject and the 
optimum strategy achieved through all previous stages.  
o Theory improvement: These are developed by relaxing the some of the 
limiting assumptions of Nash equilibrium. 
 Quantal response equilibrium models: Assumption of “subjects are 
making decisions without errors” is relaxed.  
 Cognitive hierarchy models: Assumption of “subjects’ beliefs are 
mutually consistent” is relaxed.  
o New mechanisms and strategic choices: Changing existing designs of 
mechanisms and strategic choices by experiments leads to a change in 
subjects’ behavior and increases total profit. 
 
1.4.3. Contributions of Experiments to Academic Research 
Experiments help researchers test and refine theories, and construct new ones 
(Amaldoss et al. 2008, Croson and Gächter 2010). For example, experiments can be 
used to check the comparative statics of a theory or to determine the applicable domains 
of a theory. They enable the development of new models to better predict strategic 
decisions. Experiments can show which observed anomalies are related with a specific 
field context, and which can be generalized and related to other fields. 
In addition, experiments can be used to measure individual’s preferences across 
genders, interesting social groups, cultures and demographical properties. Recently, 
experiments are used to investigate social considerations and individual decision biases, 
specifically the loss aversion and reflection effects (Schultz et al. 2007, Ho and Zhang 
2008, Loch and Wu 2008, Bendoly et al. 2010, Katok and Wu 2009). Experiments 
allow to demonstrate behavioral biases regarding the empirical outcomes and to 
determine the strategies to prevent these biases (Croson and Donohue 2002).  
Experiments offer certain advantages over field studies. In experiments, many 
parameters such as interaction rules, reward systems and information flows can be 
controlled which may not be possible in field studies (Bolton and Kwasnica 2002). 
Experiments simplify the world by involving a little context, artificial settings and 
abstract instructions. They also enable testing of certain policies before implementation 
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in the field. For example, Hewlett Packard is reported to use experiments in testing 
some of its marketing policies before implementing them with its retailers (Chen et al. 
2008).  
 
1.4.4. Reasons for Experimental Deviations from Theory Predictions  
There is usually a disconnection between theoretical models’ prediction and real-life 
observations. The main reasons for this disconnection are lack of awareness of decision- 
makers, lack of applicability of tools, and lack of information. However, the common 
factor in this difference is human behavior. For example, Katok and Wu (2009) show 
that the contracts, which are analytically proved to coordinate a supply chain, such as 
the buyback and revenue sharing contract, may not experimentally result in 
coordination due to certain behavioral factors affecting the subjects’ decision-making. 
In real life, such behavioral factors as lack of trust between supply chain partners, 
incentive misalignment and risk aversion prohibit operational success (Bendoly et al. 
2006). Table 1.2 presents classification of behavioral issues related to operating systems 
and processes. In this perspective, acquisition of information, processing of information, 
interpretation of outcome and receiving feedback are four activities to be distinguished. 
 
Table 1.2. Classification of Behavioral Issues Related to Operating Systems and 
Processes (Gino and Pisano 2008) 
 
Activity Area Behavioral Issue 
Acquisition of information 
information avoidance, confirmation bias, 
availability heuristic, salient information, illusory 
correlation and procrastination 
Processing of information 
anchoring and insufficient adjustment, 
representativeness heuristic, law of small numbers, 
sunk cost fallacy, planning fallacy, inconsistency, 
conservatism, and overconfidence 
Interpretation of outcome wishful thinking and illusion of control 
Receiving feedback 
fundamental attribution error, hindsight bias, and 
misperception of feedback 
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Table 1.3 provides examples of behavioral issues that cause experimental 
deviations from theory predictions, as stated in literature. 
 
Table 1.3. Behavioral Issues Causing the Actual Decisions to Deviate from Theory 
Predictions 
 
Behavioral Issue  Explanation Stated By 
perception of gain 
and 
loss factors 
such as risk perception (averse, 
seeking, neutral), risk reflection 
(being risk-averse in gains but risk-
seeking in losses) and framing 
Amaldoss et al. 2008, 
Bendoly et al. 2010 
controlling 
bargaining power 
tendency of exerting influence over 
other channel member 
Pavlov and Katok 2009 
social preferences 
related to instinctive 
concerns 
about the other chain member’s 
welfare, existence of a positive 
relationship between channel 
members and instinctive wishes of 
having more profit than the other 
channel member 
Loch and Wu 2008 
inappropriate goals 
tendency of exerting influence over 
other channel member 
Croson and Donohue 2002,  
Su 2008, 
Bendoly et al. 2010, 
Katok and Wu 2009 
no perfect rationality 
having limited ability to solve 
complex problems 
Croson and Donohue 2002,  
Su 2008, 
Bendoly et al. 2010, 
Katok and Wu 2009 
unexpected feedback 
loops or unexpected 
dynamics 
getting/providing unnecessary 
feedbacks 
Bendoly et al. 2010 
automated response 
(1), and lack of 
cognitive effort (2) 
responding automatically (1), and 
not performing cognitive effort while 
decision-making (2) 
Croson and Gächter 2010 
regency forgetting past events Bostian et al. 2008 
reinforcement 
focusing more on the payoff 
achieved from the actual decisions 
less on the counterfactual payoffs 
that could be achieved from other 
decisions 
Bostian et al. 2008 
overconfidence 
tendency of overestimating the 
accuracy of estimates 
Bendoly et al. 2010,  
Croson et al. 2008,  
Gino and Pisano 2008 
law of small numbers 
considering small samples as 
representative of the populations 
from which they are drawn 
Bolton and Katok 2008,  
Gino and Pisano 2008 
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In addition to above stated behavioral issues, researchers found more specific 
behavioral biases in OM-specific contexts. For example, a bias that is observed in the 
“beer game” (refer to Section 2.3. for more information) when analyzing the “bullwhip 
effect” is “underweighting the supply line” in ordering decisions (Barlas and Özevin 
2004, Croson and Donohue 2005). This bias refers to the participant’s tendency to order 
more than necessary in a given period due to underestimating the goods in the supply 
line (i.e., goods ordered, but not received yet). Another such bias observed in the beer 
game is the “pull to center effect” which refers to the average order quantities to being 
too low when they should be high and too high when they should be low (Bostian et al. 
2008). This effect is caused by (1) ex-post inventory error bias: aiming to decrease ex-
post inventory error, and (2) anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias: anchoring 
around a price-quantity combination from previous decisions or average demand, and 
making insufficient adjustments on it (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Keser and 
Paleologo 2004, Barlas and Özevin 2004, Bolton et al. 2008, Bolton and Katok 2008). 
Some examples of biases observed in different areas of operations management are 
stated below in Table 1.4 (Gino and Pisano 2008).  
 
Table 1.4. Examples of Biases Observed in Different Areas of Operations 
Management  
 
Behavioral Bias Explanation Operations Management Area 
anchoring and 
insufficient 
adjustment bias 
taking a reference point and 
making adjustments around it 
product development, project 
management, inventory 
management, forecasting, supply 
chain negotiation, resource 
allocation 
overconfidence 
bias 
tendency of overestimating 
the accuracy of estimates 
inventory management, project 
management and development, 
service operations, employee 
learning 
confirmation bias 
individuals’ tendency of 
searching information 
selectively 
product development, supply 
chain management, forecasting 
 
 
These findings lead researchers to change their assumptions and include human 
behavior in their models to better predict the results and optimum strategies. Some 
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proposed strategies to overcome human bias factors in decision-making are as follows. 
Bolton et al. (2008) provide demand distribution and expected profit information to the 
decision-makers during a behavioral experiment to make them order the optimal 
quantity. Katok and Wu (2009) express the importance of using decision support tools 
to increase total system profitability and to decrease waste by eliminating human bias 
factors in decision-making. In a newsvendor setting, Bolton and Katok (2008) define 
some institutional factors that may lead decision-makers to order the optimal stocking 
quantity as: (1) Using technology tools such as ERP to avoid unnecessary responses to 
short-term information; (2) Increasing employee experience via training programs; and 
(3) Limiting the possible order quantities.  
Employee motivation and performance improvement is another area in which the 
identification of human decision biases is important. Bendoly et al. (2010) propose three 
strategies to overcome human decision biases related to motivational and performance 
factors:  (1) Setting difficult, specific and measurable goals, which connect the outcome 
directly with the employees’ performance; (2) Tracking and analyzing the differences 
between employees’ goals and performance; (3) Providing interdependence of 
employees. 
 
1.5. Our Study 
The developments in the Internet technology and in third-party logistics have 
encouraged manufacturers to establish a “direct-online channel” and sell directly to end-
consumers. Most manufacturers are now reaching their customers via “dual” sales 
channels composed of an owned direct channel and an independent retail channel. 
While the dual channel strategy has its advantages for the manufacturer, such as 
reaching different consumer types, it also introduces coordination issues between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. This is because the dual channel setting makes the 
manufacturer both a supplier and a competitor to the retailer. Researchers have been 
investigating these issues for some time, focusing mostly on price competition between 
the channels.  
In this thesis, we study a manufacturer’s dual channel strategy in a setting where 
the direct channel is in online structure and the retail channel is in offline structure. The 
channels compete in “service” to consumers, and the service levels in the two channels 
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are characterized dependent on their channel structure. The online direct channel’s 
service level is the delivery lead time to consumers, whereas the offline retail channel’s 
service level is the product availability. The channels cater to a heterogeneous customer 
market, where customers choose between channels according to a detailed consumer 
channel choice process that takes the service levels of the channels into account. 
Developing a dual channel strategy for the manufacturer requires a specification of 
the “contract type” between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under a “wholesale price 
contract”, the manufacturer sells the products to the retailer with a unit wholesale price  and the retailer cannot return unsold products to the manufacturer. Under a “buyback 
contract”, the retailer can return unsold products to the manufacturer for a unit buyback 
price . In general, introducing a buyback price along with a given wholesale price 
reduces the retailer’s cost of overage, and hence, provides incentive for the retailer to 
order more. Literature has shown how a buyback contract can coordinate a simple 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain. However, it is not clear how much advantage the 
buyback contract will provide in a dual channel environment because of the nature of 
the relation between the firms.  
Our work is based on two theoretical studies. Chen et al. (2008) developed the 
three-stage game-theoretical dual channel model that we use. In stage I, the 
manufacturer sets the contract parameters. In stage II, the two firms simultaneously 
determine their operational decisions that define the service levels in the two channels: 
The retailer determines his product availability level and the manufacturer determines 
the delivery lead time in the direct channel. In stage III, stochastic consumer demand is 
realized and consumers prefer from which channel to buy. 
Gökduman and Kaya (2009) extended the wholesale price contract model of Chen 
et al. (2008) to a buyback contract model. Gökduman and Kaya (2009) compare the 
performances of the two contracts and show, for example, that the buyback contract 
model (BCM) can outperform the wholesale price contract model (WPM) in terms of 
total supply chain profits.  
In order to understand if these models provide reasonable predictions when human 
decision-makers are involved, one can use behavioral experiments with human subjects 
in the roles of the manufacturer and the retailer. The main reason of conducting 
behavioral experiments is to capture the effects of behavioral factors, which are not 
covered by the theoretical models. For instance, the theoretical models assume that the 
decision-makers have perfect knowledge of the best response functions, and make their 
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operational decisions with respect to the Nash equilibrium concept. However, it is 
known that the assumptions of game theory and economic decision-making models do 
not hold when human beings make decisions in relevant real-world settings 
(Kahnemand and Tversky 1979). It would be important to know the effects of such 
“behavioral deviations” from theoretical predictions if we want theory to offer value to 
practice.  
By conducting two preliminary behavioral experiments that focus only on some 
part of the model, Chen et al. (2008) showed that the wholesale price contract model 
can be used to predict the characteristics of the observed results and the changes in the 
results. However, they also detected significant dispersion in the observed data and 
deviation of the results from the theoretical predictions.  
This thesis contributes to this stream of research by presenting a detailed 
experimental study of the two aforementioned dual channel models (WPCM and BCM).  
The wholesale price contract experiments were conducted previously in HP 
Laboratories, USA. We prepared and conducted the buyback contract experiments in 
Sabancı University, Turkey. We coded the buyback version of the experimental code, 
using special-purpose software called MUMS. We conducted 6 experimental sessions at 
the CAFE (Center for Applied Finance Education) computer lab of Sabancı University. 
Human subjects are selected from Sabancı University Fall 2010/2011 MS 454 students 
who have the basic knowledge on supply chain management and contracts.  
Our main research questions include (1) How successful are the theoretical models 
(wholesale price contract and buyback contract models) in predicting the outcome of the 
game between the manufacturer and the retailer? Related to this question, (2) Is the 
Nash equilibrium a good predictor of the outcome of the operational decisions game at 
stage II? (3) Can the manufacturer anticipate the outcome of the operational decisions 
game and set contract parameters accordingly at stage I? (4) Are the subjects learning to 
make better decisions over time? (5) How is the experimental performance of the 
buyback contract model relative to the wholesale price contract model? (6) What factors 
might be affecting a participant’s ordering decision? 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we summarize the 
related literature. In Chapter 3, we describe the game-theoretic dual channel model 
under the wholesale price contract (WPCM) and buyback contract (BCM), and 
summarize the theoretical results. In Chapter 4, we analyze the wholesale price contract 
experiments (WPCE). In Chapter 5, we analyze the buyback contract experiments 
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(BCE). In Chapter 6, we compare the experimental results related to the two contracts. 
In Chapter 7, we analyze the factors that affect the behavior of subjects. In Chapter 8, 
we discuss our main results, conclude and mention future research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
In this chapter, we review the related literature in three parts. First, the literature on 
supply chain coordination will be reviewed. In this part, available coordination 
mechanisms will be discussed. Second, the literature on dual channel supply chains will 
be examined. In this part, competition and coordination issues between the 
manufacturer-owned direct channel and independent retailer channel are discussed. 
Third, the literature on behavioral experiments on operations management and supply 
chain management will be reviewed.  
 
2.1. Supply Chain Coordination  
We begin our supply chain coordination discussion by introducing the “newsvendor 
problem”, which is a fundamental inventory management problem under uncertain 
demand. The newsvendor problem considers a short life-cycle product with a single 
selling season, facing random demand. The random demand 
 for the product has a 
cumulative distribution function .  and density function . . The decision-maker 
needs to determine how many products to buy (his order quantity ) prior to the selling 
season. He pays a wholesale price  per unit he buys and gains  per sale to his 
consumers. He does not have a chance of a second order during the season, and unsold 
products are salvaged at a unit price of .  
Not having the product when a consumer demands costs the decision-maker 	 =  − . This cost is called the cost of underage. Having an unsold product at the 
end of the selling season costs the decision-maker 	 =  − . This cost is called the 
cost of overage. The optimal number of products to order depends on the costs of 
underage and overage, and on the distribution of the random demand. 
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The cost of underage is equal to the marginal benefit of having one more unit of 
inventory in stock when demanded. The cost of overage is equal to the marginal cost of 
having one more unit of inventory in stock when not demanded. The random demand 
 
will be less than or equal to  with a probability of  and more than  with a 
probability of 1 − . Thus, the expected marginal benefit of stocking one more unit 
is 	1 −  and the expected marginal cost of stocking one more unit is 	. 
The optimal order quantity needs to strike a balance between the marginal benefit and 
the marginal cost of having an extra unit. That is, we have 	1 −  =  	). 
Hence, the decision-maker’s optimum order quantity  should satisfy:  
  =   , 
 
where 	 	 +  	 =   −   − ⁄⁄  is referred to as the “critical fractile”. Let  
represent the optimal order quantity that satisfies the above condition. This quantity is 
found by  
 =   ! " −  −  # 
 
where  ! is the inverse cumulative distribution function of demand 
. See Kaya and 
Özer (2008) for more details on the newsvendor problem. 
The standard newsvendor problem explained above is concerned with only one 
decision-maker that can be referred to as the “retailer” because he purchases products to 
satisfy random consumer demand. A more complicated picture arises if one also 
considers the “manufacturer” who supplies the retailer with products. Assume that the 
manufacturer produces to order, that is, he produces after receiving the retailer’s order. 
Let the unit production cost at the manufacturer be “	”. The retailer and the 
manufacturer together are referred to as the “supply chain”.   
One can show that the retailer’s optimal order quantity  given above is not the 
optimal one for the supply chain as a whole. That is, while maximizing the retailer’s 
expected profit, this order quantity does not maximize the supply chain’s expected 
profit. The quantity that maximizes the supply chain’s expected profit would be 
 
$ =   ! " − 	 − #. 
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The retailer does not optimally order this quantity, because his costs of underage 
and overage are different from the supply chain’s. This problem, known as the “double 
marginalization’ problem in literature, leads to channel (or, supply chain) inefficiency. 
Sprengler (1950) first introduced double marginalization concept to literature. Double 
marginalization can be defined as the distortion of a supply chain member’s relative 
cost structure due to the introduction of a transfer price into a channel (Donohue  2000). 
In the problem we discussed, the wholesale price between the manufacturer and the 
retailer causes double marginalization. If the wholesale price was equal to the unit 
production cost, double marginalization would be eliminated. However, this solution is 
not implementable, as it leaves zero profit to the manufacturer. 
In literature, supply chain coordinating contracts are designed to extract the full 
supply chain system efficiency by aligning the economic incentives of the involved 
firms (Cachon  2003). This provides decreased inventory cost, reduced flow times, and 
a better match between supply and demand (Croson and Donohue 2002). Some of the 
main contract types mentioned in literature that achieve coordination are buyback 
(Pasternack 1985, Donohue 1996, Emmons and Gilbert 1998, Cachon and Lariviere 
2005), revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005), quantity flexibility (Pasternack 
1985, Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002), quantity discount (Jeuland and Shugan 
1983, Weng 1995, Chen et al. 2001), and two-part tariff (Tirole 1988) contracts.  
Coordination can also be viewed as finding a way to properly share demand risks. 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) propose buyback and revenue sharing contracts, which 
work in such a mechanism. These two contracts are efficient on risk sharing by dividing 
the supply chain revenue in desired portions to the two parties for any realization of 
demand. In a buyback contract, the manufacturer buys back unsold products from the 
retailer by paying more than the salvage value. Thus, the manufacturer shares the 
retailer’s excess stock risk. This contract is studied first by Pasternack (1985) under the 
name “providing partial credit for all returns”. Donohue (2000) study the buyback 
contract in an environment where the manufacturer runs two modes of production with 
different wholesale prices, and the retailer has an option of updating his demand 
forecast. Emmons et al. (1998) study the use of buyback contract in a setting where the 
retailer’s demand is price-dependent. In the revenue sharing contract, the manufacturer 
reduces the wholesale price to make the retailer order more products, and as a return 
obtains a portion of the retailer’s sales revenue.  
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Quantity flexibility contract is another mechanism to coordinate channels (Tsay 
1999). According to this contract, first, the manufacturer and the retailer agree on an 
initial order quantity. The retailer commits to buy at least some percentage of this initial 
order quantity while the manufacturer commits to deliver up to some percentage above 
this quantity. Using this contract, the cost of market demand uncertainty can be divided 
between the manufacturer and the retailer, so that the supply chain optimal outcome can 
be achieved (Tsay 1999). In a related study, Pasternack (1985) shows that proving full 
credit for a partial return of goods achieves channel coordination, but the retailer 
demand distribution determines the optimal return percentage. Hence, the strategy is not 
useful in a multi-retailer environment, because retailers have different demand 
distributions. 
In a sales rebate contract, the manufacturer pays the retailer for products sold to 
consumers. Taylor (2002) discusses two types of channel rebate contracts: In a linear 
channel rebate, the manufacturer pays the rebate to the retailer for each sold unit. In a 
target channel rebate, the rebate is paid for each unit sold above a target level. Taylor 
(2002) shows that the target-rebate contract can coordinate the channel.  
In a quantity discount contract, the unit wholesale price that is paid by the retailer to 
the manufacturer is a decreasing function of the retailer’s order quantity. Jeuland and 
Shugan (1983) show that quantity discounts can coordinate the supply chain. Weng 
(1995) studies the quantity discount contract in a basic form. Chen et al. (2001) extend 
his work by considering multiple retailers and general cost structures.  
The two-part contract (also known as a two-part tariff) has two terms: A wholesale 
price and a lump-sum side payment from the retailer to the manufacturer. We refer the 
readers to Tirole (1988) for more details about this contract.  
The literature discusses many other contract types that can coordinate a 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain such as the penalty contract, consignment contract, 
and options contract. For a comprehensive review of the literature, we direct the readers 
to Cachon (2003), and Kaya and Özer (2008).  
 
2.2. Dual Channel Distribution Systems 
Here we review the literature on dual channel distribution systems composed of a 
manufacturer-owned direct channel and an independent retailer channel. In this setting, 
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the manufacturer is both a supplier and a competitor of the retailer. As a result, there 
exists both vertical and horizontal competition. Vertical competition exists between the 
manufacturer and the retailer while horizontal competition exists between the direct 
channel and the retail channel.  
Channel competition and coordination issues in a dual channel setting with a 
manufacturer (upstream member) being a competitor and supplier of a retailer 
(downstream member) have recently been studied by many researchers. Within the dual 
channel management literature, a number of researchers investigate the causes of and 
the ways to avoid channel conflict. These researchers include Keck et al. (1998), Allen 
et al. (2000), Carlton and Chevalier (2001), Driver and Evans (2004), and Tsay and 
Agrawal (2004). Below we discuss some important findings of this literature.  
A number of researchers study the competition of a manufacturer and a retailer in a 
dual channel setting. Kumar and Ruan (2006) analyze competing manufacturers and 
retailers in the same product category. They investigate the reasons of variation in the 
optimal channel preference of manufacturers according to product, firm and market 
characteristics. They found that the manufacturer’s decision of introducing an online 
channel depends on the retailer’s strategy in the absence of the online channel. The 
manufacturer’s decision of the wholesale price changes the retailer’s sales effort, which 
depends on the relative attractiveness of the manufacturer’s product to the retailer in 
comparison to other manufacturers’ products. Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) investigate the 
variation in optimal channel preference of manufacturers related to product 
characteristics and consumer preferences. Ryan et al. (2008) study a dual channel 
setting of direct-online and retail channels under price competition for the first time, and 
assess the effects of price competition to the profits of each member.  
Boyacı (2005) and Chiang (2010) study vertical and horizontal inventory 
competition between dual channel members when there is stock-out-based substitution. 
Geng and Mallik (2007) study inventory competition and allocation strategies with 
undercut options in a dual channel setting. Chen et al. (2008) is the first paper in 
availability-based service competition integrated with a consumer channel choice model 
in dual channel settings. Similar to Boyacı (2005), Chiang and Monahan (2005), 
Dumrongsiri et al. (2008) and Chiang (2010), Chen et al. (2008) assume that the total 
demand is stochastic. Viswanathan (2005) study the effects of different channel 
flexibilities (i.e., firms being independent of each other), network externalities and 
switching costs on competition between online, offline and dual channel firms. 
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Bernstein et al. (2009) analyze the effects of free riding and rival products on a direct 
channel. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) investigate the effect of dual channel distribution 
strategy on the retailer’s cost for a value-adding retailer under information asymmetry.   
Some researchers consider retailer-oriented models. Alptekinoglu and Tang (2005) 
study the retailer’s direct-online channel strategy in terms of distribution methodology. 
Guo and Liu (2008) analyze a retailer’s optimal store opening decision, where the 
manufacturer’s direct channel entry is a potential threat for the retailer’s business. 
Competing retailers are studied by King et al. (2004), Hendershott and Zheng (2006) 
and Zhang (2009). Zhang (2009) study the retailer’s dual channel and price 
advertisement strategies. The author finds that advertising offline prices in the online 
channel coordinates the channels. King et al. (2004) study pricing policy and channel 
strategies in an infinitely repeated two-stage strategic gaming model with multiple 
retailers. In each period of the game, first, the retailers decide on their sales channel 
strategies, and later consumers make their channel preferences. Hendershott and Zheng 
(2006) analyze an environment of a direct-selling manufacturer with multiple retailers 
that compete in price. They assume that consumers’ channel values are heterogeneously 
distributed. The authors find that the manufacturer’s opening a direct channel combined 
with competition and price discrimination between retailers result in lowered retail 
prices. As a result, consumers’ welfare, manufacturer’s profit and overall welfare of the 
system are increased.  
Coordination of multiple distribution systems is also discussed in the literature. A 
Forrester report states that retailers understand their mission of serving customers 
together with manufacturers to overcome channel conflict (Allen et al. 2000). 
Coordination issues may depend on the product properties or system structure. For 
instance, Ryan et al. (2008) demonstrate that dual channel systems of highly price-
sensitive products, which do not seem to replace each other, are more crucial cases to be 
coordinated. In other words, the requirement to increase system performance by 
coordination increases when consumers are more sensitive to direct channel price. 
However, when consumers’ sensitivity to competitor price increases, the total system 
profit increases due to the substitution of two channels, and hence, there is less need for 
coordination. Some dual channel coordination mechanisms studied in literature are 
optimal pricing policies (Tsay and Agrawal 2004, Cattani et al. 2006, Kurata et al. 2007, 
Cai et al. 2009), revenue sharing (Ryan et al. 2008, Ganfu et al. 2009, Chiang 2010, 
Geng and Mallik 2007), improving retail services (Yan and Pei 2009), value added 
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channels  (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2008), profit sharing (Yan 2008), vendor managed 
inventory (Bernstein et al. 2006), penalty contract and two-part compensation 
commission contract (Boyacı 2005). Next, we discuss these mechanisms in more detail.  
The increasing trend to use dual sales channels leads manufacturers and retailers to 
cooperate on some profit sharing strategies to improve channel coordination and total 
supply chain performance. There are many examples of coordinating dual channel 
distribution systems using adequate pricing schemes. Cai et al. (2009) study price 
discount contracts and pricing schemes to achieve coordination, and show how a 
consistent pricing scheme may avoid channel conflict by providing more profit to the 
retailer or to the manufacturer. According to the study, price discount contracts result 
better than non-contract scenarios with manufacturer-Stackelberg, retailer-Stackelberg 
and the Nash game theoretic models. Kurata et al. (2007) study mixture of markup and 
markdown prices to coordinate the supply chain. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) show that 
revising the wholesale price can increase the total performance of the dual channel 
system when the reduction in wholesale price affects the retailer’s sales performance. 
Since the sales effort measurement is not easy to handle, using some other strategies 
such as “referral to direct” and “referral to retailer” are suggested. These strategies 
consist of using a dual channel strategy, but directing customers from one channel to 
another for the purchase. Cattani et al. (2006) suggest a specific equal pricing strategy 
for manufacturer’s direct channel and retail channel prices, which provides most profit 
for manufacturers and advantages for retailers and customers. However, this strategy 
can achieve its targets only when direct channel is less convenient than retail channel.  
Revenue sharing is another common strategy to coordinate dual channel systems. 
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) show that a revenue sharing contract can coordinate a 
supply chain with one manufacturer and one or many retailers. Since the strategy 
requires sharing revenue and cost information, it may be difficult to implement in 
practice. Chiang (2010) also propose a contract called “inventory and direct revenue 
sharing” where supply chain members agree to share the inventory holding cost of the 
total supply chain. The manufacturer also agrees to share some portion of the direct 
sales revenue with the retailer. However, this contract poses difficulties in tracking 
inventory and point of sale data. When demands are price dependent, coordination 
might be more difficult, since both price and inventory decisions should be coordinated 
in each channel. Ryan et al. (2008) study two different coordination contracts between a 
manufacturer and a retailer that compete on demand-determining price. These are the 
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minimum price constrained revenue sharing and gain/loss sharing contracts. The author 
suggests using dual channels with price and product discrimination for coordination. 
Ganfu et al. (2009) illustrate the coordination mechanism of a direct channel revenue 
sharing contract under free riding and price competition. Geng and Mallik (2007) 
propose a reverse revenue sharing contract, which achieves coordination with a fixed 
franchise fee and penalty.  
Adding value to a channel, and differentiating or improving services can help in 
coordinating dual channel systems. Yan and Pei (2009) investigate the strategic role of 
the retailer in a dual channel environment where channel members strategically 
cooperate to increase total system profit and coordination. They show that improved 
retail services manage to coordinate the dual channel supply chain, improve each supply 
chain member’s performance, and protect retailers from being eliminated from the 
market due to increased competition between channels. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) 
propose a value-adding system in which a manufacturer sells the basic form of a 
product through its online channel and allows the retailer to add value to the product to 
differentiate it from its basic version. Such a system would be highly applicable to hi-
tech industries such as computer or electronics industries. Although there is an increase 
in total system profit with the value adding system, the total profit is not equal to the 
one achieved in the integrated system case.  
Video rental and franchising industries (fast foods, hotels and motels etc.) have 
been using profit sharing to coordinate channels for a long time. Yan (2008) analyzes 
the strategic role of members under profit sharing in a dual channel supply chain. He 
uses a Nash bargaining model and measures the effect of Bertrand and Stackelberg 
models to total supply chain profit. Comparing the profits of each supply chain member 
in the retailer-only system with the profits in a dual channel system, he observes that 
both the retailer and the manufacturer benefit, and obtain more profit in comparison to 
the non-profit sharing system.  
Other coordination mechanisms of dual channel systems are as follows. Bernstein 
et al. (2006) propose a vendor managed inventory model (VMI) to coordinate the two-
echelon supply chains with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. Boyacı (2005) 
propose a penalty contract, which consists of a wholesale price and a unit penalty price 
paid by retailer to manufacturer for each unmet consumer demand. However, this 
contract is hard to implement due to the requirements of tracking and auditing the lost 
sales in retail channel. Thus, Boyacı (2005) propose an alternative coordination 
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mechanism called a two-part compensation commission contract. In this contract, the 
retailer continues to determine how much to order from the manufacturer, whereas the 
manufacturer obtains all sales revenue of the retailer. In return, the manufacturer pays 
the retailer a sales commission for each extra sales unit above a threshold value. The 
manufacturer compensates the retailer for each unit of inventory when retailer sales are 
below the target. Boyacı (2005) shows that the optimal supply chain profits can be 
obtained by choosing the target levels as required.  
 
2.3. Behavioral  Experiments 
The effects of human behavior in operations management field has recently been a 
popular subject among researchers. Bendoly et al. (2006) review operations 
management literature between years 1985 and 2005 in terms of behavioral issues, and 
categorize the existing papers in three behavioral sections, which are intentions, actions 
and reactions. Majority of operations management papers discussing behavioral issues 
are on inventory management and production management. Product development, 
quality management, procurement and strategic sourcing, and supply chain management 
are other popular areas. Gino and Pisano (2008) study the theoretical and practical 
results of behavioral and cognitive factor effects on operations management, which is 
build on the earlier work of Bendoly et al. (2006). A deep understanding of human 
behavior and cognition in production, efficiency and flexibility are mentioned as future 
research studies. 
The Operations Management (OM) literature has produced a significant number of 
theoretical models regarding supply chain management. However, the validity of these 
models is generally not tested with experimental studies. Hence, there is a gap in 
literature on testing supply chain decision-making models. In fact, experiments are very 
suitable for analyzing the behavior in supply chains. This is mainly due to experiments’ 
capability of measuring the scope of behavioral factors causing empirical regularities, 
understanding the relative strength of multiple causes for any supply chain issue, testing 
economics theory and operations theory, and measuring the effect of operational factors 
under the existence of behavioral factors (Croson and Donohue 2002). Existing 
experimental studies in supply chain management mainly focus on the newsvendor 
problem, coordination contracts, and the bullwhip effect.  
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Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) make the first laboratory study on the newsvendor 
problem by analyzing high and low safety stock conditions. They find that the order 
decisions deviate from optimal order quantities, and that receiving feedback and having 
experience do not have a significant impact on reaching the optimal order quantities. 
The authors have two explanations for these. First, subjects make their decisions as if 
they aim to decrease their ex-post inventory error (the absolute difference between 
current inventory decision and realized demand). Second, subjects have a bias of 
anchoring and insufficient adjustment. Contrary to Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), 
Bolton and Katok (2008) find that experience and feedback have significant 
contribution on the inventory decisions to reach the optimal by eliminating anchoring 
and insufficient adjustment bias. They show that the stock levels can be influenced to 
reach the optimal by institutional organization of experience and feedback. Bostian et 
al. (2008) analyze the “pull to center effect” in a newsvendor model by a laboratory 
experiment, and build an adaptive learning model for explaining individual decisions. 
They assess learning behavior by changing the frequency of information feedback and 
order decisions. Subjects in low decision frequency treatments have not improved their 
decisions round by round in comparison to the subjects in high decision frequency 
treatments. 
Bolton et al. (2008) study the role of managerial experience in the newsvendor 
problem for the first time. They find that manager subjects use only historical demand 
data as their work experience to optimize decision-making, and they are not successful 
in using analytical information. However, student subjects utilize analytical information 
and task training better than manager subjects utilize, and improve their decisions 
towards the optimal inventory decision. Barlas and Özevin (2004) analyze effects of 
some experimental factors on the performance of subjects and the correctness of 
decision rules in stock management models. They cannot find an inventory model that 
completely explains the subjects’ behavior. Corbett and Fransoo (2007) empirically 
analyze the decision-makers’ risk profile effect on the newsvendor model. Finally, 
Croson et al. (2008) propose a behavioral model of overconfident newsvendors, which 
fits well to the observed suboptimal order behavior of decision-makers. The authors also 
design an incentive contract by price and salvage value adjustments that will lead the 
overconfident newsvendors make optimal orders.  
A number of researchers conduct experimental studies in supply chain contracting. 
Katok and Wu (2009) study the behavioral aspects of the wholesale price, buyback and 
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revenue sharing contracts between a manufacturer and a retailer. Their study is the first 
laboratory investigation on the performance of these contracts. Keser and Paleologo 
(2004) investigate a simple manufacturer-retailer relationship under a wholesale price 
contract experimentally. They find that the wholesale prices and order quantities are 
lower than predicted, but the efficiency of the supply chain is as predicted by the 
theoretical models. Ho and Zhang (2008) investigate two-part tariff and quantity 
discount contracts experimentally, and show that these contracts fail to coordinate 
supply chains due to the loss aversion effect. However, Su (2008) show that for a 
newsvendor model, a two-part tariff contract can be used to coordinate the supply chain 
when the decision-maker is bounded rational. When the decision-maker is unbounded 
rational, the supply chain can be coordinated by aligning individual incentives with 
social objectives via contractual transfers. Deviation of retailer orders from theory 
predictions is a very common problem. For solving this problem, Becker-Peth et al. 
(2009) provide a response function for modeling the relationship between the supply 
contract parameters and orders to optimize supply contracts. They assume that retailers 
are irrational but predictable. They replace the newsvendor model with a new one, 
which predicts orders placed more accurately. Using this model, the buyback contract is 
revised to better coordinate the supply chain. 
Croson and Donohue (2002 and 2003), and Steckel et al. (2004) are among the 
researchers that study the “bullwhip effect” which is one of the reasons for coordination 
problems in supply chains. The bullwhip effect is first detected by Procter and Gamble 
in 1990s. The rate of birth in the United States was stable and the usage of diapers was 
in a steady rate; however, Procter and Gamble observed the oscillations of orders from 
distributors to its factories and from Procter and Gamble to its suppliers. Interestingly, 
variation of orders and inventory levels was increasing from downstream to upstream in 
the supply chain. The bullwhip effect denotes the increased oscillation of orders at each 
level and amplification of these oscillations as one goes to the upstream in the supply 
chain. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The bullwhip effect is mostly 
caused by lack of communication between supply chain members, and it may result 
with overage and shortage of inventory, fluctuations in the batching of orders and 
shipments, reduced profit margins, and increased promotions and discounts which 
change the shopping behavior of consumers (Sheffi 2007).  
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Figure 2.1. The Bullwhip Effect 
 
 
Researchers study the bullwhip effect with a role-playing simulation developed at 
MIT in the 1960s called “the beer game”. This game simulates a four-stage simple, 
linear supply chain, where players make ordering decisions based on their current 
inventory levels and customer orders. Four members of the supply chain in beer game 
are the manufacturer, the distributor, the wholesaler and the retailer. All members aim 
to maximize profit by avoiding out-of-stock situations and minimizing the excess 
stocks. The ordering and shipping delays between the stages make it difficult to match 
supply and demand for the decision-makers. Croson and Donohue (2002) study the 
behavioral aspects regarding the learning effect and communication in the beer game, 
which affect the inventory decisions. Croson and Donohue (2003) analyze the impact of 
point of sale (POS) data sharing between channel members in a beer game. They make 
a simulation experiment where the demand distribution is unknown. They observe that 
sharing POS data has some impact on reducing the bullwhip effect, specifically the 
order oscillations of upstream members. Steckel et al. (2004) study the effect of changes 
in order and delivery cycles, availability of POS information, and customer demand 
pattern on supply chain efficiency via a simulation experiment similar to the study of 
Croson and Donohue (2003). Short cycle time is found to be effective; however, sharing 
POS information is effective when demand is found to be S-shaped.  
Most supply chain coordinating contracts focus on self interested and rational 
channel members while not taking into account social issues such as reciprocity, status 
seeking and group identity (Loch and Wu 2008). However, recent studies show that 
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supply chain members consider social issues besides economic concerns while making 
decisions. Thus, social preferences may play a role in motivating individual subjects. As 
a result, social issues such as fairness, status seeking, other party’s welfare and 
reciprocity have been entered into the supply chain management literature by 
researchers in developing contracting mechanisms. Some applications are as follows. 
Pavlov and Katok (2009) consider fairness and bounded rationality issues in the 
subjects’ preferences while designing a supply chain coordination mechanism for a 
manufacturer-retailer system. When the manufacturer has full information on fully 
rational retailer’s preference for fairness, the manufacturer can coordinate the channel 
by offering the retailer the minimum conditions required for the retailer to accept. 
Otherwise, when the retailer’s preference for fairness is its private information and the 
retailer is bounded rational, the manufacturer cannot coordinate the supply chain. Loch 
and Wu (2008) study the effect of social preferences on economic decision-making in 
supply chain transactions. Subjects are assumed to have good relationship, and in a 
status-seeking condition at the beginning. Systematical deviation of subjects from the 
profit maximizing decision is found to be related to the conditional changes where a 
positive relationship promotes mutually profitable decisions of both parties, while, 
status seeking increases the competitive behavior of both subjects, and reduces the 
system efficiency and performance of subjects.  
As we mentioned before, statistical tests are used to test hypotheses in behavioral 
experiments. Below in Table 2.1, some inferential statistical tests used by researchers to 
test hypotheses in experimental studies are summarized.  
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Table 2.1. Statistical Tests Used by Researchers to Test Experimental Studies 
 
Statistical Hypothesis Test Used by 
1- Parametric tests 
t test 
Schweitzer and Cachon 2000,                  
Barlas and Özevin 2004, Schultz et al. 2007, 
Bolton and Katok 2008, Katok and Wu 2009 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
Wilks’ lambda test Loch and Wu 2008 
Hotelling’s two group t-square test Loch and Wu 2008 
2- Non-parametric Tests 
a- One-sample tests 
Non-parametric sign test Croson and Donohue 2003 
One-sample Wilcoxon test Katok and Wu 2009, Bolton et al. 2008 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test or  
Wilcoxon matched pairs test 
Keser and Paleologo 2004,                      
Kremer et al. 2007, Pavlov and Katok 2009,  
Becker-Peth et al. 2009 
Chi-square goodness of fit test Bolton and Katok 2008 
Likelihood ratio Test Su 2008 
b- Two-sample tests 
Two-sample Wilcoxon test Kremer et al. 2007 
Mann-Whitney U test or 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Croson and Donohue 2003,                    
Bostian et al. 2008, Bolton and Katok 2008, 
Loch and Wu 2008, Pavlov and Katok 2009, 
Katok and Wu 2009 
Spearman test Bostian et al. 2008 
Multiple median test Schweitzer and Cachon 2000 
 
 
In addition to hypothesis testing, researchers also employ other statistical 
methodologies. For example, regression analysis is used to predict one variable (the 
dependent variable) by defining its relation with two or more other (independent) 
variables using an equation (Croson and Donohue 2003, Corbett and Fransoo 2007, 
Loch and Wu 2008, Bolton et al. 2008, Pavlov and Katok 2009, Becker-Peth et al. 
2009). Correlation analysis is another methodology used to evaluate the association 
between two data sets (Keser and Paleologo 2004, Corbett and Fransoo 2007). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CHAPTER 3 : THE MODEL A"D THEORETICAL RESULTS 
 
In this chapter, we first explain our theoretical models (i.e., wholesale price and 
buyback contract models), and then provide our theoretical results achieved by solving 
the models in Mathematica for different parameter settings.  
 
3.1. The Dual Channel Model 
Our behavioral experiments are based on the analytical models of Chen et al. (2008), 
and Gökduman and Kaya (2009). We provide these analytical models in this chapter. 
These researchers construct a dual sales channel model that considers a manufacturer 
who sells a product through his direct online channel and an independent retail channel. 
Both the manufacturer and the retailer are risk neutral. The sales price  is determined 
exogenously, and it is the same in both channels. Hence, there is no price competition 
between the channels.  
The models are based on availability-based service competition between the 
manufacturer and the retailer. The manufacturer’s service level is determined by 
delivery lead time % in his direct channel and the retailer’s service level is determined by 
service level α in his retail store. Additionally, consumer channel choice is modeled and 
total demand is assumed to be stochastic. Chen et al. (2008) formulated the model under 
a wholesale price contract, whereas, Gökduman and Kaya (2009) extended the model to 
a buyback contract setting. 
In both models, there are three stages. Stage I is called “contracting” where the 
manufacturer sets the contract parameters (wholesale price  in the wholesale contract 
case, wholesale price  and buyback price  in the buyback contract case) and offers 
the contract to the retailer. The retailer accepts the contract if the contract provides at 
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least his reservation profit level in expectation. The type of the contract that the 
manufacturer offers at stage I is the only difference between two models.  
Stage II is called “operational decisions” where the manufacturer and the retailer 
decide on their own service levels in a simultaneous-move game. The retailer 
determines the service level α, the probability of no stock-out in the sales season. The 
retailer orders the required number of products (his order quantity) & to satisfy this 
service level from the manufacturer. The manufacturer does not have a capacity 
constraint and can satisfy the retailer’s order prior to the selling season. The 
manufacturer determines the delivery lead time %, the time a consumer needs to wait 
between ordering from the online channel and receiving the product. The manufacturer 
incurs a cost of  %'⁄  for setting up the direct channel, where  is the direct channel 
cost parameter.  
Stage III is called “consumers’ channel choice” where consumers make buying 
decisions (to buy or not) and decide on which channel to buy from. Total demand (total 
number of consumers in the market) is denoted by ( which is a uniformly distributed 
random variable between 0 and ). Consumers make their decisions based on a 
consumer channel choice model that we explain in Section 3.2. According to this 
model, consumers consider the delivery lead time % in the direct channel, the service 
level α in the retail channel, the product’s sales price , the product’s value to 
consumers , and the retailer inconvenience cost  in their channel choice decision. The 
inconvenience cost denotes the cost of time and effort spent while visiting the retail 
channel for consumers. Hence, the total demand is realized according to a uniform 
distribution exogenously, and this total demand is shared between the channels based on 
the retailer’s and manufacturer’s decisions endogenously. Below in Figure 3.1, 
sequence of events is illustrated under the wholesale price contract. For ease of 
reference, we summarize the relevant notation in Appendix A.  
Chen et al. (2008) solved the wholesale price contract model using backwards 
induction. First, they defined the expected demand in the direct and the retail channels 
based on the consumer channel choice model at stage III. Second, they showed the Nash 
equilibrium of the operational decisions game by characterizing the manufacturer’s and 
the retailer’s best response functions at stage II. Third, they found the manufacturer’s 
optimal wholesale price contract  by using a grid search at stage I. Gökduman and 
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Kaya (2009) used the same method to determine the manufacturer’s optimal buyback 
contract ,  at stage I. 
 
 
 
  Figure 3.1. The Sequence of Events under the Wholesale Price Contract 
 
3.2. Stage III: Consumers’ Channel Choice 
The consumer channel choice model is based on differentiating the consumers with 
respect to their willingness to wait before receiving the product. Consumers are 
assumed to be heterogeneous, uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and indexed with 
the time-sensitivity index *. A low time-sensitivity index * indicates that the consumer 
is a patient one, who can wait longer for the delivery of the product. The consumers 
who have low time-sensitivity index are more likely to prefer the direct channel.  
A consumer with time-sensitivity index * derives utility +, when buying from the 
direct channel. This utility is affected from the product’s sales price , product’s value  
(where  < ) and the manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision % as follows: 
 +,* =  −  − *%. 
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In this function, *% states the reduction in the utility of the consumer with index *  
due to waiting % time units to receive the product.  
Because the product might not be always available in the retail channel (depending 
on the retailer’s service level α), the utility of a consumer from the retail channel is an 
expected value. This expected utility is affected from product’s sales price , product’s 
value , retailer’s service level α, and retailer’s inconvenience cost  as follows 
 ./+0 =  φα −  − . 
 
The term φα is the retailer’s product availability level, which denotes the 
probability of a consumer finding the product in the retail store. To assure a positive 
utility for consumers (i.e., ./+0 ≥ 0, the retailer’s service level should satisfy the 
minimum service level constraint 
 
α345 ≡ 6 α ∈ /0,107φ α =  89 :;.                                                          (1) 
 
Each consumer makes his channel decision by comparing his utility from the two 
channels. Considering all consumers’ choices, four streams of demand are generated in 
the model as illustrated in Figure 3.1: Retailer’s demand 
, primary demand in the 
direct channel 
,!, secondary demand in the direct channel 
,', and lost demand 
<. 
Direct channel demand is always satisfied within the delivery lead time, whereas retailer 
demand is only satisfied when the retailer has on-hand inventory. Thus, only the retail 
channel incurs the lost demand.   
 
The decision process of the consumer with index * is as follows:  
• When +, ≥ 0, the consumer considers the direct channel as an alternative and two 
cases are possible: 
o When +,≥./+0; the consumer buys directly from the direct channel. These 
consumers constitute the primary demand 
,! in the direct channel. 
o When +, <./+0; the consumer visits the retailer first and buys the product if 
it is available. These consumers constitute part of the retailer demand 
. If 
the product is not available at the retail store, the consumer buys from the 
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direct channel. These consumers constitute the secondary demand 
,' in the 
direct channel.  
• When +, < 0, the consumer does not consider the direct channel, and two cases are 
possible:  
o When +, <./+0 and ./+0 ≥ 0; the consumer visits the retailer first and buys 
the product if available. These consumers constitute rest of the retailer demand 
. If the product is not available at the retail store, the consumer does not buy 
from the direct channel either. These consumers constitute part of the lost 
demand 
< .  
o When both +, < 0 and ./+0 < 0; the consumer does not prefer to buy from 
either channel. These consumers constitute the rest of the lost demand 
<.  
 
The heterogeneity of consumers (represented with their index *) and their decision 
process leads to the segmentation of the consumer population. To determine this 
segmentation, we define two boundary index values:  
• *! denotes the index of the consumer who is indifferent between buying from 
the direct and the retail channel. 
• *' denotes the index of the consumer who is indifferent between buying from 
the direct channel and not buying at all.  
These values are expressed as: 
 *! ≡ min =>* | +,* = ./+0@, 1A 
                 = min =B − 1 − φC +  D/ %, 1A, 
(2) *' ≡ min =>* | +,* = 0@, 1A 
                                               = min > − / %, 1@. 
 
In the most general case, d! and d' divide the consumer population into three 
segments. This is shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2. Consumer Segmentation 
 
 
Consumers with a time-sensitivity index lower than *! buy directly from the direct 
channel because +,* ≥  ./+0. These consumers constitute the first segment.  
Consumers with a time-sensitivity index higher than *! and lower than *' first visit 
the retailer. If the product is available, they buy the product there; otherwise, they buy 
the product from the direct channel. This is because 0 ≤ +,* ≤  ./+0. These 
consumers constitute the second segment.  
Consumers with a time-sensitivity index higher than *' only visit the retail channel. 
If the product is available, they buy it; otherwise, they do not consider buying the 
product from the direct channel. This is because +,* < 0 and ./+0 ≥ 0. These 
consumers constitute the third segment.  
Note that the utility from the retail channel does not depend on the time-sensitivity 
index * of the consumers. If the retail channel provides the minimum service level, it 
becomes operative and all consumers derive positive utility from the retail channel. The 
issue with the retail channel is that it cannot guarantee product availability.  
The following lemma summarizes the demand in each channel depending on the 
manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision %.  
For a given service level α, there are four possible outcomes as shown in Lemma 1. 
When the manufacturer sets a delivery lead time % smaller than the threshold value %G≡  − 1 − φα +  , all consumers buy from the direct channel and the retailer 
becomes inoperative. In this case, there is only one market segment, since *! =1 and 
the manufacturer eliminates the retailer.  
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Lemma 1. Random demand in the direct and retail channel are as follows: 
Delivery lead time range % ≤ %GH % ∈ %G ,  − 0 % ∈  − , ∞ % → ∞ 
Retailer's status Inoperative Operative Operative Operative 
Direct channel coverage Full Full Partial  one 
Retailer demand (
) 0 1 − *! ( 1 − *! ( ( 
Primary demand (
,!) ( *!( *!( J/)H 
Secondary demand (
,') J/) /
K − &0  *' − *!1 − *! /
 − &0 J/) 
Lost demand (
<) J/) 0 1 − *'1 − *! /
 − &0 /
K − &0  † %G≡ v − p1 − φα +   )J* J/): JP% )QR	)QS. 
 
 
When the manufacturer sets a delivery lead time between %G and  − , the 
manufacturer separates the market in two segments. By setting d' to 1, the manufacturer 
ensures that all consumers derive positive utility from buying the product through both 
channels. Thus, there is no lost customer in this case. As the consumer’s time-sensitivity 
index is a uniformly distributed random variable, the primary demand of direct channel 
is equal to  
,! = *!(. The retailer demand is equal to the rest of the total market 
demand which is 
 = 1 − *! (. When the retailer has sufficient inventory to meet 
this demand, (i.e., when, 
  ≤ &), the retailer satisfies all demand in his channel. 
Otherwise, the retailer cannot satisfy /
 − &0 units of his demand and these 
consumers constitute the secondary demand in the direct channel.  
The manufacturer may set a delivery lead time greater than  − . By setting such a 
delivery lead time, the manufacturer segments the market into three, since d' < 1. In 
this case, the manufacturer serves part of the consumers through his direct channel, 
allows the retailer to satisfy some part of the demand through the retail channel and lets 
some consumers leave the system without buying the product from either channel. 
Primary demand of the direct channel and retailer demand are the same as in the 
previous case. In addition, there is lost demand. Among unsatisfied retailer consumers, *' − *! 1 − *!⁄  percent have +,* ≥ 0 and these constitute the secondary 
demand 
,' in the direct channel. The rest have +,* < 0 and they constitute the lost 
demand 
<.  
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Lastly, if the manufacturer sets a very long delivery lead time (i.e., % → ∞), the 
direct channel operation is (almost) shut down and the retail channel becomes the only 
alternative. In this case, there is only one market segment again, since *! = *' = 0.  
Retailer’s availability level also affects the market segmentation. If φα =   − ⁄  and % >  − , there are only two market segments because *! = *'< 1. In 
this case, no consumer visits the direct channel when they cannot find the product in the 
retail channel.  
 
3.3. Stage II: Operational Decisions 
Here we study the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s problems at stage II. As the 
wholesale price contract is a special case of the buyback contract with  = 0, we analyze 
the operational decisions under a buyback contract in a general form. We emphasize the 
changes in the solution under a wholesale price contract when necessary. 
In this section, first the objective functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are 
defined. Then, the best response functions of the retailer and the manufacturer are 
characterized. Finally, the algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium of the operational 
decisions game is explained.    
 
3.3.1. Retailer’s Problem 
Here, the retailer’s best response service level C∗% to the manufacturer’s delivery lead 
time % decision is characterized. We first present the following Lemma that provides the 
retailer’s order quantity, availability level, and expected sales for a given service level.  
 
Lemma 2. For a given service level α,  
(i) The retailer optimally orders &C = )C1 − *!C units of product; 
(ii) The corresponding availability level is φC =  C1 − QJC;  
(iii) The expected sales in the retailer is ./RJ>
 , &@0 = )1 − *!CC − C' 2⁄  =&1 −  C 2⁄ . 
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Note that part (ii) shows the relationship between the retailer’s service level α and 
the corresponding availability level φC. 
Recall that retailer’s optimal order quantity & is a function of his service level 
decision α, which affects the demand 
 at the retail channel through the consumers’ 
channel choice process. If demand at the retail channel is higher than the retailer’s 
stocking level, the retailer ends up with lost sales (i.e., no backordering is possible), 
whereas if demand is less than the stocking level, the retailer ends up with excess 
inventory. This excess inventory can be sold back to the manufacturer under a buyback 
contract but this has a zero salvage value under a wholesale price contract.  
For a given buyback contract , , the retailer’s expected profit as a function of 
the service-level α is given by: 
 ∏ α = ./min>
 , &@0 −  & + & − ./min>
 , &@0.                  (3) 
 
In this equation, ./min>
 , &@0 denotes the expected sales of the retailer and & − ./min>
 , &@0 denotes the expected excess inventory of the retailer at the end of 
the selling season. With a buyback contract, the retailer’s expected profit is increased by & − ./min>
 , &@0 relative to the expected profit with a wholesale price contract, 
because the manufacturer buys the unsold units from the retailer at the end of the selling 
season. 
Substituting &, φC and ./min>
 , &@0 from Lemma 2 to the Equation 3, we have 
 
∏C = )α 1 − *!C  [ −  −  −  \'].                         (4) 
 
Substituting *! from Equation (2), the retailer’s problem becomes  
 
max\ ∏C =  `\a [% −  −  − 1 − C1 − lnC] [ −  −  −  \'],       (5)                  
subject to C ∈ >C , /C345, 10@,  
 
where C345 is defined in Equation (1) and C is defined such that *!C = 1. The 
term C is introduced to prohibit an undefined profit function caused by the term lnC 
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when the retailer does not order anything (i.e., when he provides zero service level). 
Proposition 1 below characterizes the retailer’s best response. 
 
Proposition 1. The retailer’s expected profit function has a unique local maximizer in 
the domain 0, ∞. Let C4% represent this local maximizer which is decreasing in the 
wholesale price . The retailer’s best response is  
 
C∗% =  c  C345,             PK C4% ≤  C345,      C4%,              PK C4% ∈ C345, 1,1,              PK C4% ≥ 1, d         
 
if  ∏C∗  ≥ 0 holds. Otherwise, the retailer sets C∗% =  0. 
 
For a given wholesale price  and buyback price , if the retailer’s expected 
profit is nonnegative, the retailer’s best response is to set his service level C either to the 
minimum service level C345, or to the local maximizer of the retailer’s expected profit 
function C4% or to 1.  
The analysis of the retailer’s problem under a wholesale contract follows parallel 
steps with the analysis explained above with the buyback price  set equal to 0.  
The retailer’s best response service level α decreases in the manufacturer’s 
wholesale price  in the wholesale price contract model. A high wholesale price  may 
force the retailer to offer the minimum service level and a very high wholesale price  
may force the retailer to set C∗ =  C and to order zero units of product.  
In the absence of the direct channel, all consumers visit the retailer as long as he 
provides at least the minimum service level C345. Thus, the retailer does not consider 
the effect of his service level decision on his demand and sets the critical fractile service 
level unless this level is below the minimum service level. Thus, under wholesale price 
contract, the following Corollary exists.  
 
Corollary 1. If the manufacturer shuts down his direct channel by setting % → ∞, then 
the retailer’s best response is to set  lima→∞ C∗ % = max >C345,  −  ⁄ @. 
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3.3.2. Manufacturer’s Problem 
Here, we characterize the manufacturer’s best response delivery lead time %∗C to the 
retailer’s service level C choice. For a given buyback contract , , the manufacturer 
solves the following problem:            
  maxa ∏3% =   − 	& +   − 	./
,! + 
,'0 − & − ./min>
 , &@0 − 3ae.        (6) 
 
In this function, the term  − 	 denotes the unit profit margin of the 
manufacturer for the products that he sells to the retailer. The term  − 	 denotes the 
unit profit margin of the manufacturer for the products that he sells to the consumers 
through the direct channel. The term ./
,! + 
,'0 denotes the total expected direct 
channel demand, which is a sum of the primary and the secondary demand. Because  is 
equal to 0 under wholesale price contract, the term (−& − ./min>
 , &@0 does not 
exist in the function under a wholesale price contract.  
This function shows the manufacturer’s trade-off between the two channels. The 
manufacturer makes a profit of  − 	 for each unit sold in the direct channel and  − 	 for each unit sold in the retail channel. Direct channel offers higher profit 
margin than the retail channel. However, with a wholesale price contract, the 
manufacturer carries no risk of sales in the retail channel because once he sells to the 
retailer; the retailer cannot return unsold products. The manufacturer considers this 
trade-off besides the cost of the direct channel while making channel decision. 
Substituting the expected sales of the retailer ./min>
 , &@0 from Lemma 2 to 
Equation 6, the manufacturer’s expected profit becomes  
 
 maxa ∏3% =  [ − 	 − f\' ] & +  − 	./
,! + 
,'0 − 3ae.               (7) 
 
Lemma 3 characterizes the expected sales in the direct channel and the 
manufacturer’s expected profit function under a buyback contract.  
 
Lemma 3. The expected sales in the direct channel is ./
,! + 
,'0 =  ) 2⁄ BCC −2*'C − *!C + *'C D. The manufacturer’s expected profit is a continuous 
function defined as  
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∏3% =
gh
i
hj∏3G % ≡  
)2  − 	 −  %' ,                                                                                    PK % ≤  %G ,               ∏3`% ≡ ) − 	C + ) − 	1 − C'2 − )C'2 + 1% l\C − %' ,         PK % ∈%G ,  − 0,∏3 % ≡ ) − 	C − )C'2 + 1%  lC −  %' ,                                           PK % >  − ,          
d 
 
where l`C  ≡  )C 2⁄ B − 1 −  C1 − lnC +  D/α +   − 	2 − C − 2 − 	0 and 
lC  ≡  /) − 	1 − C' − 0 2⁄ +  )C 2⁄ B − 1 −  C1 −  lnC + D/α + − 	2 − C − 2 − 	0.  
 
The function above is defined with respect to the three delivery lead time domains 
of Lemma 1 (except the t → ∞ case). When the manufacturer sets % >  − , the direct 
channel cannot cover the whole consumer population R. S. , *' < 1 and there is lost 
demand (“unaggressive case”, denoted with superscript u). When the manufacturer sets % ≤  − , the direct channel covers the whole consumer population R. S. , *' = 1 and 
there is no lost demand (“aggressive case”, denoted with superscript a). The 
manufacturer can increase the market share of the direct channel by decreasing the 
delivery lead time below  − . However, doing so will reduce the market share of the 
retail channel. At the extreme, the manufacturer can set % ≤  %G  and eliminate the 
retailer (the first case in the lemma above). Lemma 4 below characterizes the profit 
functions ∏3`% and ∏3 %. 
 
Lemma 4.  
(i) The function ∏3`% is increasing in % when l`C  ≤ 0. It is unimodal with a 
maximum at %n` =  2 l\C⁄  when l`C  > 0.   
(ii) The function ∏3 % is increasing in % when lC  ≤ 0. It is unimodal with a 
maximum at  %n =  2 lC⁄  when lC  > 0. 
(iii) For C = 1, we have  ∏3 % = ∏3`%.  
(iv) For C < 1, ∏3`% = ∏3 % only for % =  − . We have  ∏3 % > ∏3`%  for % <  − , and  ∏3`% > ∏3 % for % >  − . 
 
Lemmas 3 and 4 are used to characterize the manufacturer’s best response function 
as shown in the following proposition.  
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Proposition 2. Given the wholesale price  and the buyback price , the 
manufacturer’s best response to the retailer’s service level C choice is  
 
%∗C =  
gh
hi
hh
j %G ,                               R l`C > 0 )J* %n` ≤  %G ,                                                                      %n` =  2l`C ,            R l`C > 0 )J* %n`  ∈ %G,  − 0,                                                        − ,                          R lC > 0 )J* %n ≤  −  )J* %n` >  −  PK l`C ≤ 0,   %n = 2lC ,             R lC > 0 )J* %n >  − ,                                                                 
∞,                                R lC ≤ 0.                                                                                               
d 
 
The manufacturer’s best response might be one of the five different delivery lead 
time types. At one extreme, the manufacturer may set % = %G  and eliminate the retailer. 
In this case, the manufacturer will serve the whole consumer population through his 
direct channel. At another extreme, the manufacturer may set an arbitrarily long 
delivery lead time %∗ →  ∞ and shut down the direct channel. In this case, the retailer 
will serve part of the consumer population depending on his service level. The other 
three types of delivery lead time types are between these extreme values. When the 
manufacturer sets %∗ =  %n`  (aggressive case) or %∗ =   − , both the direct and the 
retailer channels are operative. In these cases, the direct channel covers the whole 
consumer population and is an alternative for all consumers. When the manufacturer 
sets %∗ =  %n (unaggressive case), the direct channel satisfies part of the consumer 
demand, and some consumers may be lost. 
  
3.3.3. The "ash Equilibrium 
Next, we determine the Nash equilibrium of the operational decisions game between the 
manufacturer and the retailer for given contract parameters. To do so, we solve the best 
response functions characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 simultaneously. It is not 
possible to find a closed form solution due to the complexities of the best response 
functions. Thus, we use the following algorithm to determine the equilibrium 
numerically.  
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The algorithm to determine the "ash equilibrium 
Set o = 0.01, ∈ =  10 p, ∏3∗ = small number  
 (Find the Nash equilibrium of the operational decisions game for a given  and ) 
   For R = 1 %P R = number of initial seeds Do 
      Set x = 0 and Cy∗ = zSS* R and  Cy! =  %y!∗ =  %y∗ =  Q)K{S J+SK 
      While Cy!∗ −  Cy ∗ >  | )J* %y!∗ −  %y∗ > ∈ Do 
         %y!∗ Cy∗  ← find the manufacturer′s best response to α∗,  
        Cy!∗ %y!∗   ← find the retailer′s best response to t!∗  
        x ← x + 1 increment j by one 
      End While 
      Report the Nash equilibrium as the pair [Cy∗R, %y∗R] 
   End For R loop 
Report  ∏3∗ , and the corresponding %∗, C∗. 
 
 
The algorithm stated above is an application of the best response dynamics 
methodology (Matsui, 1992). The algorithm finds the pure strategy Nash equilibrium %∗, C∗ iteratively. In each iteration, the algorithm determines the manufacturer’s best 
response % value and the retailer’s best response C value to the current action of the 
other party. The algorithm runs until a joint strategy is reached from which neither the 
manufacturer nor the retailer has an incentive to deviate. Note that theory does not 
guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium. However, we did not observe any 
multiple equilibrium case when this algorithm was run starting with 10 different α seed 
values in (0, 1] domain.  
 
3.4. Stage I: Contracting 
In order to find the manufacturer’s optimal buyback contract parameters , , we 
conducted a grid search over the wholesale price values  ∈  /	, 0 and the buyback 
price values  ∈  /0, 0. The selection rule is to choose the ,  pair, which 
maximizes the manufacturer’s expected profit for the Nash equilibrium found at stage 
II.  
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So far, we explained how we solved the three-stage game with backwards 
induction. Next, we outline how we proceed afterwards.  
 
3.5. Solution Methodology 
The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price  and buyback price  that are found by 
backwards induction are used to determine the manufacturer’s delivery lead time % and 
the retailer’s service level α  decisions at stage II. Then, the expected profits of the 
firms and sales of the channels are obtained at stage III. We coded this solution 
procedure, including backwards induction steps, in Matematica to determine the 
solution for a given parameter set , , , 	,  automatically. We fixed the value of 
the parameter ) to 1000, without loss of generality2.  
The core of the Mathematica code is the algorithm described in Section 3.3.3. This 
algorithm is used to find the Nash equilibrium of the stage II game for given contract 
parameter ,  values. The code determines the Nash equilibrium for all possible 
contract parameter ,  values in a nested grid, and then chooses the optimal contract 
parameter ,  values for the manufacturer. The code stores the solution that consists 
of the contract parameter ,  values, the resulting operational decisions in the Nash 
equilibrium, and the expected sales quantities in each channel and the expected profits 
of the firms.  
In order to analyze the effect of the five parameters of the model , , , 	, , 
the model is solved with all combinations of these parameters’ low, medium and high 
values as shown in Table 3.1. Hence, the model is solved 3 = 243 times, each time 
covering a different dual channel environment through the choice of the five parameter 
values. 
 
Table 3.1. Low, Medium and High Values of Parameters 
   / / −   / 
1000 4 0.25 0.125 0 
5000 8 0.5 0.5 0.25 
10000 12 0.75 0.75 0.5 
 
                                                 
2 What matters for the model is the ratio between the two parameters “)” and “m”. Hence, the model only 
has five independent parameters. 
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Note that the  and  values are absolute, whereas the ,  and 	 values are chosen 
relatively. This is because of the constraints   < ,  ≤  −  , and 	 < . 
 
3.6. Main Findings  
We present our main findings in three parts. First, we show that there are three types of 
equilibrium. Second, we illustrate how the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy 
changes with respect to the changes in the values of the parameters. Third, we illustrate 
how the values of the decision variables change when the manufacturer switches from 
one dual channel strategy to another.  
 
3.6.1. Partition into Three Equilibrium Regions 
The results of our numerical studies suggest that the five-dimensional parameter space 
is divided into three equilibrium regions. Each region implies an optimal dual channel 
strategy for the manufacturer. These three types of equilibrium are as follows:  
 
• Eliminate Retailer (ER): In this equilibrium type, the manufacturer eliminates the 
retailer by setting a high wholesale price   (in comparison to the sales price ) and 
a short delivery lead time %. With a buyback contract, he also sets a low buyback 
price . The retailer sets zero stocking quantity & and leaves the market. We have *! =  *' = 1; hence, there is only one consumer segment, which is covered by the 
manufacturer’s direct channel.  
 
• Capture All Profit (CP): In this equilibrium type, the manufacturer sells through 
both channels; however, captures all profit from the retailer. To do so, he sets a 
wholesale price  (and a buyback price  in the buyback contract case) such that the 
retailer makes almost no profit. The retailer’s minimum availability constraint is 
binding (i.e., he sets C345). We have *! =  *' < 1 and the consumers are 
partitioned into two segments.  
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• Share Profit (SP): In this equilibrium type, the manufacturer uses both the direct and 
the retail channel and shares the profit with the retailer. The manufacturer sets a low 
wholesale price  (in comparison to the sale price ) with a wholesale price 
contract; a high wholesale price  and a high buyback price  with a buyback 
contract. By doing so, the manufacturer lets the retailer have positive profit margin. 
We have, *! <  *' < 1 and the consumers are partitioned into three segments.  
 
Note that given a dual channel environment, which is described by the five model 
parameters, the manufacturer can change the type of the resulting equilibrium (i.e., his 
optimal dual channel strategy) by changing the value of contract parameters ,  at 
stage I. Each equilibrium type is associated with a different combination of market 
segmentation, channel configuration, and profit sharing strategy.    
Table 3.2 provides a sample of numerical results from the wholesale price contract 
model. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price ∗, the Nash equilibrium decisions %∗ and C∗, the expected profits of the firms, the expected sales in each channel, and the 
manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy type (“Eql. Type”) are shown for given 
parameter combinations. 
 
Table 3.2. Sample Results from the Wholesale Price Contract Model 
 
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales  Eql. 
Type     	 ∗ %∗ C∗ ∏3 ∏ Direct Retail Lost 
1000 4 1 0.38 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.03† 389 0 500 0 0 ER 
1000 12 3 4.50 0.75 2.73 9.00 0.19† 1113 0 500 0 0 ER 
5000 12 6 3.00 3.00 5.44 6.00 0.19† 1361 0 500 0 0 ER 
1000 4 2 1.00 1.00 1.80 2.85 0.19 272 1 351 51 99 CP 
5000 4 3 0.75 1.50 2.42 25.11 0.38 360 2 20 297 183 CP 
10000 8 6 1.50 1.50 4.84 10.28 0.38 1372 4 97 249 154 CP 
5000 4 1 0.38 0.50 0.77 19.85 0.24 77 24 61 191 248 SP 
5000 8 6 1.00 0.00 3.72 3.90 0.43 1923 271 206 214 80 SP 
10000 4 3 0.50 0.75 1.89 31.30  0.37  435 200 14 296 191 SP 
 † *!C∗ ≡ 1; hence q∗ = 0.  
 
 
Similarly, Table 3.3 provides sample results from the buyback contract model. 
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Table 3.3. Sample Results from the Buyback Contract Model 
 
Parameters Decision Variables Profits Sales  Eql. 
Type     	 ∗  ∗ %∗ C∗  ∏3  ∏  Direct Retail Lost 
1000 12 3 4.50 0.75 2.75 0.00 9.00 0.19 1113 0 500 0 0 ER 
5000 12 6 3.00  3.00 5.45  0.00 6.00 0.19 1361 0 500 0 0 ER 
10000 12 3 1.13 1.50  3.00  0.00 9.00 0.03 627 0 500 0 0 ER 
1000 4 2 1.50 1.00  2.00  2.00 3.79 0.38 306 0 264 146 90 CP 
5000 8 4 3.00 2.00  3.55  1.65 4.74 0.38 695 0 422 48 30 CP 
10000 8 2 4.50 1.00  2.00  2.00 12.63 0.38 299 0 237 162 101 CP 
1000 4 2 1.00 1.00  1.95  1.85 3.94 0.38 291 5 216 189 95 SP 
5000 4 3 0.75 1.50  2.95  2.90 27.21 0.50 369 12 17 364 119 SP 
10000 8 6 1.50  1.50  5.90  5.85  18.52 0.68 1667 30 45 409 47 SP 
 
 
3.6.2. The Manufacturer’s Optimal Dual Channel Strategy 
Next, we illustrate how the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy (ER, SP or 
CP) changes with respect to the changes in the values of the five model parameters. In 
our numeric experiments with the wholesale price contract, we observed that when the 
level of a parameter increases, the manufacturer’s policy changes at most twice, in a 
given sequence. For instance, as the value of the direct channel cost parameter  
increases, the manufacturer’s optimal policy changes from ER to SP to CP. The policy 
does not switch from SP to ER or from CP to ER or from CP to SP. Figure 3.3 
summarizes these observations for all five parameters. We note that high values of the 
direct channel cost , sales price , search cost  and unit production cost 	 motivate 
the manufacturer towards the CP policy, whereas high customer valuation  motivates 
the manufacturer towards ER policy. The direction from ER to CP also indicates 
increasing use of the retail channel by the manufacturer.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Changes in the Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Policy with the WPCM 
59 
 
Next, we provide more details on the manufacturer’s optimal policy, focusing on 
the direct channel cost parameter  and the retailer inconvenience cost parameter  as 
examples. Table 3.4 shows how the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy 
changes within this parameter space in the wholesale price contract model. We obtain 
structurally similar results in the buyback contract model as well. 
 
Table 3.4. Manufacturer’s Optimal Channel Strategy in the WPCM, when  = 8,  = 4, 	 =1 
 / 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75 3.00 3.25 
20000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP CP 
17500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP CP 
15000 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP CP 
12500 SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP CP 
10000 ER ER ER ER SP SP SP SP SP SP CP CP CP CP 
7500 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER SP CP CP CP CP 
5000 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER CP 
2500 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER 
0 ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER ER 
 
 
As seen in Table 3.4, / plane is divided into three strategy regions. If both the 
direct channel cost  and the retailer inconvenience cost  are high, the manufacturer’s 
optimal dual channel strategy is capture-all-profit (CP). The manufacturer is aware of 
the retailer’s high inconvenience cost, which denotes a high minimum service level C345 at the retailer. Recall that to stay in business; the retailer has to set at least the 
minimum service level. Thus, the manufacturer sets a high wholesale price (enough to 
provide the minimum expected profit for the retailer) and captures all profit from the 
retailer. If the direct channel cost  is high and the retailer’s inconvenience cost  is 
low, the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy is share-profit (SP). As the 
manufacturer has a cost disadvantage at the direct channel, he prefers not increasing the 
wholesale price a lot and leaves some profit to the retailer. If the direct channel cost  
is low, the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy is eliminate-retailer (ER).  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the partitioning of the  ⁄  plane into the three equilibrium 
regions. The figure also shows how the other three model parameters (the unit 
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production cost 	, selling price , and consumer valuation ) affect the boundaries 
between these three regions. For example, decreasing the unit production cost 	 and the 
selling price  increases the eliminate-retailer (ER) region. For given values of these 
three other parameters, it is possible that the  ⁄  plane is covered by only one or two 
of these three regions. 
 
 
 
 
Eliminate Retailer
Share 
Profit
Capture 
All ProfitIncreasing  v
Decreasing  c, p
Increasing  v
Decreasing  c, p
Decreasing  c
Cost of Direct 
Channel (m)
Inconvenience 
Cost (k)
 
 
Figure 3.4. Manufacturer’s Optimal Dual Channel Strategy on / Plane in the WPCM 
 
3.6.3. Effects of Parameters on the Decision Variables and Resulting Profits  
The following figure illustrates how the changes in a particular parameter (, as an 
example) leads to changes in the equilibrium values of the decision variables >, C, %@ 
for given values of the other four parameters, in the wholesale price contract model. 
Figure 3.5 also illustrates how the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy changes 
as k increases.  
When the retailer’s inconvenience cost is low, the retail channel becomes a strong 
competitor to the direct channel. Thus, the manufacturer eliminates the retailer by 
setting a short delivery lead time and a high wholesale price. When the retailer’s 
inconvenience cost is moderate, the retailer increases his service level to meet the 
consumer demand. As a result, the manufacturer increases the delivery lead time and 
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reduces the wholesale price to collaborate with the retailer. When the retailer’s 
inconvenience cost is high, the retailer’s minimum service level constraint is binding. 
Hence, the retailer selects C345 as his service level, and the manufacturer, who knows 
this fact, increases the delivery lead time to shift the sales to the retail channel. While 
doing so, however, the manufacturer captures all profit and leaves the retailer with 
(almost) zero profit.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Decision Variables in Equilibrium in the WPCM 
Note.  = 10,000,  = 8,  = 4, 	 = 1. 
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As illustrated in Figure 3.6, changes in the dual channel strategies also affect the 
expected sales of the channels and the profits of the firms. The manufacturer’s profit is 
stable for any value of the inconvenience cost under a threshold, because the retailer is 
eliminated. When the strategy switches to share-profit (i.e., the inconvenience cost is 
higher than this threshold), the manufacturer’s profit starts to increase. The 
manufacturer’s profit increases rapidly when the retailer’s inconvenience cost is high 
(i.e., when the strategy is capture-all-profit). In the expected sales figures, we observe 
that when the strategy is eliminate-retailer, the manufacturer meets all consumer 
demand. However, the retailer makes moderate amount of sales when the strategy is 
share-profit. In the capture-all-profit strategy, the retailer increases his sales due to 
increased delivery lead time in the direct channel; however, he gains almost no profit.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Expected Profits and Sales in the WPCM 
Note.  = 10,000,  = 8,  = 4, 	 = 1. 
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3.6.4. Comparison of the Wholesale Price and Buyback Contract Models  
Here, we compare the results of the wholesale price contract model (WPCM) and the 
buyback contract model (BCM). As seen in Table 3.5, we only present the profit 
comparisons for selected  and 	 values.  
 
Table 3.5. Expected Profits under Different Contract Types 
Note.  = 8,  = 4,  =1. 
 
Parameters Manufacturer's 
Profit  
Retailer's Profit Total System Profit 
m c WPCM BCM WPCM BCM WPCM BCM 
5000 0 1687.5 2000 0 0 1687.5 2000 
5000 1.25 1062.5 1062.5 0 0 1062.5 1062.5 
5000 3.25 130.07 137.81 0.46 1.82 130.53 139.62 
12500 0 1255.87 2000 145.68 0 1401.56 2000 
12500 1.25 704.8 930.28 73.58 31.75 778.38 962.03 
12500 3.25 76.4 94.01 0.78 3.55 77.18 97.56 
22500 0 1134.24 2000 316.59 0 1451.32 2000 
22500 1.25 599.24 922.24 151.14 32.43 750.38 954.67 
22500 3.25 60.5 81.32 0.87 3.82 61.37 85.14 
 
 
We observe that in terms of total system and manufacturer’s profit, BCM 
outperforms WPCM in all parameter combinations except one. This is expected because 
WPCM is a special case of BCM. We observe that the retailer’s profit is usually higher 
under the wholesale price contract. This is because the buyback contract gives more 
control to the manufacturer (i.e., two contract parameters to set). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CHAPTER 4 : EXPERIME"TAL STUDY OF WHOLESALE PRICE 
CO"TRACT MODEL 
 
In this chapter, we explain and analyze the experimental study that we conducted on our 
wholesale price contract model (WPCM). First, we provide information on the 
experimental procedure and design. Second, we focus on the analysis of the 
experimental data.  
 
4.1. Experimental Procedure and Design 
Our experiments were computer-based and conducted at the HP Experimental 
Economics Laboratory in Palo Alto, CA. The experimental model was implemented in 
MUMS, the special-purpose script language developed by HP Laboratories. Subjects 
were selected from the Stanford University students. Instructions for the experiments 
and a quiz for training were provided on the web3. Only the subjects who passed this 
web-based quiz were allowed to participate in the experiments. This helped to reduce 
the training time of the subjects before the experiments and filtered them according to 
their understanding of the experimental logic. During the experimental studies, subjects 
were seated at computer carrels separated from each other by dividers. A monetary 
reward was paid to each subject according to his success in the experiments. A certain 
percentage of each subject’s experimental payoff was transformed into his monetary 
reward and added to the 25$ participation fee. The average monetary reward was around 
70$.  
We conducted 17 experiments in 7 sessions. Each session lasted around 2.5 hours. 
The same subject set was used for all experiments of a session. Before beginning each 
                                                 
3 See http://www.hpl.hp.com/econexperiment/dual-channel/ for the instructions and quiz. 
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session, an experimenter explained the details of the game and answered the questions 
of the subjects. The subjects were allowed to play several training periods before the 
session started. The subjects were informed when a new experiment started (i.e., when a 
different parameter set was used). In each experiment, the same game was played for 
25-40 independent periods. At the beginning of each period, each subject was randomly 
matched with another subject. Subjects did not know with whom they were matched. A 
subject from each pair was randomly selected as manufacturer and the other as the 
retailer. Participating in both roles helped the subjects to understand the whole game, 
which is consistent with the full information assumption of the analytical model. 
Moreover, a specific subject played the role of the manufacturer and the retailer in equal 
number of times, which led to a fair distribution of monetary rewards. This is because 
the expected payoff of the manufacturer and the retailer are not equal in an experiment. 
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid according to their performance.  
A period in an experiment consisted of three stages, in general. At stage I, the 
manufacturer set the wholesale price between the integer values 1 to price 4. At stage 
II, given the wholesale price, the manufacturer decided on the delivery lead time, and 
the retailer decided on the stock level simultaneously5. At stage III, a random number of 
consumers were created by the server computer, so that the demand in each channel and 
the profit of each channel member were realized. In some of the experiments, the 
periods started directly from stage II, assuming an exogenously-given wholesale price. 
At each stage, 45 seconds were given to the subjects to make decisions. 
 We provided a decision support tool in subjects’ screens during the experiments. 
By using this tool, the subjects could run what-if analysis before submitting their 
decisions. For instance, the retailer subject could enter a stocking level and his guess on 
the manufacturer subject’s delivery lead time to this tool, and obtain the results for 11 
different realizations of the random total market demand (( = 0, 100, 200…1000). 
Subjects entered their decisions into the box at the bottom of the screens. At the end of 
each period, the subjects learned total demand realization, operational decision of his 
counterpart, number of units sold in each channel, number of lost customers, and his 
                                                 
4 We constrained the wholesale price decisions to integer values to facilitate the decision-making process 
of subjects and our analysis. 
5 In our experiments, we used the stocking level &, which is indeed equal to the service level α,  for the 
retailer’s service level. Because setting stocking level is more intuitive than setting service level for 
human subjects. The delivery lead time decision is not restricted to be an integer; however, the stocking 
level decision is. 
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profit in the period. In addition, a historical results page was provided to every subject, 
presenting all previous periods’ results for that subject.  
Table 4.1 shows the experimental design for sessions 1 to 3. All experiments in 
these sessions start from stage II, assuming an exogenously given wholesale price. In 
each session, there are three experiments, which differ in the optimal dual channel 
strategy of the manufacturer. In other words, the experimental parameters were selected 
such that the theoretical outcome of the each experiment refers to one of the three 
optimal dual channel strategies.  
  
Table 4.1. Experimental Design for Sessions 1-3 
 
Session 
# 
Subjects 
Exp. 
# 
Periods 
Equilibrium Type 
Experiment 
Type 
k m w v p 
    1a 25 Share Profits given-w 3 100,000 4 20 10 
1 10 1b 25 Capture Profits given-w 8 500,000 6 20 10 
    1c 25 Eliminate Retailer given-w 8 5,000 8 20 10 
    2a 30 Share Profits given-w 3 100,000 4 20 10 
2 10 2b 25 Capture Profits given-w 8 500,000 6 20 10 
    2c 25 Eliminate Retailer given-w 8 5,000 8 20 10 
  3a 25 Share Profits given-w 2 50,000 2 10 6 
3 8 3b 25 Capture Profits given-w 3 200,000 4 10 6 
    3c 25 Eliminate Retailer given-w 3 5,000 5 10 6 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the experimental design for sessions 4 to 7. All of these sessions 
include two types of experiments: (1) A w-setting experiment where the manufacturer 
sets the wholesale price at stage I (experiments 4a, 5a, 6a and 7a); (2) A given-w 
experiment where the theoretical optimal wholesale price is exogenously given and the 
game starts from stage II (experiments 4b, 5b, 6b and 7b).  
 
Table 4.2. Experimental Design for Sessions 4-7 
 
Session 
# 
Subjects 
Exp. 
# 
Periods 
Equilibrium Type 
Experiment 
Type 
k m v p 
4 14 
4a 35 Share Profits w-setting 2 100,000 10 6 
4b 30 Share Profits given-w as 3 2 100,000 10 6 
5 8 
5a 35 Share Profits w-setting 2 100,000 10 6 
5b 30 Share Profits given-w as 3 2 100,000 10 6 
6 10 
6a 40 Capture Profits w-setting 8 200,000 15 6 
6b 25 Capture Profits given-w as4 8 200,000 15 6 
7 10 
7a 35 Eliminate Retailer  w-setting 0 10,000 10 6 
7b 30 Eliminate Retailer  given-w as 6 0 10,000 10 6 
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4.2. Analysis of  the Experimental Data  
We present the analysis of the experimental data in three parts. First, we provide a 
general view of the results after eliminating the outliers. Second, we provide our 
analysis related to stage II decisions. This part covers the comparison of the equilibrium 
predictions with observed data, learning in the operational decisions game, and the 
effect of experiment type or wholesale price on the operational decisions. Third, we 
focus on the decisions at stage I where the manufacturer sets the wholesale price. In this 
part, we compare the theoretical optimum predictions with observed data and analyze 
learning in the wholesale price decisions.  
We used the term “theoretical predictions” to express the model’s predictions. We 
used non-parametric tests, as we had no prior assumptions on the distributions of the 
assessed variables. We mostly used the Kolmogrov-Smirnov test, the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (the Mann-Whitney U test) to test the 
significance of our results. We also implemented a two-dimensional Kolmogrov-
Smirnov test based on the algorithm of Press et al. (1992). The algorithm is provided in 
Appendix B.  
 
4.2.1. General View of the Data 
First, we eliminated outliers from our data. In statistics, an outlier is a numerically 
distant observation from the rest of the data. One reason why outliers existed in our data 
is that the subjects had mistaken their roles. Recall that in each period, the roles were re-
assigned: a manufacturer subject might become a retailer in a subsequent period or vice 
versa. For instance, in experiment 4b, some manufacturer subjects set very high delivery 
lead times such as 400, 550, 1000 when the average delivery lead time was around 27, 
because they were making decisions as if they were determining the stock level being 
retailers. On the other hand, in some occasions, manufacturer subjects set extremely low 
delivery lead time values such as 0 or 1, when the average delivery lead time was 
around 27. We eliminated such cases from our data as well. In total, we eliminated 22 
data from our experiment results. Eliminated outlier data is presented in Appendix C. 
We conducted all statistical tests after these eliminations. We used a significance level 
of 0.05 for the statistical analysis.  
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Table 4.3 provides the results on delivery lead time %, stocking level &, 
manufacturer’s profit and retailer’s profit in each experiment. We show the model’s 
theoretical predictions under column “Eql.” (equilibrium) and mean of the observed 
data under column “Avg.” (average). In Table 4.4, for the w-setting experiments (i.e., 
4a, 5a, 6a and 7a), we also provide the results related to the cases in which the 
manufacturer subjects set the theoretical-optimal wholesale price at stage I.  
 
Table 4.3. General View of the Results 
 
Delivery 
Lead Time   Stock Level  Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. 
Eql. 
Type 
Exp. Type Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
1a SP w-given as 4  13.95 16.35 495.44 364.79 3015.93 2837.77 1315.17 1096.94 
1b CP w-given as 6  23.55 25.44 258.29 253.10 2761.47 2571.10 456.26 -136.85 
1c ER w-given as 8  10.00 10.82 0.00 45.42 4950.00 5035.26 0.00 -239.87 
2a SP w-given as 4  13.95 18.36 495.44 393.97 3015.93 3013.03 1315.17 1198.81 
2b CP w-given as 6  23.55 29.83 258.29 238.01 2761.47 2415.41 456.26 -79.59 
2c ER w-given as 8  10.00 9.79 0.00 21.26 4950.00 4932.18 0.00 -119.23 
3a SP w-given as 2 15.67 17.49 593.40 476.46 1439.73 1182.20 1143.39 1025.25 
3b CP w-given as 4 34.32 46.49 337.83 355.76 1531.19 1423.98 288.10 -9.61 
3c ER w-given as 5 4.00 11.91 0.00 108.18 2687.50 2225.36 0.00 -236.64 
4a SP w-setting 24.56 26.86 461.12 358.05 1572.83 1271.81 670.82 507.20 
4b SP w-given as 3  24.56 26.71 461.12 390.00 1572.83 1359.59 670.82 617.55 
5a SP w-setting 24.56 28.09 461.12 368.12 1572.83 1256.37 670.82 593.73 
5b SP w-given as 3 24.56 27.25 461.12 350.44 1572.83 1271.12 670.82 571.74 
6a CP w-setting 18.34 17.77 288.91 288.98 2033.24 1396.11 86.12 133.59 
6b CP w-given as 4 18.34 16.77 288.91 142.85 2033.24 1455.73 86.12 -84.07 
7a ER w-setting 4.00 13.98 0.00 278.70 2375.00 1925.59 0.00 265.76 
7b ER w-given as 6 4.00 5.21 0.00 2.82 2375.00 2137.58 0.00 0.08 
 
 
From the table above, we observe that the stage II decisions are close to the 
equilibrium values. However, in general, manufacturers set longer delivery lead times 
than the model’s prediction, and retailers set lower stocking levels than the model’s  
prediction when the predicted level is high and higher stocking levels than the model’s 
prediction when the predicted level is zero. 
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Table 4.4. Observed Results for Theoretical Optimal w in w-setting Experiments 
 
Delivery 
Lead Time  Stock Level   Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. 
Eql. 
Type 
Explanation 
# of 
Data 
Eql Avg. Eql Avg. Eql Avg. Eql Avg. 
4a SP w = 3 data 121 24.56 27.42 461.12 389.85 1572.83 1317.99 670.82 548.53 
5a SP w = 3 data 102 24.56 29.80 461.12 353.59 1572.83 1239.00 670.82 475.41 
6a CP w = 4 data 17 18.34 18.47 288.91 119.41 2033.24 1115.88 86.12 -226.00 
7a ER w = 6 data 3 4.00 7.67 0.00 0.33 2375.00 1263.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Next, we discuss our observations in detail. 
 
4.2.2. Results in the Stage II Decisions 
Here, we focus on the operational decisions game at stage II. We aim to determine 
whether Nash Equilibrium is a good predictor of the operational decisions game 
outcome, whether there exists any learning in the operational decisions over time, and 
whether experiment type or wholesale price affects operational decisions. In the 
following three subsections, for the given-w experiments, we consider all data, whereas 
for w-setting experiments, we only consider the data in which the manufacturer subjects 
set the theoretical optimal wholesale price at stage I. 
 
4.2.2.1. Comparing the Equilibrium Predictions and Observed Data  
Here we analyze if Nash equilibrium is a good predictor of the operational decisions 
game results at stage II.  
In each of sessions 1-3, the subjects’ decisions in one experiment deviated 
significantly from their decisions in another experiment. We supported these separation 
results by the two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests with extremely low p-values 
in all comparisons (p-values < 10 p). Our theoretical predictions on sessions 1, 2 and 3 
are such that the manufacturer’s delivery lead time % in experiment a will be lower than 
in experiment b, but will be higher than that in experiment c; and the retailer’s stocking 
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level & in experiment b will be higher than that in experiment c, but lower than that in 
experiment a in a given session.  
When we analyze our results, we see that directional changes in the experiment 
results are consistent with the model’s predictions. The average values of subjects’ 
decisions in each experiment reflect these comparisons. Figure 4.1 shows this result for 
session 2. In the figure, we compare the observed results in one experiment with 
another. Each triangle or circle in the figure shows the outcome of one game played 
between a manufacturer and a retailer couple in a given experiment. Squares represent 
the theoretical Nash equilibrium of each experiment. It is seen from the figure that the 
decisions in one experiment are separated from the decisions in other experiment in the 
predicted directions. Hence, the directional predictions of the model appear to be robust 
with respect to behavioral issues. Thus, qualitative recommendations of the model are 
likely to be implemented in actual business environments.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Decisions in Session 2 
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Moreover, each experiment’s results are consistent with the characteristics of the 
predicted equilibrium type. These can be observed in Table 4.3 presented above. For 
instance, consider experiment 2c in session 2. Given the experimental setup, the 
analytical model predicts that the manufacturer’s optimal dual channel strategy will be 
Eliminate Retailer, ER. Thus, he will set a very short delivery lead time and the retailer 
will order zero stocking quantity. This is how the subjects behaved, on average. The 
manufacturer subjects’ average delivery lead time % is even shorter than predicted and 
the retailer subjects’ average stocking level & is close to zero. When we checked the 
subjects’ stocking level decisions, we observed that they chose zero stocking level in a 
significant number of periods in experiment 2c and are eliminated from the market. 
However, in some periods, the retailer subjects chose a positive stocking quantity 
leading to a loss, which caused a negative average profit of retailer in experiment 2c.  
Although the model’s qualitative predictions hold, the data exhibits deviations from 
the model’s quantitative equilibrium predictions. Table 4.5 shows the predicted 
equilibrium values (in the Eql. column), mean values of the observed data (in the Avg. 
column), and median values of the observed data (in the Med. column) in each 
experiment for decision variables % and &. The table also indicates the p-values of the  
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests that we used to measure the statistical significance of the 
deviations (Wilcoxon, 1945). We tested the null hypothesis that the median difference 
between the predicted equilibrium value and the observed data of the operational 
decision is equal to zero. We observe that for most experiments, the median difference 
is statistically significant. Moreover, the table shows the p-values of the two-
dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov test that we used to test the null hypothesis that the 
observed values and predicted equilibrium values of the operational decisions in each 
experiment come from the same distribution. For most of the experiments, the results 
reject the null hypothesis.  
In general, manufacturers set longer delivery lead times than the model’s 
prediction. Risk and loss aversion might be reasons for this behavior. In the model 
setting, the cost of operating a direct channel with a low delivery lead time is 
deterministic, whereas, the benefit from operating that channel is uncertain. This is 
because the manufacturer’s benefit depends on the retailer’s stocking quantity decision 
and realized total demand. Knowing such biases might benefit the players of the game: 
for example, if the retailer knows this bias of the manufacturer, he should set higher 
stocking quantity to meet the increased consumer demand in the retailer channel. 
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In general, retailers set lower stock levels than the model’s prediction when the 
predicted level is high, and higher stock levels than the model’s prediction when the 
predicted level is zero. The behavior of retailers’ setting stock levels too low when they 
should be high and too high when they should be low looks similar to “pull to center 
effect” (Bostian et al. 2008). In the experiments where ER is the manufacturer’s optimal 
dual channel strategy (experiments 1c, 2c, 3c, 7a and 7b), under-stocking was not 
possible, because the theoretical prediction is zero units. If we ignore these cases, we 
observe that the retailers set stock levels lower than predicted. The behavior of retailers’ 
setting stock levels too low when they should be high might be caused by risk aversion. 
In the model setting, the cost of stocking & units is deterministic, whereas, its benefit is 
uncertain. This is because the retailer’s benefit depends also on the manufacturer’s 
delivery lead time decision and realized total demand. If the retailer is risk averse, 
knowing that fact, the manufacturer should set lower delivery lead time than the 
analytical model’s prediction to avoid a lost demand situation caused by the shortage in 
the retailer channel.  
 
Table 4.5. Comparing the Equilibrium Predictions with the Observed Data 
 
Exp. 
Delivery Lead Time   Stock Level  p-values 
WRS test KS test 
Eql. Avg. Med. Eql. Avg. Med.    ,  
1a 13.95 16.35 15.00 495.44 364.79 350.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1b 23.55 25.44 25.00 258.29 253.10 300.00 0.07 0.85 0.00 
1c 10.00 10.82 10.00 0.00 45.42 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 
2a 13.95 18.36 15.00 495.44 393.97 400.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
2b 23.55 29.83 25.00 258.29 238.01 300.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 
2c 10.00 9.79 10.00 0.00 21.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3a 15.67 17.49 15.00 593.40 476.46 500.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
3b 34.32 46.49 30.00 337.83 355.76 400.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 
3c 4.00 11.91 8.00 0.00 108.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
4a 24.56 27.42 28.00 461.12 389.85 400.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
4b 24.56 26.71 26.00 461.12 390.00 381.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 
5a 24.56 29.80 29.00 461.12 353.59 350.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5b 24.56 27.25 25.00 461.12 350.44 345.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6a 18.34 18.47 17.00 288.91 119.41 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00 
6b 18.34 16.77 16.00 288.91 142.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7a 4.00 7.67 10.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.28 0.32 0.01 
7b 4.00 5.21 4.00 0.00 2.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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These results generalize the observations of Chen et al. (2008). The analysis in this 
section shows that the analytical model of Chen et al. (2008) can be used to predict the 
characteristics of the decisions related to a specific dual channel strategy and the 
changes in the decisions when the manufacturer shifts from one dual channel strategy to 
another. However, the subjects’ decisions have significant deviations from the model’s 
quantitative predictions. Thus, the quantitative predictions of the model should not be 
used directly at their quantitative values while decision-making in a real business 
environment. 
 
4.2.2.2. Learning in the Operational Decisions Game 
Here, we aim to understand if the subjects learned how to make better decisions over 
time. We first controlled if there is dispersion in the decisions of the subjects in each 
experiment. We calculated dispersion by multivariate standard deviation normalized by 
the mean values. The related formula is:  
 
∑ %4 − % %⁄ ²54! + ∑ &4 − & &⁄ ²54!J − 1  
 
where %4, &4 shows a data point related to a period, n is the number of observations 
(number of data points), and % and & are the means of the delivery lead time and stock 
level decisions, respectively. We divide the deviations by their respective mean values 
for normalization. This normalized measure prevents the stocking level &4 values, 
which are considerably larger, to dominate the delivery lead time %4 values. In Figure 
4.2, we compare the dispersion of the decisions in the first half with the dispersion of 
the decisions in the second half in each experiment.  
Operational decisions data exhibits significant dispersion. We expect that the 
subjects would search better strategies during the experiment. If so, the subjects would 
learn how to make better decisions over time, in which case the dispersion in their 
decisions would decrease and mean of their decisions would move towards the Nash 
equilibrium predicted by the model. However, as shown in Figure 4.2, dispersion 
increases from the first half to second for most of the experiments.  
  
Figure 4.2. Comparison of Dispersion in the Two Halves of the Experiments
 
 
Second, we tested the null hypothesis that the decisions from the two halves of the 
experiment come from the same distribution. 
 
Table 4.6. Comparing the Stage II Decisions in the Two Halves of Each Experiment
 
Exp. 
Delivery Lead Time
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. Avg.
1a 13.95 17.31 15.38
1b 23.55 26.39 24.50
1c 10.00 10.75 10.89
2a 13.95 18.57 18.15
2b 23.55 25.77 33.95
2c 10.00 10.25 
3a 15.67 16.38 18.63
3b 34.32 44.77 48.21
3c 4.00 16.32 
4a 24.56 26.87 27.98
4b 24.56 26.50 26.93
5a 24.56 30.80 28.80
5b 24.56 26.98 27.51
6a 18.34 19.44 17.38
6b 18.34 16.53 17.02
7a 4.00 10.00 
7b 4.00 6.20 
0
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p-
  Stock Level           KS test
2nd 
Half 
 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg. 
  
 495.44 391.83 337.39 0.33 0.00 
 258.29 277.21 229.00 0.53 0.13 
 0.00 71.70 18.73 0.02 0.14 
 495.44 398.64 389.24 0.03 0.72 
 258.29 240.39 235.59 0.01 0.04 
9.32 0.00 39.90 2.32 0.95 0.70 
 593.40 459.70 493.57 0.33 0.97 
 337.83 376.43 335.09 0.23 0.91 
7.50 0.00 164.80 51.56 0.00 0.02 
 461.12 388.74 390.98 0.59 0.59 
 461.12 378.04 401.97 0.83 0.12 
 461.12 365.98 341.20 1.00 0.28 
 461.12 372.95 327.93 0.91 0.16 
 288.91 116.67 122.50 1.00 1.00 
 288.91 138.55 147.21 1.00 0.91 
3.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 N/A N/A 
4.22 0.00 4.45 1.16 0.04 1.00 
1-c 2-a 2-b 2-c 3-a 3-b 3-c 4-a 4-b 5-a 5-b 6-a
 
 
 
values 
 WRS test 
,    
0.00 0.08 0.00 
0.13 0.47 0.27 
0.00 0.15 0.01 
0.07 0.00 0.70 
0.00 0.01 0.18 
0.56 0.72 0.26 
0.49 0.12 0.71 
0.29 0.19 0.47 
0.00 0.00 0.01 
0.38 0.42 0.57 
0.23 0.56 0.07 
0.45 0.74 0.16 
0.18 0.73 0.04 
0.51 0.33 0.91 
0.96 0.72 0.89 
N/A 0.16 0.16 
0.19 0.00 0.65 
6-b 7-b
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In Table 4.6, we provided related p-values for stage II decision variables in each 
experiment. For one-dimensional test, we tested the null hypothesis for each decision 
variable % and & separately, whereas, for the two-dimensional test, we tested the %, & 
decisions as a couple. For most of the experiments, we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
by Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) tests. As shown in the 
table, the average decisions (column “Avg.”) in the two halves do not indicate a 
consistent move towards the equilibrium values (column “Eql.”).  
Third, we analyzed if the decisions in each experiment converge to the predicted 
equilibrium value or not. We measured the distances of decisions in the two halves of 
each experiment to the theoretical Nash equilibrium in order to analyze if there is a 
significant move towards the predicted equilibrium value. We define a “distance” as the 
absolute value of the difference between a decision point and the equilibrium value.  
 
Table 4.7. Comparing the Distances of Stage II Decisions in the Two Halves of Each 
Experiment 
 
Exp. 
Distance of Delivery Lead 
Time  Distance of Stock Level  p-values 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg.  
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg.  
KS test WRS test 
    
1a 13.95 4.80 3.37 495.44 132.47 168.74 0.67 0.00 0.23 0.00 
1b 23.55 7.47 3.65 258.29 123.52 139.88 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.24 
1c 10.00 3.79 2.69 0.00 71.70 25.15 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 
2a 13.95 5.74 6.42 495.44 139.23 122.05 0.07 0.74 0.15 0.80 
2b 23.55 5.09 12.10 258.29 94.64 154.16 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
2c 10.00 2.41 0.68 0.00 39.90 2.32 0.44 0.70 0.03 0.26 
3a 15.67 6.98 7.09 593.40 167.40 152.44 0.73 0.92 0.81 0.47 
3b 34.32 27.92 26.51 337.83 120.17 135.28 0.62 0.47 0.78 0.36 
3c 4.00 12.32 3.66 0.00 164.80 51.56 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 
4a 24.56 7.62 9.09 461.12 109.40 128.02 0.29 0.31 0.09 0.09 
4b 24.56 6.90 7.07 461.12 126.30 108.57 0.49 0.12 0.55 0.08 
5a 24.56 9.34 7.22 461.12 117.96 129.51 0.97 0.56 0.71 0.31 
5b 24.56 4.81 4.56 461.12 133.03 160.43 0.91 0.16 0.44 0.06 
6a 18.34 2.59 2.21 288.91 232.73 266.96 1.00 0.99 0.72 0.55 
6b 18.34 2.97 3.16 288.91 200.15 214.21 1.00 0.94 0.76 0.62 
7a 4.00 6.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 N/A N/A 0.16 0.16 
7b 4.00 2.20 0.24 0.00 4.45 1.16 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.65 
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We tested the null hypothesis that the distances of the decisions in the first half and 
the second half of an experiment are drawn from the same population. As indicated by 
the p-values in Table 4.7, for most of the experiments, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis by one-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
(WRS) tests. The average distances in the two halves do not indicate a consistent 
improvement. Thus, we cannot say that the decisions move towards the equilibrium 
value, in general.  
There are some experiments that have significant differences between the two 
halves. For these, we can talk about an improvement in the direction of the predicted 
equilibrium or vice versa. The comparison of the average values and the standard 
deviations of the distances in the two halves may provide an intuition for the direction 
of the move. For instance, we observe that the delivery lead times in experiment 1b, 3c 
and 7b, and the stock levels in experiment 1c and 3c are improved from the first half to 
the second in the direction of predicted equilibrium value. In  
Figure 4.3, we provide the histogram plots of distances of delivery lead time 
decisions to equilibrium in experiment 7b. As seen from the histogram plots, distances 
in the second half are relatively smaller than the distances in the first half. We conclude 
that if the distances in the first and second halves of an experiment do not come from 
the same distribution, one reason for that might be learning in the direction of the 
predicted equilibrium.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Histogram of Distances of Delivery Lead Time Decisions to Equilibrium in 
Experiment 7b 
 
 
 To sum up, we could not found strong evidence for the existence of
experiments.  
 
4.2.2.3. Effect of Experiment Type on Operational Decisions 
Here, we analyze whether 
do this, we compare the 
within sessions 4, 5, 6 and 7.
suggests that the operational decisions
different distributions. 
 
Figure 4.4. Comparing Given versus Set Wholesale Price Experiments for Session 5
 
 
From Table 4.8, we observe that 
w-setting experiments are quite close to each other
the % decisions in the given
distribution function and the null hypothesis that the 
setting experiments in a session have identical distribution function. 
the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test i
decisions of session 6. Hence, we conclude that whether the optimal wholesale price is 
exogenously given or set by the manufacturer does not make a significant difference in 
stage II decisions.  
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the experiment type affects operational decisions
subjects’ behavior in the given-w and w-setting experiments
 Figure 4.4 provides the comparison for session 5, which 
 data of the two experiments 
 
the average decisions in given-
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llustrate, the only significant difference is in the t 
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Table 4.8. Comparison of the Decisions in w-Setting and Given-w Experiments in 
Sessions 4-7 
 
Session 
Average  
p-value 
Average  
p-value 
Given   Set  Given  Set  
4 26.71 27.42 0.55 390.00 389.85 0.94 
5 27.25 29.80 0.07 350.44 353.59 0.21 
6 16.77 18.47 0.03 142.85 119.41 0.61 
7 5.21 7.67 0.30 2.82 0.33 0.44 
  
 
4.2.2.4. Effect of Wholesale Price on Operational Decisions 
Here, we compare the w-setting experiment stage II results for different wholesale 
values that the manufacturer set in a given experiment. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 
compare the results by the wholesale price for experiments 4a and 5a, respectively. As 
seen from figures, when wholesale price increases in a given experiment, the subjects 
set shorter delivery lead times and lower stocking quantities in the stage II game. This 
observation is consistent with the analytical model’s qualitative predictions. The 
dispersion and deviation characteristics of data can also be observed from the figures.  
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. . 
 
Figure 4.5. Decisions by the Wholesale Prices in Experiment 4a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Decisions by the Wholesale Prices in Experiment 5a 
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In order to compare the stage II results by the wholesale price statistically, we 
conducted two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests. We tested the null hypothesis 
that the %, & decisions by the wholesale prices in a given experiment are drawn from 
the same population. Table 4.9, Table 4.10, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 show the test 
results related to the wholesale price pairs in experiments 4a, 5a, 6a and 7a, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.9. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Wholesale Price in Experiment 
4a 
 
Exp 4a w=2 w= 3 w=4 
w=2 N/A 0.0553 0.0031 
w=3 0.0553 N/A 0.0018 
w=4 0.0031 0.0018 N/A 
 
 
Table 4.10. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Wholesale Price in Experiment 
5a 
 
Exp 5a w=2 w= 3 w=4 
w=2 N/A 0.0000 0.0003 
w=3 0.0000 N/A 0.0001 
w=4 0.0003 0.0001 N/A 
 
 
Table 4.11. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Wholesale Price in Experiment 
6a 
 
Exp 6a w=2 w=3 w=4 w=5 
w=2 N/A 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 
w=3 0.0063 N/A 0.0001 0.0000 
w=4 0.0000 0.0001 N/A 0.9511 
w=5 0.0000 0.0000 0.9511 N/A 
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Table 4.12. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Wholesale Price in Experiment 
7a 
 
Exp 7a w=2 w= 3 w=4 w=5 
w=2 N/A 0.0705 0.0489 0.0032 
w=3 0.0705 N/A 0.0000 0.0000 
w=4 0.0489 0.0000 N/A 0.0000 
w=5 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 N/A 
 
 
Most of the results support our observations from the figures above, and we reject 
the null hypothesis that the %, & decisions by the wholesale prices in a given 
experiment come from the same distribution. We have strong evidence that subjects 
react at stage II to the wholesale price set at stage I.  
 
4.2.3. Results in Stage I Decision 
We analyze stage I decisions in two parts. First, we check if the manufacturer subjects 
chose the theoretically optimal wholesale price or not. Second, we control if there is any 
learning in the wholesale price decisions or not.  
 
4.2.3.1. Comparing the Theoretical Optimum Predictions and Observed Data  
Theory assumes that the manufacturer subjects can “foresee” the outcome of the stage II 
game, and set the stage I decision (i.e., the wholesale price ) accordingly. Hence, we 
are interested in comparing their decisions with the theoretical predictions.  
Figure 4.7 presents the wholesale price choices of subjects in w-setting 
experiments. The figure illustrates the number of times that a specific wholesale price is 
selected in each experiment. Theoretical optimal  of each experiment are marked with 
an asterix. In general, we observe that the manufacturer subjects choose the 
theoretically optimal value or one value below the theoretical optimal, most frequently. 
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Figure 4.7. Comparison of Wholesale Price Choice in w-setting Experiments 
 
 
The “theoretical optimal” wholesale price assumes that the players will play the 
Nash equilibrium at stage II. However, we know that their choices deviate significantly 
from the equilibrium predictions. Hence, the theoretical optimum wholesale price may 
not be the practical optimum to set at stage I. Thus, the reason for why the subjects did 
not select optimal  in some of the w-setting experiments most frequently might be that 
the most selected  is more profitable than the theoretical optimum. Table 4.13 
compares the manufacturer’s average realized profit with the theoretical optimal , with 
the practical optimal  (i.e., the observed optimal  that resulted in the highest 
observed manufacturer’s profit) and with the most frequently selected .   
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Table 4.13. Manufacturer’s Profit Comparison for w-setting Experiments 
 
Exp.  
Theoretical Optimal  Practical Optimal  Most Selected          
 Manufacturer's  Average  
Profit 
 Manufacturer's Average  
Profit 
 Manufacturer's Average 
 Profit 
4a 3 1317.99  4 1416.30 3 1317.99 
5a 3 1239.00  5 2846.00 3 1239.00 
6a 4 1115.88  3 1531.58 3 1531.58 
7a 6 1263.00  5 2161.16 5 2161.16 
 
 
We observe that the subjects selected theoretical optimal  most frequently only in 
experiments 4a and 5a. However, the optimal  did not turn out to be the most 
profitable. For experiments 6a and 7a, the subjects did not select the theoretical optimal , but they selected the most profitable one. That is, they were successful in 
anticipating the stage II outcome, although this outcome is different from what is 
predicted by theory.  
 
4.2.3.2. Learning in the Wholesale Price Decision 
In section 4.2.2.2., we could not find significant learning effect in stage II decisions. 
Here, we aim to find if the manufacturer subjects learned how to make better wholesale 
price decisions over time in the w-setting experiments. 
First, we compare the wholesale price decisions in the first and the second halves of 
each experiment by conducting Wilcoxon Rank-Sum and Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests. 
We tested the null hypothesis that the wholesale price decisions in the two halves of an 
experiment have identical distribution function. Table 4.14 shows mean values (“Avg.”) 
of the wholesale price decisions in the first and second halves of each experiment, 
theoretical optimal wholesale price (“Opt. w”) in each experiment and p-values (“p-
value”) related to each test. For all experiments except 6a, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that wholesale price decisions in the first and the second halves of an 
experiment come from the same distribution. In addition, as shown in the table, mean 
values do not change from first half to second half consistently. 
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Table 4.14. Comparing the Wholesale Price Decisions in the Two Halves of Each 
Experiment 
 
WRS test KS test 
Exp. Opt. w Avg.  of 
1st Half    
Avg.  of 
2nd Half  
p-value p-value 
4a 3 3.30 3.11 0.14 0.40 
5a 3 3.00 2.91 0.40 1.00 
6a 4 3.13 2.77 0.02 0.00 
7a 6 4.14 4.26 0.30 0.45 
 
 
Hence the only experiment that shows signs of learning is experiment 6a. Figure 
4.8 shows that the average wholesale price in experiment 6a decrease over periods. Note 
however that the average wholesale price is not moving towards the theoretical optimal 
value 4, but to practical optimal value 3.  
 
 
Figure 4.8. Average Wholesale Price per Period in Session 6 
 
 
Given this observation, we analyze if the wholesale price decisions converge to the 
theoretical optimal value or not, for all four experiments. To this end, we measured the 
distances of wholesale price decisions to the theoretical optimal value in the first half 
and the second half of each experiment. We tested the null hypothesis that the distances 
of the wholesale price decisions to the theoretical optimal value in the two halves of an 
experiment are drawn from the same population. As shown in Table 4.15, the only 
significant difference between the distances appears in experiment 4a with the 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. The Kolmogrov-Smirnov test detects no significant 
difference. In addition, the average distances (presented under column “Avg.”) and the 
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standard deviation of distances (presented under column “StDev.”) in the two halves do 
not indicate a consistent improvement. Thus, we cannot say that the decisions move 
towards the theoretical optimal, in general.  
 
Table 4.15. Comparing the Distances of Wholesale Price Decisions in the Two Halves 
of Each Experiment 
 
 
Distance of  
in the 1st Half  
Distance of  in 
the 2nd Half  
KS test WRS test 
Exp. Opt. w Avg. StDev. Avg. StDev. p-value p-value 
4a 3 0.70 0.71 0.52 0.66 0.32 0.04 
5a 3 0.29 0.49 0.26 0.44 1.00 0.85 
6a 4 1.23 0.79 1.29 0.54 0.58 0.30 
7a 6 1.87 0.90 1.74 0.80 0.38 0.26 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CHAPTER 5 : EXPERIME"TAL STUDY OF BUYBACK CO"TRACT 
MODEL 
 
In this chapter, we explain and analyze the experimental study that we conducted on our 
buyback contract model. First, we give information on the experimental procedure and 
design. Then we focus on the analysis of the experimental data.  
 
5.1. Experimental Procedure and Design 
Our experiments are computer-based and were conducted at the CAFE (Center for 
Applied Finance Education) computer laboratory of Sabancı University. We coded and 
implemented the buyback contract version of the experimental model with HP MUMS 
software. As an example for the experiment code, in Appendix D, we provide the main 
script code that is used to define the number of subjects, and to call other functional 
scripts. Appendix E illustrates another important part of the code where the parameters 
(, , , , )), and contract parameters (, , the stages and the allocation strategy of 
subjects to the roles are defined.  
Subjects are selected from Sabancı University MS 454 course Fall 2010/2011 
students. We distributed instructions to the subjects before they came to the experiments 
to reduce the training time during the experimental session. Sample instructions are 
provided in Appendix F. At the beginning of each session, we made a short quiz on the 
instructions to make sure that the subjects understood the mechanism of the experiment, 
and eliminated the subjects who failed to pass the quiz. After the quiz, we let the 
subjects play several pilot (training) periods. Before beginning to each session, an 
experimenter explained the details of the game and answered the questions of the 
subjects. During the experiments, we did not let the subjects communicate with each 
other.  
87 
 
To provide incentive, the subjects’ total profit at the end of the experimental session 
is converted into a bonus grade for the course MS 454. The maximum bonus was set as 
1.5% applied to the final grade of the subject in that course. A survey on the 
experiments is conducted to the students after each session. In this survey, their 
suggestions and general opinion related to the experiments is asked.  
We conducted 7 experiments in 6 sessions. Only session 6 had two experiments 
(played by the same group of subjects). Each session lasted around 2.5 hours. In each 
experiment, the same game is played for 30 independent periods. General view of the 
experimental design is provided in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1. General View of the Experimental Design 
 
Session 
# 
Subjects 
Exp. 
# 
Periods 
Experiment Type 
1 10 b1a 30 w & b setting 
2 8 b2a 30 w & b setting 
3 14 b3a 30 given-w as 3 
4 12 b4a 30 w & b setting 
5 8 b5a 30 w & b setting 
6 12 b6a 30 given-w as 5 
6 12 b6b 19 given-w as 5 and given-b as 3 
 
 
Each subject was randomly matched with another subject at the beginning of each 
period. Subjects did not know with whom they were matched. A subject from each pair 
was randomly selected as manufacturer and the other as the retailer. Participating in 
both roles helped the subjects to understand the whole game, which is consistent with 
the full information assumption of the analytical model. Moreover, a specific subject 
played the role of the manufacturer and the retailer in equal number of times, which led 
to a fair distribution of monetary rewards. This is because the expected payoff of the 
manufacturer and the retailer are not equal in an experiment. The code, which is used to 
match the subjects and assign them to the manufacturer and the retailer roles, can be 
seen in Appendix E. At the end of each session, the subjects’ cumulative payoff is 
reported.  
In the most general type of experiments, there are three stages. At stage I, the 
manufacturer sets the wholesale price (as an integer between 0 and the sales price ), 
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and the buyback price (as an integer between 0 and the wholesale price)6. At stage II, 
given the wholesale and buyback prices, the manufacturer decides on the delivery lead 
time, and the retailer decides on the stock level simultaneously. At stage III, a random 
number of consumers are generated by the software, and the demand in each channel 
and the profit of each firm are realized. If both of the contract parameters are 
exogenously given, the experiment started directly from stage II. At each stage, 45 
seconds is given to the subjects to make decisions. 
We provided a decision support tool in subjects’ screens during the experiments. 
By using this tool, the subjects could run what-if analysis before entering their 
decisions. For instance, the retailer subject can enter a stocking level and his guess on 
the manufacturer subject’s delivery lead time to this tool and achieve the results for 11 
different realizations of the random total market demand (( = 0, 100, 200…1000). 
More detailed explanation about the decision support tool can be found in Appendix F. 
Subjects enter their decisions into the boxes at the bottom of the screens. At the end of 
each period, each subject learned the total demand realization, operational decision of 
his counterpart, number of units sold in each channel, number of lost customers, and his 
profit in the period. In addition, a historical results page was provided to every subject, 
presenting all previous periods’ results for that subject. 
There are three types of buyback contract experiments depending on the contract 
parameters (, ) being set by the manufacturer or exogenously given:  
• w & b setting: This type of experiments start from stage I where the 
manufacturer sets contract parameters (, ).  
• given-w & b-setting: This type of experiments starts from stage I where the 
manufacturer sets contract parameter () at stage I. Wholesale price ()  is 
exogenously given.  
• given w & b: This type of experiments start from stage II, and contract 
parameters (, ) are assumed to be exogenously given. Stage I is skipped.  
Table 5.2 shows the experimental design for w & b setting experiments.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 We constrained the wholesale price and buyback price decisions to integer values to facilitate the 
decision-making process of subjects and our analysis. As the unit production cost is assumed to be 0, the 
lowest wholesale price to set is equal to 0.  
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Table 5.2. Experimental Design for w & b Setting Experiments 
 
Session # Subjects Exp. # Periods     
1 10 b1a 30 2 100,000 10 6 
2 8 b2a 30 2 100,000 10 6 
4 12 b4a 30 8 200,000 15 6 
5 8 b5a 30 0 10,000 10 6 
 
 
The parameters (, , , , 	 of the experiments are set to match the parameters in 
the wholesale price contract experiments (WPCE), as compared in Table 5.3. We used 
the same parameter settings to compare the experimental results of WPCE with BCE, 
which is discussed in Section 6. Note that the optimum “channel strategy” turns out to 
be “share profit” with the BCM for all of these parameter settings.  
 
Table 5.3. Parameter Settings Used in Both Contract Type of Experiments 
 
Experiment 
Theoretical 
Optimal Dual 
Channel Strategy 
Theoretical 
Optimal Stage I 
Decisions 
Parameters 
WPCE BCE WPCM BCM () (, )      
4a - 5a b1a - b2a SP SP (3) (5, 5) 2 100,000 10 6 0 
6a b4a CP SP (4) (5, 5) 8 200,000 15 6 0 
7a b5a ER SP (6) (5, 5) 0 10,000 10 6 0 
 
 
Table 5.4 shows the experimental design for given-w & b-setting experiments. In 
these experiments, at stage I, the wholesale price is exogenously given, and the 
manufacturer determines the buyback price. These experiments have the same 
parameter set as experiments b1a and b2a. The wholesale price is given as 3 (a non-
optimal wholesale price) in experiment b3a and as 5 (the optimal wholesale price) in 
experiment b6a.  
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Table 5.4. Experimental Design for Given-w & b-Setting Experiments 
 
Session # Subjects Exp. # Periods Exp. Type     
3 14 b3a 30 given-w as 3 2 100,000 10 6 
6 12 b6a 30 given-w as 5 2 100,000 10 6 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows the experimental design for the only given w & b experiment7. 
This experiment has the same parameter setting (, , , , 	) as experiments b1a, b2a, 
b3a and b6a. Wholesale and buyback prices are given such that the optimal dual channel 
strategy of the manufacturer is capture all profit.  
 
Table 5.5. Experimental Design for Given w & b Experiment 
 
Session # Subjects Exp. # Periods Exp. Type     
6 12 b6b 19 
given-w as 5 
and given-b as 3 
8 200,000 15 6 
 
 
5.2. Analysis of the Experimental Data 
We present the analysis of our experimental data in three parts. First, we provide a 
general view of the results after eliminating the outliers. Second, we provide our 
analysis related to stage II decisions. This part covers comparison of the equilibrium 
predictions and qualitative predictions with observed data, learning in the operational 
decisions game, and effect of experiment type and buyback price on the operational 
decisions. Third, we focus on the decisions at stage I where the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale and buyback prices. In this part, we compare the theoretical optimum 
predictions and observed data, and analyze learning in the wholesale price and buyback 
price decisions. Finally, we analyze general trends on the decisions and the relationships 
between the decision variables.  
 
                                                 
7 Note that this experiment only lasted for 19 periods due to a system breakdown. 
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5.2.1. General View of the Data  
First, we eliminated outliers from our data, as presented in Appendix G. In total, we 
eliminated 12 data from our experiment results. In one period of experiment b1a, the 
manufacturer subject set a buyback price higher than the wholesale price he set, that is 
detected as outlier and deleted from the data. The rest of the outliers consist of a very 
high delivery lead time in comparison to the average delivery lead time set in a given 
experiment. Results provided in the tables below are calculated after eliminating the 
outliers from the data. We used a significance level of 0.05 for the statistical analysis in 
the following sections.  
Next, we provide the results on delivery lead time t, stocking level q, 
manufacturer’s profit and retailer’s profit in each experiment. For each of these, we 
show the model’s theoretical predictions under column “Eql.” and mean of the observed 
data under column “Avg.”. Table structures differ with respect to the experiment type. 
We provide the results related to w & b setting experiments, given-w & b-setting 
experiments, and given w & b experiments separately.  
 
General View of the Results for w & b Setting Experiments 
 
Table 5.6. General View of the Results for w & b Setting Experiments 
 
Wholesale 
Price  Buyback Price  Delivery Lead Time  Stock Quantity  Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b1a 5 4.5 5 2.3 200 26 990 413 2503 1619 495 286 
b2a 5 4.4 5 2.2 200 24 990 357 2503 1417 495 265 
b4a 5 4.6 5 1.8 100 29 920 359 2520 1699 460 -264 
b5a 5 4.7 5 2.3 ∞ 9 1000 436 2500 2153 500 243 
 
 
As seen in Table 5.6, both the manufacturers and the retailers have lower average 
observed profits than equilibrium prediction. Although the manufacturers set wholesale 
prices close to the equilibrium, they did not set the buyback prices as high as in the 
theory. Thus, the retailers ordered less than predicted. This caused less profit for both 
firms.  
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For all of the experiments in Table 5.6, unit production cost is zero and sales price 
is 6. The theoretical optimal wholesale and buyback prices are equal to 5 for all 
experiments. Thus, the manufacturer’s optimal strategy is to sell the products at a high 
wholesale price (close to sales price) and to buy the unsold products by paying back the  
wholesale price. That is, it is optimal for the manufacturer to take all risk from the 
retailer by setting  =  = 5. 
Next, we analyze the general results one step deeper by considering only the data in 
which the manufacturer subjects set the theoretical optimal wholesale price (i.e., =5 
for all four experiments above in the table) at stage I. Comparison of the results in Table 
5.6 with the results in Table 5.7 indicates an increase in the average buyback prices and 
manufacturer’s average profit. Average delivery lead time is closer to the Nash 
equilibrium, but the average stock level and the retailer’s average profit deviated from 
the Nash equilibrium more in comparison to the general results stated in the previous 
table.  
 
Table 5.7. Observed Results for Theoretical Optimal w in w & b Setting Experiments 
 
 
Buyback 
Price  Delivery Lead Time  Stock Quantity  Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. Explanation 
# of 
Data 
Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b1a  = 5 data 76 5 2.9 200 26 990 397 2503 1809 495 169 
b2a  = 5 data 42 5 2.8 200 28 990 302 2503 1547 495 166 
b4a  = 5 data 72 5 2.4 100 34 920 374 2520 1916 460 -311 
b5a  = 5 data 76 5 2.6 ∞ 7 1000 404 2500 2380 500 128 
 
 
Next, we focus even more and consider only the data for which the manufacturer 
subjects chose the theoretical optimal (, ) couple. Table 5.8 presents the results8. 
Note that the number of data points is really low. We observe that, the retailer sets the 
stock level very close to the equilibrium on average. This profits both the manufacturer 
and the retailer almost as predicted by the theoretical model.  
 
                                                 
8  Note that there exist no data for the theoretical optimal (, ) couple in experiments b2a and b5a.  
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Table 5.8. Observed Results for Theoretical Optimal (w, b) in w & b Setting 
Experiments 
 
   
Delivery Lead 
Time  Stock Quantity   Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. Explanation 
# of 
Data 
Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b1a (=5, =5) 
data 
6 200 29 990 932 2503 2858 495 547 
b4a 
(=5, =5) 
data 2 100 20 920 850 2520 2114 460 291 
 
 
We observe that the results are consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions, 
when the manufacturer chooses the theoretically optimal contract parameters  =  =5), the retailer orders a high quantity and the manufacturer’s profit is quite high. Thus, 
the model is successful in predicting the stage II outcome if the manufacturer chooses 
the theoretically optimal contract parameters at stage I. However, we have also shown 
that the manufacturer usually chooses a lower  and much lower  value than the 
model’s prediction. We will be studying the implications of these choices.  
 
General View of the Results for Given-w & b-Setting Experiments 
 
In Table 5.9 we provide the results for given-w and b-setting experiments. When the 
wholesale price is given as lower than the optimal (i.e., experiment b3a), the retailers’ 
order quantity and profit turns out to be very close to the equilibrium. However, when 
the wholesale price is given as the optimal, the retailer’s profit is relatively less than the 
equilibrium, because the retailer did not order as much. Behavior of the retailers to 
order less when the wholesale price is higher is probably due to risk aversion.  
 
Table 5.9. General View of the Results for Given-w & b-Setting Experiments 
 
 
Wholesale 
Price  Buyback Price  Delivery Lead Time  
Stock 
Quantity    Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. 
Exp. 
Type 
Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b3a 
w-given 
as 3 
3.0 3.0 2.0 1.7 38 167 716 614 1713 1437 1062 966 
b6a 
w-given 
as 5 
5.0 5.0 5.0 4.2 200 48 990 583 2503 2002 495 271 
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Next, we analyze the general results one-step deeper by focusing on the theoretical 
optimal buyback price data for each given wholesale price. As seen from the results in 
Table 5.10, in given-w & b-setting experiments, if the manufacturers set optimal 
buyback price, the average observed results become closer to the equilibrium values. 
This improvement is similar to what we observed with the w & b setting experiments. 
 
Table 5.10. Observed Results for Theoretical Optimal  in Given-w & b-Setting 
Experiments 
 
 
Delivery 
Lead Time  Stock Quantity  Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. Explanation 
# of 
Data 
Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b3a 
w-given as 3 
and =2 data 74 38 42 716 619 1713 1484 1062 908 
b6a 
w-given as 5 
and =5 data 91 200 74 990 796 2503 2377 495 458 
 
 
General View of the Results for Given w & b Experiments 
 
The results in Table 5.11 support our finding that if the optimal stage I decisions are 
given exogenously to the subjects, our theoretical model is more successful in 
predicting the stage II outcomes. 
 
Table 5.11. General View of the Results for Given w & b Experiments 
 
 
Delivery Lead 
Time  Stock Quantity   Manufacturer's Profit Retailer's          Profit 
Exp. 
Eql. 
Type 
Exp. Type Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b6b CP 
w-given as 5,    
b-given as 3 
21 27 322 264 2171 1624 48 -166 
 
 
In conclusion, the subjects on average set lower wholesale price, buyback price, 
delivery lead time and stock level in comparison to theoretical predictions. Thus, the 
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profit realize lower than predicted.  
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5.2.2. Results in the Stage II Decisions 
Here we focus on the operational decisions game at stage II. We aim to determine 
whether the Nash Equilibrium is a good predictor of the operational decisions game 
outcome, whether there exists any learning in the operational decisions over time, and 
whether there is an effect of experiment type or buyback price on the operational 
decisions at stage II. 
 
5.2.2.1. Comparing the Equilibrium Predictions and Observed Data 
We analyze if the Nash equilibrium is a good predictor of the operational decisions 
game results at stage II. To this end, we focus on stage II decisions of all experiments, 
independent of whether  or  was given or set at stage I.  
 
             
              
Figure 5.1. Delivery Lead Time and Stock Level Decisions around the Nash 
Equilibrium 
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From Figure 5.1, we observe that the delivery lead time and stock level decisions of 
the subjects (for a given  and ) are scattered around the Nash equilibrium. Each 
triangle in the figure represents the outcome of a one period game between a 
manufacturer and a retailer, and each square represents the theoretical Nash equilibrium. 
The given contract parameters (, ) are shown in parenthesis. We observe that the 
model cannot accurately “predict” the quantitative choices of the subjects, and there 
exists significant dispersion in data. We will study these later.  
While the model is not successful in quantitative prediction of the exact decision 
values, it is successful in predicting how the decisions will change when the parameters 
change. Figure 5.2 illustrates this result for session 6, in which the same subject set 
participated in two different experiments. We observe that as predicted by the model, 
both & and % decisions have increased from experiment b6b (=5, =3 data) to 
experiment b6a (=5, =5 data). The separation result is supported by a two-
dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov test with a p-value of less than10 p.   
 
 
Figure 5.2. Decisions in Experiments b6a (=5, =5 data) and b6b (=5, =3 data) 
 
 
Table 5.12. Average Stage II Decisions in Session 6 
 
Delivery Lead Time t Stock Quantity q 
Exp. Eql. Type (,) Eql. Avg. Eql. Avg. 
b6a SP 5,5 200.00 73.70 990.00 795.79 
b6b CP 5,3 20.80 26.59 321.80 264.39 
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As shown in Table 5.12, the average values of subjects’ decisions also reflect the 
separation.  
Session 6 is the only session in which we have one subject set participated in 
multiple experiments. For other sessions, we analyzed how the subjects' stage II 
decisions change in a given experiment for different stage I decisions (,). We show 
the separation results in the stage II decisions in Figure 5.3 for experiments b1a, b4a and 
b6a. In all of them, the changes are in the predicted directions. We supported the 
separation results with two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests with p-values less 
than 10 ' for experiment b1a, less than 10  for experiment b4a, and less than 10 p 
for experiment b6a.  
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
S
to
ck
 L
e
v
e
l 
D
e
ci
si
o
n
 (
q
)
Delivery Lead Time Decision (t)
b1a (5,4) b1a (5,4) Eql b1a (5,2) b1a (5,2) Eql
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
S
to
ck
 L
e
v
e
l 
D
e
ci
si
o
n
 (
q
)
Delivery Lead Time Decision (t)
b4a (6,2) b4a (6,2) Eql b4a (4,1) b4a (4,1) Eql
98 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Decisions in Experiments b1a, b4a and b6a 
 
 
We observe that although the model’s qualitative predictions hold, the data has 
deviations from model’s quantitative equilibrium predictions. Table 5.13 shows the 
predicted equilibrium values (in “Eql.” column), mean and median values of the 
observed data (in “Avg.” and “Med.” columns) for decision variables % and &. The table 
shows the p-values obtained from testing the null hypothesis that the median difference 
between the observed values and the predicted equilibrium value of the operational 
decision in each experiment for stated (,  is zero. As indicated by the p-values, for 
most experiments the median difference between the predicted equilibrium value and 
the observed data is found to be statistically significant by the Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test.  
 
Table 5.13. Comparing the Equilibrium Predictions with the Observed Data 
 
Exp. (w, b) 
Delivery Lead Time  Stocking Level  p-values  WRS test KS test 
Eql. Avg. Med. Eql. Avg. Med.   ,  
b1a 5,4 28.70 32.80 30.00 466.70 470.48 500.00 0.37 0.62 1.00 
b1a 5,5 200.00 29.00 29.00 990.00 931.67 1000.00 0.01 0.91 1.00 
b2a 5,2 18.80 33.81 37.50 211.70 231.94 250.00 0.00 0.68 0.00 
b3a 3,2 38.00 41.97 32.50 716.20 619.11 650.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
b4a 5,4 21.90 45.90 45.90 334.20 488.25 488.25 0.14 0.01 0.00 
b4a 5,5 100.00 20.00 20.00 920.00 850.00 850.00 0.16 0.66 1.00 
b5a 5,3 4.30 7.79 5.00 305.70 454.00 400.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
b6a 5,5 200.00 73.70 60.00 990.00 795.79 900.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
b6b 5,3 20.80 26.59 20.00 321.80 264.39 307.50 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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 The table above also shows the p
Kolmogrov-Smirtov test, which we used to test the null hypothesis that the 
values and the predicted equilibrium values of the operational decisions in each 
experiment for stated (
experiments, we find that the distributions of observed and predicted operational 
decisions are significantly different. 
In general, manufacturers set higher delivery 
when the predicted level is low, and lower delivery 
prediction when the predicted level is high. In general, retailers set lo
than the model’s prediction when the predicted level is high and higher stocking levels 
than the model’s prediction w
do not prefer to choose very low and very high values, but i
that are more moderate. 
to “pull to center effect” (
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-values obtained from two
,  come from the same distribution. For most of the 
 
lead time than the model’s prediction 
lead time than the model’s 
hen the predicted level is low. It seems that the subjects 
nstead they prefer values 
The behavior of subjects’ setting moderate values looks similar 
Bostian et al. 2008).  
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.4. Equilibrium vs. Average Observed Decision
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Figure 5.4 compares the average observed stage II decisions with equilibrium 
values for every buyback price set at stage I. For each experiment, we used only the 
data in which the wholesale price was set as the theoretical prediction. The theoretical 
optimal buyback prices are marked with an asterix9. We observe that there exist 
deviations from equilibrium values at this level as well.  
According to our model, in a given experimental setting, for a fixed wholesale 
price, when buyback price increases, the retailer’s stock level and the manufacturer’s 
delivery lead time increase. As seen in Figure 5.4, our stock level data is almost 
consistent with this qualitative prediction of the model; however, our delivery lead time 
data is not. Average delivery lead time is higher than predicted for low buyback prices 
and lower than predicted for high buyback prices, in general. The manufacturer subjects 
do not prefer a very short delivery lead time, because the direct channel cost caused by a 
short delivery lead time is deterministic; whereas the demand of direct channel is not 
known. It depends on the retailer’s decision and on the realization of the total random 
demand. Instead of risking themselves with a high uncertain payoff, the manufacturer 
subjects seem to prefer a lower yet more certain payoff. Risk and loss aversion might be 
reasons for this behavior. The manufacturer subjects do not prefer a very high delivery 
lead time; this is probably because the manufacturers do not prefer to depend only on 
the retailer’s good judgment. If the retailer stocks low quantity, there will be lost 
customers and the manufacturer might capture some of those with the direct channel. 
Another factor might be the endowment effect: As the manufacturer “owns” the direct 
channel, he places a higher value on this channel than what would be rational.  
These observations suggest that the analytical model of Gökduman and Kaya 
(2009) can be used to predict the characteristics of the decisions and the changes in the 
decisions when the manufacturer shifts from one dual channel strategy to another. 
However, the subjects’ decisions have significant deviations from the model’s 
quantitative predictions. Thus, the quantitative predictions of the model should not be 
used directly in decision-making in a real business environment.  
 
                                                 
9 In some of the cases, we could not mark the optimal buyback price. Because this buyback price is not 
selected by the decision-makers. Thus, there exists no observed data for them. 
 5.2.2.2. Learning in the Operational Decisions Game
Here, we again focus on the stage II decisions in order to analyze if the subjects learned 
how to make better decisions over time. We first controlled if there is dispersion in the 
decisions of the subjects in 
multivariate standard deviation normalized by the mean values. The related formula is: 
 

 
where %4, &4 shows a data point representing the stage II decisions of a given
manufacturer-retailer couple, 
and % and & are the means of the delivery lead time and stocking level decisions, 
respectively. We divide the deviations by their respective
normalization. Normalization prevents the stocking level 
considerably larger, to dominate the delivery 
We find that operational decisions data exhibit
that the subjects would search better strategies during the game. If so, the subjects 
would learn how to make better decisions over time, in which case the dispersion in 
their decisions would decrease and 
Nash equilibrium predicted by the mode
dispersion measure increased from 
Dispersion is due to heterogen
the course of the experiments. 
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each experiment. We calculated the dispersion by 
∑ %4 − % %⁄ ²54! + ∑ &4 − & &⁄ ²54!J − 1  
J is the number of observations (number of data points), 
 
(&4) 
lead time (%4) values.   
s significant dispersion. We expect 
the mean of their decisions would move towards the 
l. However, as shown in 
first half to second for most of the experiments.
eity of subjects and their trying different 
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Second, we analyzed if the decisions in the first half and the second half of each 
experiment come from the same distribution or not. As the p-values in Table 5.14 
indicate, for most of the experiments, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
decisions in the first and the second half of an experiment are drawn from the same 
population by Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) tests. For 
one-dimensional KS test, we tested for each decision variable % and & separately; for the 
two dimensional test, we tested the (%, &) decisions as a couple. In addition, as shown in 
the table, the average decisions in the two halves do not indicate a consistent move 
towards the equilibrium values.   
 
Table 5.14. Comparing the Stage II Decisions in the Two Halves of Each Experiment 
 
p-values 
Exp
. 
(, ) 
Delivery Lead Time  Stock Level  KS test WRS test 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg. 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg. 
  (, )   
b1a 5,4 28.70 27.08 39.00 466.70 513.08 424.33 0.31 0.49 0.35 0.03 0.14 
b1a 5,5 200.00 29.00 29.00 990.00 966.67 896.67 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.80 
b2a 5,2 18.80 33.13 34.50 211.70 288.75 175.13 0.96 0.27 0.28 0.91 0.14 
b3a 3,2 38.00 39.89 44.05 716.20 650.24 587.97 0.55 0.35 0.30 0.15 0.05 
b4a 5,4 21.90 48.20 43.60 334.20 570.00 406.50 0.76 0.06 0.30 0.39 0.14 
b4a 5,5 100.00 20.00 20.00 920.00 
1000.0
0 
700.00 N/A N/A N/A 1.00 0.32 
b5a 5,3 4.30 10.60 4.79 305.70 460.00 447.57 0.09 0.84 0.21 0.02 0.77 
b6a 5,5 200.00 61.52 86.16 990.00 760.41 831.96 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.35 
b6b 5,3 20.80 29.46 23.72 321.80 320.86 207.93 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.02 
 
 
Third, we analyzed whether the decisions in each experiment converge to the Nash 
equilibrium or not. We measured the distances of decisions in the first half and the 
second half of each experiment to the theoretical Nash equilibrium in order to analyze if 
there is a significant move towards the predicted equilibrium value. We tested the null 
hypothesis that the distances of the decisions in the two halves of an experiment are 
drawn from the same population. As shown in Table 5.15, for most of the experiments, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis by one-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) and 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) tests. In addition, the average distances in the two halves 
do not indicate a consistent improvement. Thus, we cannot say that the decisions move 
towards the equilibrium value, in general 
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Table 5.15. Comparing the Distances of Stage II Decisions in the Two Halves of Each 
Experiment 
 
  
Distance of Delivery Lead 
Time  
Distance of Stock Level  p-values 
 
 
Eql. 
1st 
Half  
Avg. 
2nd 
Half  
Avg. 
Eql. 
1st  
Half  
Avg. 
2nd 
Half  
Avg. 
KS test WRS test  
 
Exp. (, )     
b1a 5,4 28.70 6.67 11.87 466.70 82.30 95.12 0.83 0.99 0.96 0.96 
b1a 5,5 200.00 171.00 171.00 990.00 36.67 106.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
b2a 5,2 18.80 15.28 16.40 211.70 180.40 105.73 0.63 0.27 0.83 0.07 
b3a 3,2 38.00 24.59 22.16 716.20 98.62 139.11 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.30 
b4a 5,4 21.90 31.80 30.78 334.20 266.32 145.98 0.99 0.16 0.76 0.14 
b4a 5,5 100.00 80.00 80.00 920.00 80.00 220.00 N/A 1.00 N/A 0.32 
b5a 5,3 4.30 6.42 1.31 305.70 175.82 159.41 0.09 0.84 0.24 0.61 
b6a 5,5 200.00 140.65 131.62 990.00 238.67 167.73 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.27 
b6b 5,3 20.80 11.94 6.66 321.80 172.31 246.93 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
 
Experiment b6b turned out to be the only one that indicates some difference in the 
distance measure of the two halves data. Next, we check whether this difference is in 
the desired direction (i.e., reduced distance to equilibrium). In Figure 5.6 and Figure 
5.7, we provide the histogram plots of distances of decisions to equilibrium. These plots 
indicate that the % decisions are improved, but the & decisions are not improved.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Histogram of Distances of Delivery Lead Time Decisions to Equilibrium in 
Experiment b6b 
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Figure 5.7. Histogram of Distances of Stock Level Decisions to Equilibrium in 
Experiment b6b 
 
 
In conclusion, similar to the wholesale price experiments, we could not found 
indication of learning in the buyback experiments.  
 
5.2.2.3. Effect of Experiment Type on Operational Decisions 
We are interested in determining how the experiment type (i.e., w & b setting, given-w 
& b-setting, given w &b) affects the outcome of the stage II operational decisions game. 
To this end, we compare the subject groups’ behavior in the experiments with different 
experiment types when all other parameters are the same. In theory, a given wholesale 
price and buyback price, whether they are chosen by a human decision-maker 
(manufacturer) or exogenously given, should result in the same operational decisions at 
stage II game. In order to analyze, if there exists any difference, we compared the 
operational decisions from w & b setting experiments, given-w & b-setting experiments, 
and given w & b experiments for specified wholesale and buyback prices. In other 
words, we aim to find whether the manufacturer’s determination of the contract 
parameters at stage I makes a difference in stage II outcome or not. 
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Figure 5.8. Comparison of Operational Decisions in w & b Setting and Given w & b 
Experiments 
 
 
We detected some differences, particularly in the % decisions. For example, Figure 
5.8 compares the operational decisions between experiment b4a (w & b setting) and b6b 
(given w & b) for (=5, =3) data. Visual inspection suggests that there might be a 
difference between these two distributions. When we tested the data statistically, we 
obtained a p-value close to 0 for both & and % decisions by Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. 
Thus, we rejected our null hypothesis that the decisions in the two experiments come 
from the same distribution.  
We also compared the operational decisions in experiment b3a and b6a (given-w & 
b-setting) with b1a and b2a (w & b setting) for the same wholesale price and buyback 
price pairs. Related p-values are provided in Table 5.16. For almost all comparisons, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the stock level decisions in the two experiments 
come from the same distribution by Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. Hence, it seems like the 
retailers did not care much about whether the contract parameters were exogenously 
given, or set by the manufacturer. However, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
delivery lead time decisions in the two experiments come from the same distribution in 
8 of the 14 comparisons. Thus, the manufacturers seem to care about the difference in 
the experiment type while making their delivery lead time decision.  
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Table 5.16. Comparing w & b Setting Experiments with Given-w & b-Setting 
Experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.4. Effect of Buyback Price on Operational Decisions 
We are interested in determining how the manufacturer’s buyback price decision affects 
the outcome of the stage II operational decisions game. To this end, we compared the 
stage II results by the buyback price in given-w & b-setting experiments (experiments 
b3a and b6a). We do not present the results from w & b setting experiments because 
they yield a low number of data for any (, )  pair.  
Figure 5.9 compares the results by the buyback price (0 versus 2, and 1 versus 3) 
for experiment b3a. We observe that higher buyback prices usually lead to longer 
delivery lead times and higher stock levels. This observation is consistent with the 
analytical model's predictions. Note that our overall observations regarding dispersion 
and deviation from equilibrium are present in these figures.  
 
  
comparison 
 
comparison 
p-value p-value 
(, ) b3a 
b
1a
 3,0 0.00 0.95 
3,1 0.59 0.61 
3,2 0.19 0.72 
b
2a
 3,1 0.60 0.21 
3,3 0.05 0.06 
 
comparison 
 
comparison 
  p-value p-value 
(, ) b6a 
b
1a
 
5,1 0.02 0.33 
5,2 0.92 0.46 
5,3 0.20 0.27 
5,4 0.00 0.05 
5,5 0.00 0.23 
b
2a
 
5,1 0.05 0.37 
5,2 0.02 0.96 
5,3 0.47 0.96 
5,4 0.02 0.41 
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Figure 5.9. Decisions by the Buyback Prices in Experiment b3a 
 
 
In order to compare the stage II results by the buyback price statistically, we 
conducted two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests. We tested the null hypothesis 
that the (%, &) decisions by the buyback prices are drawn from the same population. As 
presented in Table 5.17 and Table 5.18, the subjects’ behavior is dependent on the 
buyback price set at stage I.  
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Table 5.17. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Buyback Price in Experiment 
b3a 
 
Exp b3a =0 =1 =2 =3 
=0 N/A 0.07 0.00 0.00 
=1 0.07 N/A 0.00 0.00 
=2 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00 
=3 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
 
 
Table 5.18. Comparison of the Stage II Decisions by the Buyback Price in Experiment 
b6a 
 
Exp b6a =1 =2 =3 =4 =5 
=1 N/A 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
=2 0.02 N/A 0.31 0.00 0.00 
=3 0.00 0.31 N/A 0.04 0.00 
=4 0.00 0.00 0.04 N/A 0.00 
=5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 N/A 
 
5.2.3. Results in the Stage I Decisions 
We analyze stage I decisions in two parts. First, we check if the manufacturer subjects 
chose the theoretically optimal stage I decisions or not. Second, we check if there is any 
learning in the stage I decisions.  
 
5.2.3.1. Comparing the Theoretical Optimum Predictions and Observed Data  
Theory assumes that the manufacturer subjects can “foresee” the outcome of the stage II 
game, and set the stage I decisions (i.e., the contract parameters  and ) accordingly. 
Given our experiments’ complex setting, and high uncertainty due to random total 
demand, it would not be easy for the manufacturers to do that. Hence, we are interested 
in comparing their decisions with the theoretical predictions.  
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Figure 5.10 presents the (, ) choices of subjects in the w & b setting 
experiments. The figure illustrates the number of times that a specific wholesale price 
and buyback price pair is selected in each experiment. Theoretical optimal (, )  
values of each experiment are marked with an asterix. In general, we observe that the 
manufacturer subjects not necessarily choose the theoretically optimal  and  values 
when they are setting both  and . The subjects usually choose  values that are close 
to the theoretical optimal, whereas the chosen  values are well below the optimal. As 
we will discuss later, this tendency of the manufacturers caused suboptimal profits for 
both firms, on average. 
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Figure 5.10. Comparison of (, ) Choice for w & b Setting Experiments 
 
 
111 
 
Figure 5.11 presents the results for the given-w and b-setting experiments. Here we 
observe that the subjects did set the theoretically optimal buyback price most frequently, 
when  is not a decision.   
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Figure 5.11. Comparison of (, ) Choice for Given-w & b-Setting Experiments 
 
 
The “theoretical optimal” (, ) couple assumes that the players will play the Nash 
equilibrium at stage II. However, we know that their choices deviate significantly from 
the equilibrium predictions. Hence, the theoretical optimum couple may not be the 
practical optimum to set at stage I. We are interested in comparing the subjects’ choices 
with the theoretical optimum and the practical optimum (, ) couples.  
Table 5.19 compares manufacturer’s average observed profit with theoretical 
optimum (, ) couple, with the practical optimum (, ) couple (i.e., the observed 
optimal (, ) couple that resulted in the highest observed manufacturer’s profit) and 
with the most frequently selected (, ) couple. 
First, as we mentioned above, the profit results show that the theoretical optimal 
(, ) couple is not the practical optimal (, ) for most of the experiments. Only in 
experiment b1a, the theoretical optimal (, ) couple is also the practical optimal, 
which provided more profit than the model predicts. Second, in all of the experiments, 
the most frequently selected (, ) couple is different from the theoretical optimal. 
Third, in the three of the four experiments, the (, ) couple that the subjects chose 
most frequently provided less profit than the average realized profit of the practical 
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optimal (, ). In experiment b5a, subjects selected the most profitable (, ) couple 
the most frequently. In general, the subjects are not successful in selecting either the 
theoretical optimal or the practical optimal (, ) couple the most.  
 
Table 5.19. Manufacturer’s Profit Comparison for w & b Setting Experiments 
           
Exp. 
Theoretical Optimal 
(, ) 
Practical Optimal 
(, ) 
Most Selected                 
(, ) 
(, ) 
Manufacturer's 
Average 
Profit 
(, ) 
Manufacturer's 
Average 
 Profit 
(, ) 
Manufacturer's 
Average  
Profit 
b1a 5,5 2857.50  5,5 2857.50 5,4 2184.16 
b2a 5,5 N/A 5,4 2074.77 4,2 1482.03 
b4a 5,5 2113.50  6,5 2862.67 4,1 2042.83 
b5a 5,5 N/A 5,3 2617.97 5,3 2617.97 
N/A*: not available 
 
 
Next, we study whether the subjects selected the most profitable buyback price, for 
a specific wholesale price value (exogenously given in experiments 3a, 6a, and for =5 
data in experiments 1a, 2a, 4a, 5a). To do this, we compared the choice frequency of 
buyback prices and manufacturer’s average observed profit with these buyback prices in 
all experiments except b6b. Figure 5.12 summarizes this comparison. Again, we 
observe that the subjects do not choose the most profitable buyback price in most of the 
experiments.  
In conclusion, these analysis show that in general, the manufacturers can not 
anticipate the stage II decisions and set the stage I parameters accordingly in a dual 
channel environment with a buyback contract. Recall that in the wholesale price 
contract study, the manufacturers were somewhat successful in choosing the practical-
optimal wholesale price at stage I. We believe that the introduction of the buyback price 
into the contract forces the limits of participants’ cognitive abilities. The participants 
might have difficulty judging the effects of the two contract parameters  and   
together. While the manufacturers are comfortable in setting high wholesale price, they 
are not as so when it comes to offering a high buyback price. This severely limits the 
potential gains from using a buyback contract. Hence, using a more sophisticated 
contract does not guarantee high increase in performance due to such mental limits. In 
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fact, this may be one reason why simple contracts are preferred to more sophisticated 
ones in practice. 
  
  
  
 
Figure 5.12. Comparison of Buyback Price Choice Frequency and Average Observed 
Profit 
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5.2.3.2. Learning in the Wholesale Price and Buyback Decisions 
In section 5.2.2.2., we could not identify significant learning in stage II decisions. Here, 
we conduct a similar study regarding the manufacturer’s wholesale price and buyback 
price decision at stage I.  
For analyzing w & b setting experiments, we compared the wholesale price and 
buyback decisions in the first half with the decisions in the second half of each 
experiment by the two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. We tested the null 
hypothesis that the stage I decisions (, ) from the two halves of an experiment have 
identical distribution function. As indicated by the p-values in Table 5.20, we could not 
detect any significant difference between the decisions in the two halves of the stated 
experiments. Hence, we failed to find evidence regarding “learning” with this approach. 
 
Table 5.20. Comparing the Stage I Decisions in the Two Halves of Each Experiment 
 
Exp. 
Eql. 
(, ) 
Avg.  1st 
Half 
Avg.  2nd 
Half 
Avg.  1st 
Half 
Avg.  2nd 
Half 
p-value 
b1a (5,5) 4.48 4.58 2.15 2.51 0.39 
b2a (5,5) 4.37 4.37 2.13 2.27 0.70 
b4a (5,5) 4.51 4.59 1.63 1.93 0.20 
b5a (5,5) 4.58 4.80 2.32 2.22 0.28 
 
 
Table 5.21. Comparing the Buyback Price Decisions in the Two Halves of Each 
Experiment 
 
Exp.  Eql.  
Avg  of 
1st  Half 
Avg.  of 
2nd Half  
p-value 
KS test                 WRS test          
b3a 2 1.65 1.83 0.61 0.15 
b6a 5 4.04 4.43 0.30 0.02 
 
 
For the given-w & b-setting experiments, the only decision at stage I is the buyback 
price. We tested the null hypothesis that the buyback price decisions in the two halves 
of an experiment come from the same population. As summarized in Table 5.21, the 
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) test detects significant difference between the two halves 
of experiment b6a. However, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates no significant 
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difference for the same experiment. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference for the other experiment, b3a. 
Given these observations, we analyzed the buyback price decisions in experiment 
b6a in detail. Figure 5.13 shows that the average (over players) buyback price in 
experiment b6a increases over periods towards the theoretical optimal value . This 
may indicate some learning. 
 
 
Figure 5.13. Average Buyback Price per Period in Experiment b6a 
 
 
To find evidence of learning, we also tried an alternative approach. We analyzed if 
the buyback price for given-w & b-setting experiments converge to the theoretical 
optimum value or not. In order to check if there is a move in the direction of theoretical 
optimum value, we conducted Kolmogrov-Smirnov (KS) and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
(WRS) tests and compared the “distances” of buyback price decisions to the theoretical 
optimal  value in the two halves of each experiment. We define “distance” as the 
absolute value of the difference between a data point and the theoretical optimal value. 
We tested the null hypothesis that the distances of buyback price decisions to the 
theoretical optimal   value in the two halves of an experiment have identical 
distribution function.  
Similar to our previous finding, the only significant difference we found was for 
experiment b6a, with Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test. The results are summarized in Table 
5.22. In addition, as shown in the table, the average distances in the two halves do not 
indicate a consistent improvement. Thus, we cannot say that the decisions move 
towards the theoretical optimum values, in general.  
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Table 5.22. Comparing the Distances of Buyback Price Decisions in the Two Halves of 
Each Experiment 
 
1st 
 Half Distance  
2nd 
 Half Distance  
p-value 
Exp. Eql.  Avg. Std. Dev.  Avg.  Std. Dev.  KS test                 WRS test                 
b3a 2 0.73 0.64 0.76 0.61 1.00 0.69 
b6a 5 0.96 1.09 0.57 0.82 0.30 0.02 
 
 
Again, we focus on experiment b6a decisions where there is some indication of 
learning, i.e., statistically significant difference between the distance values. From the 
table above, we observe that the average and standard deviation of the distances are 
smaller in the second half of the experiment. Figure 5.14 compares the histogram plot of 
distances between the two halves also supporting this result. For this experiment, the 
subjects might have learned how to make better decisions over time.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Histogram of Distances of Buyback Decisions to the Equilibrium in 
Experiment b6a 
 
 
For experiment b6a, we analyzed the change in the manufacturer’s profit and 
retailer’s profit. Figure 5.15 shows that the manufacturer’s average (over players) profit 
increases over periods. However, this is not supported statistically. Figure 5.16 shows 
that the retailer’s average profit in experiment b6a increases over periods towards the 
theoretical optimal value (495). The increase in the retailer’s average profit is found to 
be significant with a p-value of 0.01 and R² value of 0.197. Thus, for this experiment, 
the improvement of buyback decisions affects the retailer’s profit the most.  
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Figure 5.15. Manufacturer’s Average Profit per Period in Experiment b6a 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16. Retailer’s Average Profit per Period in Experiment b6a 
 
 
If the subjects learn how to make better decisions over periods, their profit should 
increase. To analyze whether there is a significant profit change, we tested the null 
hypothesis that the profits in the two halves of a given experiment come from the same 
distribution. We conducted our tests for the data that have the stated (, ) couples in 
Table 5.23 and Table 5.24 (for the manufacturer and the retailer respectively). 
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Table 5.23. Analyzing the Change in the Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Exp. (w,b) 
Manufacturer's Profit p-value 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg. 
KS test                 WRS test          
b1a 5,4 2038.00 2431.00 1916.75 0.60 0.16 
b1a 5,5 2503.00 2934.00 2781.00 1.00 0.51 
b2a 5,2 1326.00 1613.13 1158.00 0.63 0.37 
b3a 3,2 1713.00 1583.49 1384.38 0.72 0.23 
b4a 5,4 2108.00 2020.70 1256.40 0.76 0.41 
b4a 5,5 2520.00 4419.00 -192.00 N/A 0.32 
b5a 5,3 2257.00 2118.20 3153.43 0.04 0.01 
b6a 5,5 2503.00 2553.96 2195.22 0.35 0.25 
b6b 5,3 2171.00 1772.60 1476.21 0.06 0.14 
 
 
The p-values in Table 5.23 indicate that manufacturer’s profit increases 
significantly only in experiment b5a. Contrary to our expectation, a comparison of the 
manufacturer’s average profits finds a decrease from the first half of the experiment to 
the second for most experiments. Hence, we could not find any support regarding the 
manufacturer’s learning.   
 
Table 5.24. Analyzing the Change in the Retailer’s Profit 
 
Exp. (w,b) 
Retailer's Profit p-value 
Eql. 
1st 
Half 
Avg. 
2nd 
Half 
Avg. 
KS test                 WRS test          
b1a 5,4 227.40 335.69 251.00 0.73 0.38 
b1a 5,5 495.00 561.00 532.00 1.00 0.56 
b2a 5,2 101.20 148.75 114.63 0.96 0.75 
b3a 3,2 1062.00 959.92 855.70 1.00 0.63 
b4a 5,4 144.60 -194.80 -177.30 0.99 0.68 
b4a 5,5 460.00 547.00 34.00 N/A 0.32 
b5a 5,3 125.30 76.00 337.21 0.22 0.08 
b6a 5,5 495.00 491.41 423.56 0.23 0.26 
b6b 5,3 47.97 -237.77 -94.60 0.05 0.06 
 
119 
 
Table 5.24 presents the same results for the retailer’s profit. Again, we could not 
detect any significant change in the retailers’ profit from first half to second half of the 
experiments, in general.  
Next, we make a period-by-period comparison of the first and second half profits of 
the two firms. Figure 5.17 presents the results for experiment b6b, as an example. Each 
point in the figure represents the profit outcome of a manufacturer and a retailer at a 
single period of the experiment. Circles represent the first half data, whereas triangles 
represent the second half data. Visual inspection suggests that the profits of the firms 
have not improved from first half to second half of the experiment.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Comparison of the Manufacturer’s and the Retailer’s Profits in the Two 
Halves of Experiment b6b 
 
 
This observation is supported by two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests as 
shown in Table 5.25 for selected (, )  couples. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the profit outcomes of the manufacturer-retailer couples at each period come from 
the same distribution in the two halves of an experiment in all of the experiments. 
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Table 5.25. Analyzing the Change in the Manufacturer’s and the Retailer’s Profit 
 
Exp. b1a b1a b2a b3a b4a b5a b6a b6b 
(, ) 5,4 5,5 5,2 3,2 5,4 5,3 5,5 5,3 
KS test p-value 0.41 0.99 0.73 0.59 0.67 0.09 0.39 0.07 
 
 
Figure 5.17 also suggests a positive correlation between the manufacturer’s and the 
retailer’s observed profits. To check this relationship, we fitted a regression line by 
excluding the data points where the retailer’s observed profit is zero (i.e., where the 
retailer opted out by stocking zero units).  
Figure 5.18 represents this relationship. The significance of the relationship is close 
to 0, and R²=0.531, a quite high value. The reason behind this strong relation is that 
both firms’ observed profit depends critically on the realization of the random total 
demand. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18. Relationship of the Manufacturer’s and the Retailer’s Profit in Experiment 
b6b 
 
 
Table 5.26 presents the results of regression analysis between the manufacturer’s 
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less than 0.01. The results reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits.  
Table 5.26. Relationship between the Manufacturer’s and the Retailer’s Profits 
 
Exp. (, ) R² p-value 
b1a 5,4 0.84 0.00 
b1a 5,5 1.00 0.00 
b2a 5,2 0.55 0.00 
b3a 3,2 0.90 0.00 
b4a 5,4 0.37 0.01 
b5a 5,3 0.59 0.00 
b6a 5,5 1.00 0.00 
b6b 5,3 0.24 0.00 
 
 
5.2.4. Other Analysis 
Here we analyze the data to find out the trends (increase/decrease) over periods and 
correlations between decision variables. 
First, we are concerned with how the average decisions (over players) change over 
periods to learn if there exists any significant trend. To this end, we conducted simple 
(with one independent variable) linear regression calculations and observed trends in 
certain period averages, as summarized in Table 5.27.  
 
Table 5.27. Trends in Decisions over Periods 
 
Average Decision / Period 
Exp.      −  
manufacturer's 
profit 
retailer's 
profit 
b1a increasing increasing decreasing 
b2a increasing 
b3a decreasing 
b4a increasing decreasing 
b5a increasing 
b6a increasing increasing increasing decreasing increasing 
b6a decreasing decreasing 
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The changes in the stated variables are found to be statistically significant with a p-
value less than 0.01. However, R² values are found to be less than 0.3 which shows that 
trend over periods is not the only significant factor in explaining the overall variation. In 
particular, we observe that there is some indication of buyback prices and delivery lead 
time decisions rising over time. This suggests that the manufacturers switched from 
their direct channel to retail channel over the course of the experiment.  
Second, we analyze the relationship between the variables in each experiment to 
find out the effect of decisions to each other, if any. To do this, we conducted a 
regression analysis of each variable on other by using the data from the same period in 
each experiment. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
two variables. The relationships between some of the variables are found to be 
statistically significant with p-values close to 0. Detailed regression analysis results can 
be found in Appendix H. In general, we find that  
• when the wholesale price increases, the buyback price also increases 
• when the buyback price increases, stock quantity ordered by the retailer 
increases 
• when the difference between the wholesale price and the buyback price 
increases, stock quantity ordered by the retailer decreases 
• when the wholesale price increases, stock quantity ordered by the retailer 
decreases 
• when stock quantity ordered by the retailer increases, the manufacturer’s 
profit increases.  
Note that there is nothing surprising about these relationships. They are all 
intuitive, and these results serve as a logical check of our overall data.  
For a given wholesale price, the model predicts that, when buyback price increases, 
both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profit increases, primarily because the 
retailers order more. As presented in Figure 5.19, we analyzed the manufacturer’s and 
the retailer’s average observed profit for each selected (, ) couple in w & b setting 
experiments and compared these values with the theoretical predictions. We observe 
that the change in the profits is consistent with the model’s predictions. For a given 
wholesale price, when buyback price increases, both the manufacturer’s and the 
retailer’s average observed profit increases. 
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In Figure 5.19, we observed an interesting phenomenon: The manufacturer’s 
average observed profit is higher than the equilibrium profit for some (, ) couples 
(such as couples (5,0), (5,1), (5,2), (6,2) and (6,3) in experiment b1a, and  (2,1), (5,0), 
(5,1), (5,2), (6,1), (6,2), (6,3), (6,4) and (6,5) in experiment 4a). For these cases, we 
found that the average observed stock level is higher than the equilibrium. As the 
retailers ordered more, the manufacturers made more profit than predicted. Average 
stock levels ordered by retailers in experiment b1 and b4a are shown in Figure 5.20.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20. Average Stock Levels for (w, b) in Experiments b1a and b4a 
 
 
Next, we focus on the effect of buyback price on the firms’ profits. Below in Figure 
5.21, we compare the manufacturer’s average observed and theoretical prediction 
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 with an asterix10. From the figure, it is clear that the manufacturer’s
profit increases when the buyback price increases. 
 
Figure 5.21. Manufacturer’s Profit as a Function of the Buyback Price for the Optimal 
 
 
                                        
10 In some of the cases, we could not mark the optimal buyback price. Since this buyback price is not 
selected by the decision-makers. Thus, there exists no obs
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CHAPTER 6 : COMPARISO" OF WHOLESALE PRICE A"D 
BUYBACK CO"TRACT EXPERIME"TS 
 
In this chapter, we compare the wholesale price contract experiments (WPCE) with 
buyback contract experiments (BCE), to find out whether our theoretical predictions for 
different contract settings hold.  
According to Gökduman and Kaya (2009), buyback contract outperforms the 
wholesale price contract in terms of manufacturer's profit and total system profit. Thus, 
we expect that our BCE results will be better than WPCE results in terms of profits. In 
order to understand which contract type performs better in experiments, we compare the 
wholesale price contract w-setting experiments with buyback contract w & b setting 
experiments for each given parameter set (, 	, , , ), and wholesale price contract 
given-w experiments with buyback contract given-w & b-setting experiments for each 
given parameter set  (, 	, , , ) and wholesale price .  
 
6.1. Comparison of w-Setting Experiments with w & b Setting Experiments 
 
Table 6.1. Parameter Sets of Experiments in w-Setting and w & b Setting Type 
 
Parameter 
Set  
    Exp. Exp. Type 
1 2 100,000 10 6 
4a w-setting 
5a w-setting 
b1a w & b setting 
b2a w & b setting 
2 8 200,000 15 6 
6a w-setting 
b4a w & b setting 
3 0 10,000 10 6 
7a w-setting 
b5a w & b setting 
 In total, we have three different parameter sets 
are in w-setting type in WPCE, and w & b setting type in BCE. These experiments are 
shown in Table 6.1.  
We compared manufacturer’s prof
experiments in each parameter set by illustrating 
equilibrium values. 
 
Figure 6.1. Comparison of w
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manufacturer’s average observed profit is not as high as predicted by the equilibrium in 
BCE. The retailer’s average observed profit is lower in BCE (i.e., b1a, b2a) in 
comparison to WPCE (i.e., 4a, 5a) as predicted by the model
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 retailer’s average observed profit and average observed total 
-ordering.   
 
-Setting and w & b Setting Experiments for Parameter Set 
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6.2. Comparison of Given-w Experiments with Given-w & b-Setting 
Experiments 
We have one parameter set (, 	, , , ) for the experiments, which are in given-w 
type in wholesale price contract experiments, and given-w & b-setting type in buyback 
contract experiments. The experiments in this parameter set are shown in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2. Parameter Set of Experiments in Given-w and Given-w & b-Setting Type 
 
Parameter 
set  
     Exp. Exp. Type 
4 2 100,000 10 6 3 
4b given-w 
5b given-w 
b3a given-w & b-setting 
 
 
We compared manufacturer’s profit, retailer’s profit and total system profit of the 
experiments by illustrating average observed and theoretical equilibrium values.  
For parameter set IV, comparison of profits is shown in Figure 6.4. Manufacturer's 
observed profit, retailer’s observed profit and observed total system profit are increased 
on average when the contract type changes from wholesale price (i.e., experiments 4b 
and 5b) to buyback (i.e., experiment b3a). In all of these experiments, the wholesale 
price is given as 3. This wholesale price is relatively lower in comparison to the average 
wholesale price set in the experiments b1a and b2a, which are w & b setting version of 
the same experiment. Because the average observed buyback price set in experiment 
b3a is 1.74, which is close to theoretical optimal value of 2, retailer’s average observed 
stock level is close to equilibrium prediction. As a result, all supply chain members 
profited from the buyback contract in comparison to the wholesale price contract.  
 
 
 Figure 6.4. Comparison of Given
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increases when the contract changes from wholesale price into buyback. However, 
manufacturer’s average observed profit do not increase as much as predicted, because 
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-w and Given-w & b-Setting Experiments for 
Parameter Set IV 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CHAPTER 7 : A"ALYSIS OF THE FACTORS AFFECTI"G DECISIO"S  
 
Although the periods of an experiment in our experimental study are independent (i.e., a 
outcome in a period is not affected directly from any decision in a previous period), the 
decision in a given period might be affected by the outcome of the previous period due 
to behavioral reasons. For example, a subject that incurred a loss in a given period 
might make a more cautious decision in the next period. Given the complexity of our 
experiment setting (two decision stages, random total demand etc.), it is not easy to 
pinpoint the exact behavioral factors (loss aversion, irrationality, decision heuristics 
etc.) that affect participants’ decisions. At least, however, we can check whether the 
subjects’ decisions in a given period can be explained by a multiple regression model 
using variables related to previous period’s decisions and outcomes. Constructing such 
models would give us clues about the underlying behavioral factors that affect 
decisions.  
Here, we analyze the factors affecting the stock level decisions of retailers and 
delivery lead time decisions of manufacturers in the WPCE11. We used simple and 
multiple linear regression, and autocorrelation analysis. For a brief explanation on the 
multiple linear regression, please see the Appendix I.  
 
7.1. Retailer’s Stock Level Decision 
Here, we analyze retailer subjects’ stock level decisions in order to find the behavioral 
reasons underlying their decisions. First, we control whether there is a significant 
relationship between the stock level decision and other variables. We control the 
relationship with multiple and simple regression analysis for each experiment and each 
subject. Second, we control whether there is a significant relationship of each subject’s 
                                                 
11 Analysis regarding to BCE can be obtained from the authors.  
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stock level decision at a period with his decisions at the previous periods. To do this, we 
make an autocorrelation analysis.  
 
7.1.1. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
For analyzing the relationship between the retailer’s stock level decision and the other 
variables (i.e., if the decision of the retailer is affected by the changes in other 
variables), and measuring the effect of each variable on the retailer’s stock level 
decision, we used multiple linear regression as the method and SPSS as the statistical 
tool.  
We chose “backward” as the variable selection method and conducted all of our 
regression analysis using this method in SPSS. As we have many candidate predictor 
variables and data of many subjects who behave differently, we did not use 
simultaneous selection methods (i.e., “enter” or “remove”). The “stepwise” did not 
succeed in many of our regression analysis, because it aims to provide the least number 
of predictor variables in the model. In addition, the “forward” selection method showed 
similar results with “stepwise” and the results were not available for some cases. As 
such, we decided to use the “backward” method.   
We worked on all experiments and conducted regression analysis to regress “the 
retailer’s stock level decision at period t” with 7 different predictor variables. These 
variables and their abbreviations used in the regression result tables are shown in Table 
7.1. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between retailer’s stock 
level decision and the variables stated in the table. 
 
Table 7.1. Predictor Variables for Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of Retailer’s 
Stock Level Decision 
 
Variable Abbreviation 
retailer's sale at period t-1 saler 
retailer's profit at period t-1 profitr 
retailer's stock level decision at period t-1 stock 
total demand at period t-1 demandt 
retailer's overage at period t-1 overage  
lost-retailer demand at period t-1 lostrd 
wholesale price at period t  wprice 
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The predictor variable “wholesale price at period t” is only considered for the w-
setting experiments. The variable “retailer’s overage” denotes the retailer’s excess 
inventory when excess inventory exists, and the retailer’s lost demand quantity when 
the retailer loses demand.  
In addition to stated predictor variables in the table, we had selected “unsold retailer 
stock at period t-1” and “retailer demand at period t-1” as the other candidates for 
predictor variables. However, the analysis that included these variables did not result in 
significant regression equations for some of the cases. This was due to high multi-
collinearity between the predictor variables. First, there is a strong correlation between 
overage and unsold retailer stock. In some analyses, the correlation coefficient between 
these variables is equal to 1. The simple linear regression of unsold retailer stock and 
stock level indicated a very weak relationship. Hence, we removed this variable from 
our analysis. Second, retailer demand is stochastic and it did not exist in any final 
regression equation we obtained. It has a correlation with retailer's sale, retailer's profit 
and total demand. In addition, retailer demand is a fraction of total demand. Thus, we 
removed this variable from our analysis as well.  
The analysis is conducted for two different data: experiment-based (where all 
subjects’ data is collected together to see the general trend) and subject-based (to 
investigate subject-based decisions). In subject-based investigations, we analyzed each 
experiment data for each subjects’ decisions separately.  
Experiments that include at least 70% of the time the same stock level decision 
were excluded from the experiment-based analysis. Similarly, subjects who chose at 
least 70% of the time the same stock level in a given experiment were excluded from 
the subject-based analysis. For such experiments or subjects, R² values might be 
artificially high; however, these R² values do not convey meaningful information. These 
are stated as “Discarded” in the regression result tables. 
For all of the variables stated in the regression result tables, the VIF statistic is less 
than 10. We discarded the variables with a VIF more than 10 to avoid the effect of 
multi-collinearity. 
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7.1.1.1. Experiment-based Analysis 
Experiment-based regression analysis resulted with significant regression equations for 
all of the experiments. However, the R² values are found to be less than 0.5 for most 
cases.  
Experiment-based regression analysis results are shown below in Table 7.2. The 
column “Ses.” presents the session and “Exp.” presents the experiment. If the stock 
level decision is expressed by an equation of at least one predictor variable being 
significant (i.e., if the regression model passed the F test and p-value ≤ 0.1), the 
“response” for that experiment is defined as “yes”. “Response variables” show which 
predictor variables are in the regression model. We also provide the R², adjusted R² and 
F-test p-values. “Equation” shows the regression model of the significant analysis, 
where p-value is less than 0.1. Absolute regression coefficient (absolute beta values) of 
each predictor variable in an equation indicates the power of that variable in predicting 
the stock level decision.  
The analysis shows that the set of factors that affect the decisions depend on the 
experiment. However, previous period stock level is a significant variable that affects 
the stock level decision in most of the experiments. Wholesale price in the current 
period is also a significant variable in all of the w-setting experiments as indicated by its 
high absolute beta value. 
Experiment-based results give an idea about how most of the subjects behaved in a 
given experimental setup. However, as the R² values are not large enough, we may not 
say that the equations are successful in predicting the behavior of all subjects. In 
experiment 7a, the R² value is high due to the impact of the wholesale price on the 
retailer’s quantity decision. The significance is 0 for all of the regression equations, 
indicating that the models strongly (i.e., without error) reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between the stock level decision and the stated response 
variables. 
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Table 7.2. Experiment-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision 
 
Ses. Exp.  Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1 
1a yes 
overage, 
stock, 
lostrd 
0.163 0.144 0.000 
stock = 227.741 + 
0.447*stock - 0.302*lostrd 
- 0.246*overage  
1b yes stock 0.309 0.302 0.000 
stock = 93.638 + 
0.572*stock 
1c Discarded 
2 
2a yes 
demandt, 
overage  
0.150 0.137 0.000 
stock = 204.512 + 
0.325*demandt + 
0.412*overage  
2b yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
overage 
0.442 0.426 0.000 
stock = 127.221 + 
0.692*stock - 
0.087*demandt - 
0.145*overage 
2c Discarded 
3 
3a yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
overage 
0.473 0.455 0.000 
stock = 32.037 + 
0.375*stock + 
0.465*demandt + 
0.417*overage  
3b yes 
overage, 
saler 
0.204 0.188 0.000 
stock = 224.629 + 
0.510*saler + 
0.218*overage 
3c yes 
saler, 
overage  
0.585 0.575 0.000 
stock = 17.435 + 
1.002*saler + 
0.410*overage  
4 
4a yes 
wprice, 
profitr, 
saler 
0.321 0.312 0.000 
stock = 547.886 + 
0.535*saler - 0.077*profitr 
- 91.873*wprice 
4b yes stock, saler 0.303 0.296 0.000 
stock = 194.884 + 
0.608*stock - 0.148*saler 
5 
5a yes 
stock, 
wprice 
0.270 0.258 0.000 
stock = 567.070 + 
0.245*stock -
99.494*wprice 
5b yes 
stock, 
profitr 
0.359 0.346 0.000 
stock = 171.889 + 
0.571*stock - 0.040*profitr 
6 
6a yes 
stock, 
profitr, 
wprice 
0.331 0.320 0.000 
stock = 540.204 + 
0.315*stock - 0.029*profitr 
- 115.698*wprice 
6b yes 
saler, 
overega  
0.402 0.391 0.000 
stock = 53.883 + 
0.805*saler + 
0.309*overage  
7 
7a yes 
stock, 
wprice 
0.539 0.534 0.000 
stock = 787.303 + 
0.230*stock -
136.222*wprice 
7b Discarded 
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7.1.1.2. Subject-based Analysis 
The regression analysis results of the subject-based experiments are provided in 
Appendix J. Here we provide a summary of our observations. The subject-based 
regression analysis shows different results depending on the subject and the experiment. 
The most important observation is that we cannot talk of a set of significant variables 
that affect most subjects’ stocking level decision consistently, in general. The only 
exception is the wholesale price in the w-setting experiments (i.e., 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a). 
However, there are variables, which are responded by all subjects in a given 
experiment. For example, all subjects responded to retailer’s sale in experiment 2c and 
overage in experiment 3a.  
We obtained some more specific observations from the subject-based analysis. 
First, we can trust on the models in predicting the subjects’ behaviors. This fact is due 
to high prediction power (i.e., the R² values are greater than 0.5), and low significance 
of the models (i.e., the p-vales are less than 0.05) for most of the cases.   
Second, response of subjects to our predictor variables depends on the subjects, the 
experimental environment (the parameter set) and the type of the experiment. An 
example of subjects’ differing behavior in the same experiment can be observed in 
experiment 1a in which there are some subjects whose response to a particular variable 
is positive and other subjects whose response is negative. An example for subjects being 
sensitive to experimental environment is subject 8 in session 1. He did not respond to 
any variable in experiment 1a; however, he responded to some variables in experiments 
1b and 1c. This observation is the behavior of many subjects in sessions 1, 2 and 3. As 
examples for the effect of experiment type, we provide the situation in sessions 6 and 7. 
In experiments 6a and 7a, all subjects responded to at least one variable; whereas, in 
experiments 6b and 7b none of the subjects responded to any variable while deciding on 
the stock level. This is because experiments 6a and 7a are w-setting experiments; while, 
experiments 6b and 7b are given-w experiments.  
Third observation is about w-setting experiments (i.e., 4a, 5a, 6a and 7a). In these 
experiments, all subjects responded to the wholesale price except subject 7 in 
experiment 4a. In all of these cases, the wholesale price is the most powerful predictor 
of the stock level decision and it negatively affects the stock level. This is not surprising 
because the wholesale price is related to the same period, and hence, directly affects the 
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profit structure of the retailer, whereas the other predictor variables are related to the 
previous period.  
We also detected groups of subjects who respond to the same variables in a given 
experiment. For example, in experiment 4b, subjects 2, 10 and 12 only responded to 
total demand, in experiment 6a, subjects 4 and 5 only respond to the wholesale price 
while subjects 8 and 9 respond to both lost retailer demand and wholesale price. In 
experiment 7a, subjects 0, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 only respond to the wholesale price. 
However, none of the subjects responded to only the same set of variables in different 
experiments of a session.  
 
7.1.2. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis with Dummy Variables 
We wanted to deepen our analysis related to the relationship between retailer’s stock 
level decision and predictor variables stated before. To this end, instead of using the 
numerical values of some variables directly, we used 1/0 dummy variables where 1 
indicates presence of a characteristic and 0 indicates its absence.  
We changed three of our predictor variables into dummy variables. These variables 
are “retailer’s sale at period t-1”, “retailer’s profit at period t-1”, and “lost-retailer 
demand at period t-1”. Below in Table 7.3, we provide the “characteristic” that we 
searched in each variable values, our “logical test” to categorize the values, and new 
“categorical values” related to each logical test. 
 
Table 7.3. Dummy Variables 
 
Variable  Characteristic Logical Test 
Categorical 
Value  
retailer's sale at 
period t-1 
Positive retailer's sale  
retailer's sale > 0 1 
retailer's sale <= 0 0 
retailer's profit at 
period t-1 
Positive retailer's profit 
retailer's profit > 0 1 
retailer's profit <= 0 0 
lost-retailer demand 
at period t-1  
No lost-retailer demand 
lost-retailer demand = 0   1 
lost-retailer demand ≠ 0   0 
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As an example, the values of the variable “retailer’s sale at period t-1” are changed 
according to the characteristic “positive retailer’s sale”. If the retailer’s sale at a period 
is greater than 0, its value is replaced with“1”. If the retailer’s sale at a period is less 
than or equal to 0, its value is replaced with “0”.  
We conducted another multiple regression analysis to investigate the factors 
affecting stock level decision with the predictor variables presented in Table 7.4. We 
tested the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between retailer’s stock level 
decision and the variables stated in the table. 
 
Table 7.4. Predictor Variables for Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of Stock 
Level Decision with Dummy Variables 
 
Variable  Type 
stock level at period t-1 continuous 
total demand at period  t-1 continuous 
retailer's sale at period t-1 dummy 
retailer's profit at period t-1 dummy 
lost-retailer demand at period t-1 dummy 
overage at period t-1 continuous 
wholesale price at period t continuous 
 
 
We refer to the analysis with dummy variables as the “new” analysis, and the 
previous one without dummy variables as the “previous” analysis. For all of the 
variables in the regression result tables, the VIF statistic is less than 10 to avoid the 
effect of multi-collinearity. 
 
7.1.2.1. Experiment-based Analysis 
Table 7.5 below summarizes the results of our experiment-based regression analysis 
with dummy variables.  
New analysis results support the major conclusions derived from the previous 
analysis. The set of factors that affect the decisions depend on the experiment, previous 
period stock level is a significant variable, and wholesale price in the current period is a 
significant variable in all of the w-setting experiments. New analysis improved the R² 
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and adjusted R² values for most of the experiments. In most of the regression equations, 
the significant variables are changed in comparison to the previous analysis. 
 
Table 7.5. Experiment-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision 
with Dummy Variables 
 
Ses. Exp.  Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1 
1a yes 
stock, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.166 0.148 0.000 
stock = 173.698 + 0.422*stock + 
70.064*lostrd - 0.239*overage 
1b yes 
profitr, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.362 0.344 0.000 
          stock = 334.963 + 
125.248*profitr - 244.196*lostrd 
+ 0.676*overage 
1c Discarded 
2 
2a yes 
stock, 
saler 
0.211 0.199 0.000 
 stock = 593.427 + 0.387*stock - 
364.461*saler 
2b yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
lostrd 
0.443 0.428 0.000 
stock = 185.790 + 0.604*stock - 
0.086*demandt - 62.468*lostrd 
2c Discarded 
3 
3a yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
saler 
0.464 0.446 0.000 
stock = 232.777 + 0.953*stock + 
0.159*demandt - 310.924*saler 
3b yes 
stock, 
profitr 
0.199 0.184 0.000 
stock = 203.755 + 0.349*stock + 
53.887*profitr 
3c yes 
stock, 
overage 
0.589 0.580 0.000 
stock = 14.212 + 0.862*stock - 
0.386*overage 
4 
4a yes 
wprice, 
stock 
0.308 0.301 0.000 
stock = 554.654 - 90.538*wprice 
+ 0.254*prestock 
4b yes 
stock, 
profitr 
0.299 0.291 0.000 
stock = 222.963 + 0.508*stock -  
41.591*profitr 
5 
5a yes 
wprice, 
stock, 
saler, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.323 0.295 0.000 
stock = 716.373 - 
101.214*wprice + 0.255*stock - 
116.962*saler - 60.265*lostrd + 
0.083*overage 
5b yes 
stock, 
demandt 
0.332 0.319 0.000 
stock = 191.557 + 0.567*stock - 
0.083*demandt 
6 
6a yes 
stock, 
wprice 
0.318 0.310 0.000 
stock = 525.246 + 0.311*stock -
111.471*wprice 
6b yes 
stock, 
profitr 
0.418 0.407 0.000 
stock = 50.094 + 0.450*stock + 
124.162*profitr 
7 
7a yes 
wprice, 
stock 
0.539 0.534 0.000 
stock = 787.303 -
136.222*wprice + 0.230*stock 
7b Discarded 
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7.1.2.2. Subject-based Analysis 
Results of the subject-based multiple regression analysis of the experiments with 
dummy variables are presented in Appendix K. This new analysis indicates different 
results depending on the subject, the experimental environment (the parameter set) and 
the type of experiment as in the previous analysis. The most important observation is 
that we can still not talk of a set of significant variables that affect most subjects’ 
stocking level decision, in general. The only exception is the wholesale price in the w-
setting experiments (i.e., 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a).  
Our more specific observations related to new analysis consist of several points. 
First, the new analysis increased the number of positive response in total. There are 10 
new cases, in which a regression model explains the stock level decision significantly 
(passed the F test and p-value is less than 0.1). However, we observed 6 reverse cases, 
in which the stock level decisions are expressed by a regression equation significantly in 
the previous analysis, but not expressed significantly in the new analysis. One reason 
for this situation, which is observed for subject 6 in experiment 1a, and subjects 6 and 
11 in experiment 4b, is that the response variable that is obtained in the previous 
analysis could not be included in the new analysis because all values of the predictor 
variable turned out to be 1 or 0 for some of the subjects. Another reason is that some 
predictor variables turned out to be insignificant in explaining the stock level decision 
because changing the variable type caused to lose information. This is observed for 
subject 4 in experiment 3b, subject 6 in experiment 3c, and subject 7 in experiment 4a.  
 Second, new subject-based analysis did not result in improved R², Adj. R² and p-
values for all cases. There are some cases in which these values are deteriorated, and 
some others in which these values stayed the same. As a result, we can say that an 
improvement in R², Adj. R² and significance values is not observed in general.   
 
7.1.3. Simple Linear Regression Analysis  
We also conducted simple linear regression analyses between the stock level decision 
and each predictor variable alone. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between the stock level decision and the predictor variable. As an example, 
we provide the analysis on subject 9 in experiment 1a. We knew from the multiple 
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linear regression analysis that subject 9 responded to three predictor variables in 
experiment 1a resulting with a multiple regression equation of stock(t) = 512.679 + 
0.947*retailer’s sale(t-1) - 0.534*total demand(t-1) - 0.635*overage(t-1) with an R² of 
0.717 and p-value of 0.008. Related regression data is provided below in Table 7.6.  
 
Table 7.6. Subject 9’s Regression Data in Experiment 1a 
 
Stock 
Level (t-1) 
Total 
Demand 
(t-1) 
Retailer's 
Sale (t-1) 
Retailer's 
Profit (t-1) 
Lost-Retailer 
Demand (t-1) 
Overage 
(t-1) 
Stock 
Level (t) 
500 896 500 3000 97 -97 600 
600 567 435 1950 297 -297 600 
600 682 565 3250 170 -170 600 
600 362 291 510 251 -251 500 
500 546 413 2130 179 -179 450 
450 115 83 -970 0 196 200 
200 295 182 1020 299 -299 450 
450 102 85 -950 0 95 500 
500 123 99 -1010 0 75 200 
200 281 178 980 0 155 600 
600 43 34 -2060 462 -462 100 
100 875 100 600 318 -318 300 
300 796 300 1800 0 109 500 
 
 
Below in figures, the relationship between each predictor variable and subject 9’s 
stock level decision are plotted. The regression equations, R² values and p-values are 
also provided.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Lost-Retailer Demand(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
stock (t)= -0,245*lostrd(t-1) + 469,9
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Figure 7.1 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and his lost 
demand at period t-1 are negatively related. The absolute beta value shows that a change 
in the lost-retailer demand affects his decision moderately. However, proportion of the 
variance in stock level explained by the model (i.e., the R² value) is very small and p-
value is greater than 0.1, thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between stock level decision and previous period lost-retailer demand. Note 
that the existence of “zero” predictor values (i.e., when there is no lost-retailer demand) 
deteriorate the quality of the regression.   
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Overage(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
 
 
Figure 7.2 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and his “overage at 
period t-1” are positively related. However, the beta value of the overage is only 0.090 
which shows that a change in overage has a very small effect on the subject 9’s 
decision. R² value is 0.012, which shows that the model’s success in explaining the 
variance of the stock level is very low. P-value is greater than 0.1, so we say that there 
is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
overage in previous period and stock level decision.  
 
stock(t)= 0,090*overage(t-1) + 440,8
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Figure 7.3. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Retailer’s Profit(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
 
 
Figure 7.3 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and his profit at 
period t-1 are positively related. Beta value is small due to the scale difference between 
the profit values and stocking values. The model’s success in explaining the variance in 
the stock level decision is large, as indicated by the high R² value. The p-value is 0, 
showing that there is a very significant relationship between retailer’s stock level 
decision and his previous period profit. If we know the retailer’s profit in period t-1, we 
can predict his stock level decision at period t successfully. However, “retailer’s profit 
at period t-1” is not indicated as a response variable according to the multiple regression 
analysis. The reason for that is the high multi-collinearity between retailer’s profit and 
other predictor variables, which resulted with a low tolerance value (0), so that this 
variable could not enter to any model. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Retailer’s Sale(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
stock (t)= 0,084*profitr(t-1) + 364,2
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Figure 7.4 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and his sale at 
period t-1 are positively related and the beta value is relatively high, showing that a 
change in the retailer’s sale in previous period affects the stock level decision strongly. 
R² value of 0.547 indicates that the model’s success in predicting the stock level is high. 
P-value is 0 denoting that the model is very significant (i.e., have no error). This is not 
surprise as the multiple regression analysis indicated “retailer’s sale at period t-1” as a 
significant predictor variable. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Total Demand(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
 
 
Figure 7.5 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and total demand 
at period t-1 are positively related. R² value indicates a low prediction power of the total 
demand. P-value is less than 0.1, so we reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between total demand at period t-1 and retailer’s stock level decision at 
period t. This is the result we obtained from the multiple regression analysis that “total 
demand at period t-1” is a significant response variable. 
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Figure 7.6. Retailer’s Stock Level(t) vs. Stock Level(t-1) in Exp. 1a 
 
 
Figure 7.6 shows that subject 9’s stock level decision at period t and stock level at 
period t-1 are negatively related. However, the beta value is so small that we can 
assume that there is no relationship between them. R² value of this regression (4E-05) is 
very small and p-value is very high, indicating that the model is not accepted. 
To sum up, the simple linear regression analysis results of subject 9 in experiment 
1a indicate that he responded his previous period profit and sale, and previous period 
total demand when he made his decisions.  
Table 7.7 presents our initial estimations of the sign of the relationship between 
each predictor variable and the dependent variable.  
 
Table 7.7. Expected Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and 
Stock Level Decision 
 
Variable 
Expected Sign of 
the Relationship 
stock level at period t-1 + 
total demand at period t-1 + 
retailer's sale at period t-1 + 
retailer's profit at period t-1 + 
lost-retailer demand at period t-1 + 
overage  at period t-1 - 
wholesale price at period t - 
 
stock (t)= -0,006*stock(t-1) + 433,5
R² = 4E-05 p-value=0.98
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Only in some of the cases, we observed these full set of expectations to hold. For 
the other cases, at least one predictor variable had the opposite effect or it is not possible 
to define the relationship12.  
Next, we checked if there exists consistency among subjects regarding the beta 
signs. We detected some subjects who have the same sign combination in an 
experiment. Table 7.8. presents the signs of beta coefficients for all subjects in 
experiment 1c. We observe that subjects 0, 7 and 9 have the same set of signs.  
 
Table 7.8. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Stock Level 
Decision in Experiment 1c 
 
Subjects 
Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
stock level(t-1) + N/A N/A + N/A - - + + + 
total demand (t-1) - N/A N/A + N/A + + - + - 
retailer's sale (t-1) + N/A N/A + N/A + N/A + + + 
retailer's profit (t-1) - N/A N/A - N/A + + - - - 
lost-retailer demand (t-1) - N/A N/A - N/A + - - + - 
overage (t-1) + N/A N/A + N/A - - + + + 
 
 
Table 7.9. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Stock Level 
Decision in Experiment 1b 
 
Subjects  
Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
stock level(t-1) + + + - + - + - - + 
total demand (t-1) + - + + - - - + + + 
retailer's sale (t-1) + + + + - - - + - + 
retailer's profit (t-1) + + + + - - - + - + 
lost retailer demand (t-1) - N/A + + N/A - - + + + 
overage (t-1) + + - - + + + - - - 
 
 
                                                 
12 The sign of the relationship between each predictor variable and stock level decision for all subjects in 
each  experiment is available from the authors. 
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On the contrary, for some experiments it is possible to find two subjects that have 
inverse signs of each other for each variable. Table 7.9 illustrates this for experiment 1b, 
subjects 5 and 9. 
Finally, we wanted to see if the same subject had the same responses to a given 
variable among different experiments in a given session. We found differences. This 
makes sense because different experiments mean different parameter sets. Table 7.10 
and Table 7.11 illustrate this for subject 7 in session 1 and subject 9 in session 7, 
respectively.  
 
Table 7.10. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Stock Level 
Decision for Subject 7 in Session 1 
 
Variable Exp 1a Exp 1b Exp 1c 
stock level (t-1) + - + 
total demand (t-1) - + - 
retailer's sale (t-1) - + + 
retailer's profit (t-1) - + - 
lost-retailer demand (t-1) - + - 
overage (t-1) + - + 
 
 
Table 7.11. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Stock Level 
Decision for Subject 9 in Session 7 
 
Variable Exp 7a Exp 7b 
stock level(t-1) + - 
total demand (t-1) + - 
retailer's sale (t-1) + - 
retailer's profit (t-1) + - 
lost-retailer demand (t-1) + - 
overage (t-1) + + 
 
 
In conclusion, there is not a general trend in subjects’ behavior when they decide on 
the stock level decision. Most of the subjects did not respond according to our 
expectations.  
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7.1.4. Autocorrelation Analysis 
In some of our analysis, we observed that the subjects’ stock level decisions are not 
related with the seven predictor variables significantly. This result encouraged us to 
investigate other factors to affect the subjects' stock level decisions. Thus, we analyzed 
if the stock level decisions of the subjects are affected from their own stock level 
decisions in previous periods. To do this, we conducted subject-based autocorrelation 
analysis for all experiments.  
In statistics, autocorrelation of a variable describes the correlation between the 
values of that variable in different two time points, as a function of these time points. 
"Lag t" indicates the time period distance of the compared values of the variable.  
In Appendix L, we provide our autocorrelation analysis results for each subject in 
each experiment. Correlation values are presented for first three lags. Significance 
indicates the p-value at the first lag obtained by conducting the Box-Ljung test. The 
Box-Ljung is a statistical test, which is based on autocorrelation plot, and tests the 
overall randomness based on a number of lags. By using this test, the null hypothesis of 
“the data is random” (i.e., the decisions are independent) is tested. 
Analyzing our results, we conclude that there is not enough evidence to say that the 
subjects' stock level decisions are affected from their own stock level decisions in any 
of the previous three periods significantly. However, there are some cases, in which a 
subject’s decision is highly related to his previous period decision. All of these cases are 
found to be statistically significant at the first lag with a significance value of less than 
0.05 with the Box-Ljung test. This is not surprising because most of these cases resulted 
with a significant response of the manufacturer to stock level at period t-1 in multiple 
regression analysis. Moreover, by conducting autocorrelation analysis, we managed to 
explain the behavior in two new cases. Although multiple regression analysis did not 
indicate any significant result for these cases, autocorrelation analysis indicated that 
they affected from their own previous period stock level when making their decisions. 
 
7.2. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time Decision 
Here, we analyze manufacturer subjects’ delivery lead time decisions in order to find 
the behavioral reasons underlying their decisions. First, we control whether there is a 
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significant relationship between the delivery lead time decision and other variables. We 
control the relationship with multiple and simple regression analysis for each 
experiment and each subject. Second, we control whether there is a significant 
relationship of each subject’s delivery lead time decision at a period with his decisions 
at the previous periods. To do this, we make an autocorrelation analysis.  
 
7.2.1. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
We analyzed if the subjects are affected from the changes in other variables when they 
set delivery lead time. For analyzing the relationship between the manufacturer’s 
delivery lead time decision and the other variables, and measuring the effect of each 
variable on the manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision, we used multiple linear 
regression as the method and SPSS as the statistical tool. As the variable selection 
method, we used “backward”. We worked on all experiments and conducted regression 
analysis to regress “the manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision at period t” with 6 
different predictor variables. These variables and their abbreviations used in regression 
result tables are shown below in Table 7.12. We tested the null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship between manufacturer’s delivery lead time decision and the variables 
stated in the table. The predictor variable “wholesale price at period t” is only 
considered for the w-setting experiments.  
 
Table 7.12. Predictor Variables for Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of 
Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time Decision 
 
Variable Abbreviation 
manufacturer's profit at period t-1 profitm  
manufacturer's sale (direct channel sale) at period t-1 salem 
total demand at period t-1 demandt 
total sale at period t-1 salet 
delivery lead time at period t-1 time 
wholesale price at period t  wprice 
 
 
In addition to stated predictor variables in the table, we had considered 
“manufacturer’s profit from direct channel at period t-1” and “manufacturer’s profit 
from retailer at period t-1” as other candidates for predictor variables. However, the 
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analysis that included these variables did not result in significant regression equations 
for some of the cases. This was due to high multi-collinearity between the predictor 
variables. First, manufacturer’s profit is sum of manufacturer’s profit from direct 
channel and manufacturer’s profit from retailer. Hence, these three variables cannot be 
used as predictors all together. Second, manufacturer’s profit from direct channel is 
highly correlated with manufacturer’s sale (i.e., his sale in the direct channel). Third, as 
the direct channel demand is a ratio of total demand and correlated with manufacturer's 
profit from direct channel, manufacturer's profit from direct channel is also highly 
correlated with total demand. As a result, we decided to remove these variables from 
our analysis.  
The analysis is conducted for two different data: experiment-based (where all 
subjects’ data is collected together to see the general trend) and subject-based (to 
investigate subject-based decisions). In subject-based investigations, we analyzed each 
experiment data for each subjects’ decisions separately.  
Experiments, which include at least 70% of the time the same delivery lead time 
decision, were excluded from the experiment-based analysis. Similarly, subjects who 
chose at least 70% of the time the same delivery lead time in a given experiment were 
excluded from the subject-based analysis. For such experiments or subjects, R² values 
might be artificially high; however, these R² values do not convey meaningful 
information. These are stated as “Discarded” in the regression result tables. 
For all of the variables stated in regression result tables, the VIF statistic is less than 
10. We discarded the variables with a VIF more than 10 to avoid the effect of multi-
collinearity. 
 
7.2.1.1. Experiment-based Analysis 
Results are shown in Table 7.13. The column “Ses.” presents the session and “Exp.” 
presents the experiment. If the delivery lead time decision is expressed by an equation 
of at least one predictor variable significantly (i.e., if the regression model passed the F 
test and p-value ≤ 0.1), the “response” for that experiment is defined as “yes”. 
“Response variables” show which predictor variables are in the regression model. We 
also provide R², the adjusted R² and F-test p-values. “Equation” shows the regression 
model of the significant analysis, where p-value is less than 0.1. Absolute regression 
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coefficient (absolute beta values) of each predictor variable in an equation indicates the 
power of that variable in predicting the delivery lead time decision.  
 
Table 7.13. Experiment-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time 
Decision 
 
Ses. Exp.  Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1 
1a yes time 0.295 0.289 0.000 time = 8.772 + 0.447*time 
1b yes time 0.390 0.384 0.000 time = 10.468 + 0.603*time 
1c yes time 0.322 0.316 0.000 time = 4.568 + 0.562*time 
2 
2a yes 
time, 
profitm, 
demandt 
0.376 0.362 0.000 
time = 4.508 + 0.7*time - 
0.016*demandt + 
0.003*profitm 
2b yes time 0.591 0.588 0.000 time = 5.807 + 0.843*time 
2c yes time 0.606 0.603 0.000 time = 4.406 + 0.510*time 
3 
3a yes time 0.665 0.661 0.000 time = 3.613 + 0.818*time 
3b yes 
time, 
profitm, 
salem  
0.362 0.343 0.000 
time = 44.661 + 0.428*time 
- 0.009*profitm - 
0.114*salem 
3c yes 
time, 
profitm 
0.477 0.465 0.000 
time = 7.308 + 0.543*time 
- 0.001*profitm 
4 
4a yes time 0.224 0.221 0.000 time = 13.486 + 0.508*time 
4b yes 
salet, 
time, 
salem 
0.372 0.362 0.000 
time = 17.618  + 
0.472*time - 0.012*salet + 
0.005*salem 
5 
5a yes time  0.232 0.226 0.000 time = 16.381 + 0.403*time 
5b yes 
time, 
demandt, 
salem 
0.522 0.507 0.000 
time = 11.584 + 0.528*time 
+ 0.016*demandt - 
0.103*salem 
6 
6a yes 
time, 
profitm 
0.265 0.257 0.000 
time = 9.801 + 0.489*time 
+ 0.000*profitm 
6b yes time 0.223 0.216 0.000 time = 7.065 + 0.588*time 
7 
7a yes 
time, 
wprice 
0.911 0.910 0.000 
time = 5.860 + 0.947*time 
-1.207*wprice 
7b Discarded 
 
 
The analysis shows that set of factors that affect the decisions depend on the 
experiment. However, previous period delivery lead time is a significant variable that 
affects the delivery lead time decision in all of the experiments, and the most strong 
predictor variable in most of the experiments. In other words, a change in this variable 
affects the manufacturer’s decision most. High absolute beta values of the “delivery 
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lead time at period t-1” indicate this effect. In contrast to the stock level analysis results, 
wholesale price in the current period is not a significant variable in all of the w-setting 
experiments.  
Experiment-based results give an idea on how most of the subjects behaved in a 
given experimental setup. The significance is 0 for all of the experiments, indicating 
that the model rejects the null hypothesis that there is a no relationship between the 
delivery lead time decisions and stated response variables strongly. The R² values are 
high, showing the success of the model in predicting the delivery lead time. 
 
7.2.1.2. Subject-based Analysis 
The regression analysis results of the subject-based experiments are provided in 
Appendix M. Here we provide a summary of our observations The subject-based 
regression analysis shows different results depending on the subject and experiment. 
The most important observation is that we can talk of a significant variable that affects 
most subjects’ delivery lead time decision consistently, in general. This variable is 
previous period delivery lead time. Experiment-based results were a sign of this result. 
Besides, there are some variables, which are responded by all subjects in a given 
experiment. These include wholesale price in experiment 7a, manufacturer’s profit in 
experiment 5a, and delivery lead time in experiments 1c, 2c and 3a.  
We obtained some more specific observations from the subject-based analysis. 
First, we can trust on the models in predicting the subjects’ behaviors. This fact is due 
to high prediction power (i.e., the R² values are greater than 0.5) and low significance of 
the models (i.e., the p-vales are less than 0.05) for most of the cases.   
Second, response of subjects to our predictor variables depends on the subjects, the 
experimental environment (the parameter sett) and the type of the experiment. An 
example of subjects’ differing behavior in the same experiment can be observed in 
experiment 1b in which there are some subjects whose response to a particular variable 
is positive and other subjects whose response is negative. An example for subjects being 
sensitive to experimental environment is subject 9 in session 1. He did not respond to 
any variable in experiment 1a and 1c; however, he responded to a variable in 
experiments 1b. This observation is the common behavior of some subjects in sessions 
1, 2 and 3. An example for the effect of experiment type is the situation in session 4. 
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When we compare the results in experiment 4a with 4b, we observe that the same 
subjects responded differently. This is because experiment 4a is a w-setting experiment, 
while, experiment 4b is a given-w experiment.  
Third observation is about w-setting experiments (i.e., 4a, 5a, 6a and 7a). In these 
experiments, not all manufacturer subjects responded to the wholesale price in contrast 
to the retailer subjects when they decide on their stage II decisions. However, the 
wholesale price is the most powerful predictor of the delivery lead time decisions as in 
the analysis results of the stock level decisions. This is not surprising because the 
wholesale price is related to the same period, and hence, directly affects the profit 
structure of the manufacturer, whereas the other predictor variables are related to the 
previous period. Another observation is on the sign of the relationship. In experiment 
7a, all subjects responded to wholesale price negatively. However, in experiments 4a, 
5a and 6a, the relationship between the delivery lead time and wholesale price is not 
always negative; even all responses are in positive direction in experiment 4a. The 
manufacturer’s optimal strategy in these experiments, which is ER in experiment 7a, CP 
in experiment 6a, and SP in experiments 4a and 5a might explain this change.  
We also detected groups of subjects (1) who responded to the same variables in a 
given experiment, and (2) who responded to the same variables in different experiments 
of the same session. Some   examples of the first situation are observed in experiments 
1b, 3b and 4a. In experiment 1b, subjects 2, 3 and 5 only responded to delivery lead 
time, in experiment 3b, subjects 0 and 4 only responded to total demand, and in 
experiment 4a, subjects 8 and 13 responded to both delivery lead time and 
manufacturer’s profit. An example of the second situation is observed in session 2. 
Subjects 4 and 6 only responded to delivery lead time in all experiments of this session.  
 
7.2.2. Simple Linear Regression Analysis 
We also conducted simple linear regression analyses between the delivery lead time 
decision and each predictor variable alone. We tested the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between the delivery lead time decision and the predictor variable. As an 
example, we provide the analysis on subject 1 in experiment 7b. We knew from the 
multiple linear regression analysis that subject 1 responded to one predictor variable in 
Experiment 7b resulting in a multiple regression equation of delivery time(t) = 7.288 - 
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0.005*total sale(t-1) with an R² of 0.430 and p-value of 0.011. Related data is provided 
in Table 7.14.  
 
Table 7.14. Subject 1’s Regression Data in Experiment 7b 
 
Delivery Lead 
Time  (t-1) 
Total Demand 
(t-1) 
Manufacturer's 
Sale (t-1) 
Manufacturer’s 
Profit (t-1) 
Total Sale 
(t-1) 
Delivery 
Lead 
Time (t) 
50 518 41 242 41 10 
10 88 35 110 35 8 
8 8 4 -132 4 10 
10 519 208 1148 208 7 
7 98 56 132 56 6 
6 672 448 2410 448 5 
5 654 523 2738 523 4 
4 854 854 4499 854 4 
4 666 656 3371 666 4 
4 231 231 761 231 3 
3 372 368 1121 372 4 
4 77 77 -163 77 4 
4 820 820 4295 820 4 
4 696 696 3551 696 4 
 
 
Below in figures, the relationship between each predictor variable and subject 1’s 
deliver lead time decision are plotted. The regression equations, R² and p-values are also 
provided.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time(t) vs. Delivery Lead Time(t-1) in Exp 
7b 
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Figure 7.7 shows that subject 1’s delivery lead time decision at period t and his 
delivery lead time decision at period t-1 are positively related. R² is relatively high, 
which shows that information on the delivery lead time in the previous period is useful 
in predicting the next period delivery lead time. P-value is 0 denoting that the 
relationship is strongly significant. However, “delivery lead time at period t-1” is 
eliminated from the model in multiple regression analysis. This is not related to the 
multi-collinearity; whereas, its partial significance is assessed to be more than 0.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time(t) vs. Total Demand(t-1) in Exp. 7b 
 
 
Figure 7.8 shows that subject 1 is negatively affected from the total demand at 
period t-1 when he sets his delivery lead time at period t. R² is denoting that the power 
of this model in predicting the delivery lead time is not low. However, p-value shows 
that this relationship is not significant.  
There is a negative relationship between subject 1’s sale at period t-1 and his 
delivery lead time decision at period t, as shown in Figure 7.9. High R² shows that the 
model is powerful in predicting the delivery lead time and low p-value shows that the 
relationship is significant. However, low absolute beta value of  this variable shows that 
a unit change in subject 1’s direct channel sale affects the delivery lead time decision of 
subject 1 at a negligible amount. Multiple regression analysis did not indicate 
“manufacturer’s sale at period t-1” as a significant response variable. The fact is due to 
high multi-collinearity between manufacturer’s sale and other variables (especially high 
correlation with total sale), so that this variable is excluded from the model.  
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Figure 7.9. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time(t) vs. Manufacturer’s Sale(t-1) in Exp. 
7b 
 
 
Figure 7.10 shows that subject 1 gives importance on his profit at period t-1, when 
he sets his delivery lead time at period t, and the relationship between these two 
variables is negative. The relationship is negative and R² is relatively high, which 
indicates the model’s success in explaining the variance in delivery lead time decision. 
P-value is less than 0.01 indicating that the relationship is significant. The reason for the 
small absolute beta value is the scale difference between delivery lead time and profit 
values. This variable is not stated to be a significant response variable in multiple 
regression analysis due to high multi-collinearity between manufacturer’s profit and 
total sale.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time(t) vs. Manufacturer’s Profit(t-1) in 
Exp. 7b 
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In addition, subject 1 gives a high importance on total sale at period t-1, when he 
sets his delivery lead time at period t. There is a negative and strong relationship 
between delivery lead time at period t and “total sale at period t-1” for subject 1, as seen 
in Figure 7.11. This is the result of multiple regression analysis with a R² of 0.430 and 
p-value of 0.01.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Manufacturer’s Delivery Lead Time(t) vs. Total Sale(t-1) in Exp. 7b 
 
 
As seen from figures above, although the multiple regression analysis resulted with 
only one significant variable for subject 1 in experiment 7b, there are some other 
variables, which affect the subject’s delivery lead time decision and can be used in 
prediction of his decisions.  
We observed that some subjects improved their delivery lead time decision by time. 
For instance, subject 0 in experiment 1c, subjects 2 and 3 in experiment 3c, subjects 7 
and 9 in experiment 7a, and subjects 1 and 7 in experiment 7b decreased their delivery 
lead time decision over periods. As the theoretical optimal strategy of the manufacturer 
is ER in these experiments, these subjects might have learned how to make better 
decisions by time.  
Table 7.15 below presents our initial estimations of the sign of the relationship 
between each predictor variable and delivery lead time. 
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Table 7.15. Expected Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and 
Delivery Lead Time 
 
Variable 
Expected Sign of the 
Relationship 
manufacturer's profit (t-1) - 
manufacturer's sale (t-1) - 
total demand (t-1) - 
total sale (t-1) - 
delivery lead time (t-1) + 
wholesale price (t) - 
 
 
Only in some of the cases, we observed these full set of expectations to hold. In 
addition, none of the subjects responded according to our expectations in three 
experiments (i.e., experiments 2c, 4a and 6a)13.  
Next, we checked if there exists consistency among subjects regarding the beta 
signs. We detected some subjects who have the same sign combination in an 
experiment. Table 7.16 presents the signs of beta coefficients for all subjects in 
experiment 1a. There are three set of subjects in which the subjects have the same set of 
signs.  
 
Table 7.16. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Delivery 
Lead Time Decision in Experiment 1a 
 
Subjects  
Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
delivery lead time (t-1) - + - - + + + + + - 
total demand (t-1) + + + + - + - + - + 
manufacturer's sale (t-1) + - + + - + - + - + 
manufacturer's profit (t-1) + - + + - + - + - + 
total sale (t-1) + + + + - + - + - + 
 
 
On the contrary, for some experiments it is possible to find two subjects that have 
inverse signs of each other for each variable. Table 7.17 illustrates this for experiment 
6b, where subjects 2 and 3 behaved different from subjects 0, 5 and 7.  
                                                 
13 The sign of the relationship between each predictor variable and delivery lead time decision for all 
subjects in each experiment is available from the authors. 
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Table 7.17. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Delivery 
Lead Time Decision in Experiment 6b 
 
Subjects  
Variable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
delivery lead time (t-1) + + - - + + + + - + 
total demand (t-1) + + - - - + - + + - 
manufacturer's sale (t-1) + + - - - + - + + - 
manufacturer's profit (t-1) + - - - - + - + + - 
total sale (t-1) + - - - - + - + + - 
 
 
Finally, we wanted to see if the same subject had the same responses to a given 
variable among different experiments in a given session. We found differences. This 
makes sense because different experiments mean different parameter sets. Table 7.18 
shows how the behavior of subject 0 in session 1 changed from one experiment to 
another.  
 
Table 7.18. Sign of the Relationship between Each Predictor Variable and Delivery 
Lead Time for Subject 0 in Session 1 
 
Variable Exp. 1a Exp. 1b Exp. 1c 
delivery lead time (t-1) - - + 
total demand (t-1) + + - 
manufacturer's sale (t-1) + - - 
manufacturer's profit (t-1) + + - 
total sale (t-1) + - - 
 
 
In conclusion, there is not a general trend in subjects’ behavior when they decide on 
the delivery lead time decision. Most of the subjects did not respond according to our 
expectations.  
 
7.2.3. Autocorrelation Analysis 
In some of our analysis, we observed that the subjects’ delivery lead time decisions are 
not related with the 6 predictor variables significantly. This result encouraged us to 
investigate other factors to affect the subjects’ delivery lead time decisions. Thus, we 
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analyzed if the delivery lead time decisions of the subjects are affected from their own 
delivery lead time decisions in previous periods. To do this, we conducted subject-based 
autocorrelation analysis for all experiments.  
In Appendix N, we provide our autocorrelation analysis results for each subject in 
each experiment. Correlation values are presented for first three lags. Significance 
indicates the p-value at the first lag obtained by conducting the Box-Ljung test. We  
tested the null hypothesis that “the data is random” (i.e., the decisions are independent). 
Analyzing our results, we conclude with that there is not enough evidence to say 
that the subjects’ delivery lead time decisions are affected from their own delivery lead 
time decisions in any of the previous three periods significantly. However, there are 
some cases, in which a subject’s decision is highly related to his previous period 
decision. All of these cases are found to be statistically significant at the first lag with a 
significance value of less than 0.05 with the Box-Ljung test. This is not surprising 
because most of these cases resulted with a significant response of the manufacturer to 
delivery lead time at period t-1 in multiple regression analysis. However, by conducting 
autocorrelation analysis, we could not explain the behavior in the cases in which our 
multiple regression analysis did not result with a significant response variable.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CHAPTER 8 : CO"CLUSIO" A"D FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Here, we discuss our main results, conclude and mention future research directions.  
 
8.1. Conclusion  
In this thesis, we studied the dual channel management problem of a manufacturer. Our 
study is based on the theoretical models of Chen et al. (2008), and Gökduman and Kaya 
(2009). We analyze manufacturer-retailer interaction under two contract types (i.e., 
wholesale price contract and buyback contract) through controlled experiments with 
human subjects to check the validity of our theoretical models and predictions, and to 
analyze the behavior of subjects. 
The three-stage game theoretical dual channel model was previously solved with 
backwards induction, using analytical as well as computational methods coded with 
Mathematica. That study identified three types of dual channel strategies for the 
manufacturer: Eliminate retailer (ER), Capture all Profit (CP) and Share Profit (SP). 
Each strategy characterizes three aspects of the dual channel relationship: How the 
market will be segmented, how much each channel will sell and how profits will be 
shared between the manufacturer and the retailer. We presented the theoretical model in 
this thesis for completeness, but our focus is on experiments with human decision 
makers. 
One reason why we conducted experiments is to check the validity of the “dual 
channel strategy recommendations” to the manufacturer. In a way, experiments act as 
“wind tunnels” to test such business policy changes, often bridging the gap between 
theoretical predictions and real-life applicability. In this respect, our experiments show 
that the dual channel models (wholesale price contract and buyback contract models) 
are overall successful. They can predict the type of manufacturer’s strategy for given 
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parameter sets (, , 	, , ) representing different market conditions. The models are 
also successful in predicting the direction of subjects’ decisions and results in response 
to changes in parameter values. The models, however, are not that successful in 
prediction of the actual decision values. We observe significant deviations from 
predicted values, and high level of “dispersion” in participants’ decisions that do not 
decrease with “learning” over time. We attribute the deviations to certain “behavioral 
factors” such as risk aversion, loss aversion and decision heuristics. Note, however, that 
in this thesis work, we do not “prove” the existence of these behavioral factors we only 
observe their effects on decisions and speculate. Proving the existence of such factors 
would require a more in-depth study that is in our future work agenda.  
Our model presents s a relatively complex “game” that has two decision stages 
(stages I and II), one of them containing a simultaneous move game in itself (the stage 
II operational decisions game). The presence of random total demand further 
complicates the decision making process for the participants. Within this “complex” 
game structure, our experiments also serve to two general questions that are of interest 
to most game-theoretical models: (1) Is Nash Equilibrium a good predictor of the 
outcome of a simultaneous-move game? (2) When making decision at the first stage of 
a two-stage game, can a subject foresee the outcome of the second stage, and act 
accordingly? We find that (1) The Nash Equilibrium is not necessarily a good predictor 
of the exact decision values, due perhaps to the behavioral biases. However, it is a good 
predictor of directional changes (2) The participants can anticipate the second stage 
outcome and act accordingly in relatively simple models (i.e., the wholesale price 
contract model) but not in more complicated ones (i.e., the buyback contract model).  
The central theme in our study is the performance comparison of the buyback 
contract and wholesale price contracts. The dual channel model with buyback contract 
gives the manufacturer extensive power in our theoretical model. He can squeeze the 
retailer with its direct channel horizontally, and at the same time, with the two contract 
parameters vertically. By choosing the contract parameters at stage I, he sets the “tome 
of the game” to be played at stage II. Thus, in theory, the manufacturer’s contract 
decisions at stage I determine how consumers will be segmented between the channels, 
and how risks and profits will be shared with the retailer. Whether the manufacturer can 
use this power wisely by setting the right contract parameters at stage I is the question. 
At face value, the buyback contract benefits the retailer by reducing its cost of overage. 
However, the manufacturer can also play with the wholesale price and make sure that 
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the retailer only gains the minimum acceptable profit. Theory says that the manufacturer 
can achieve high market coverage and high profit with the buyback contract, and leave 
the retailer with limited profit. What we observe is that the manufacturers indeed 
squeeze the retailer’s profit, but are not as successful in improving their own profits. 
Manufacturers did not offer generous buyback prices, and as a result, retailers did not 
order as much. In some cases, manufacturers made more use of their direct channel than 
necessary.  
Our observations on the total supply chain profit are similar. In theory, the dual 
channel structure improves total supply chain profits through serving heterogeneous 
consumers with two different channels. In our theoretical model, the time-sensitive 
consumers prefer to buy from the retail channel, while the less-time-sensitive 
consumers prefer to buy from the direct channel. The total supply chain profit is directly 
related to the number of customers served. If the retailer stocks sufficient quantity, and 
if the manufacturer sets a reasonable delivery lead time, the total number of lost 
customers would be minimized. In theory, the buyback contract complements this 
benefit of dual channels by making the retailer order more units. In our experimental 
study, however, because the manufacturers could not set high-enough buyback prices, 
this benefit went mostly unrealized.  
Our study has a number of weaknesses. One such weakness is that the experiments 
take around 2.5 hours, which places some cognitive burden on the participants. 
Although we observed that the participants did not lose focus during the experiments, 
this is an issue to be considered in future studies. Another weakness is that we used two 
different set of participants in our WPCE and BCE experiments (i.e., a between-subjects 
design). We could have obtained sharper results if we compared the results of the same 
subject set between the two studies (i.e., a within-subject design). However, using the 
same subject set in two studies would cause significant “learning effect”. The 
experience level of participants from one study might affect their behavior in the other 
study. This is a classical trade-off in such experimental studies, and we chose the 
“between subjects” alternative for our work.  
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8.2. Future Research Directions  
This study can be extended in a number of ways. Here we provide only a number of 
examples. First, we observed that the theoretical model is not successful in predicting 
the quantitative decisions, because there is bias in human decision-makers’ decisions. 
One can change our model to another form, which captures the human decision bias. 
For example, the utility functions of the decision makers can be modified to allow “risk 
aversion”. Second, we studied the wholesale price and buyback contracts. Other 
contracts including quantity discount, revenue sharing or rebates can also be considered. 
Third, the model setting can be changed to include other dual channel environment 
factors into account; such as competition between multiple manufacturers or retailers, 
and other combinations of channel ownership and structure such as retailers operating 
online stores or manufacturers operating physical stores.  
The experimental study can also be modified in a number of ways. First, to obtain a 
less complex game for participants, the total demand might be fixed at some value. 
Recall that the demand faced by a particular channel would still be “unknown” in 
advance because the total demand is shared between the channels based on the service 
level decisions of the two players. Removing the stochastic nature of the total demand 
would make the game less realistic, however, more manageable for participants. We 
believe that we will observe less dispersion and more learning in this version of the 
game. Second, we considered the total demand to be uniformly distributed. One can 
also study alternative total demand distributions such as normal distribution. This 
change can easily be implemented in the experimental study; however, it would be 
difficult in the theoretical study. One can perhaps resort to numerical methods to solve 
the model with different demand distributions. Third, to study the role of a “long-run 
partnership” between the firms, we may make the same manufacturer-retailer couples to 
play in all periods of an experiment. We expect the players to act “strategically” in the 
initial periods, leading to interesting results regarding collaboration, threats, 
punishments and reputation. Fourth, we can provide a more “visual” decision support 
tool to help subjects’ decision-making process. The current decision support tool 
presents the results in a table format, which may not be easy for the subjects to 
comprehend. Fifth, one can conduct more experiments using the current setting to 
strengthen existing results. This includes conducting WPCE experiments with Sabanci 
University students. Finally, one can further analyze data from the current (and possibly 
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new) experiments to address other questions of interest. For example, to study 
differences due to cultural factors, the decisions of Turkish and American students 
within the same experimental setting can be compared.  
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APPE"DICES 
 
Appendix A. "otation 
Exogenous Constants 
: Product’s value to consumers 
: Selling price at both channels 
): Maximum market size for the product 
: Retailer inconvenience cost 
	: Unit production cost 
: Direct channel cost parameter 
 
Decision Variables 
C ∈  /0, 10: Retailer’s service level 
φC  ∈  /0, 10: Availability level &C: Stocking level %: Direct channel’s delivery lead time : Wholesale price : Buyback price 
 
Others * ∈  /0, 10: Consumer time-sensitivity index 
,!: Primary demand in the direct channel 
,': Secondary demand in the direct channel 
: Demand in the retail channel (: Market size ~  /0, )0 
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Appendix B. The Algorithm of Two-dimensional Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test 
Two-dimensional Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on two samples. Given the x and y 
coordinates of the first sample as n1 values in arrays x1(1:n1) and y1(1:n1), and 
likewise for the second sample, n2 values in arrays x2 and y2, this routine returns the 
two-dimensional, two-sample K-S statistic as “d”, and its significance level as “prob”. 
Small values of prob show that the two samples are significantly different. Note that the 
test is slightly distribution-dependent, so prob is only an estimate. 
 
SUBROUTINE ks2d2s(x1,y1,n1,x2,y2,n2,d,prob) 
INTEGER n1,n2 
REAL d,prob,x1(n1),x2(n2),y1(n1),y2(n2) 
C USES pearsn,probks,quadct 
INTEGER j 
REAL d1,d2,dum,dumm,fa,fb,fc,fd,ga,gb,gc,gd,r1,r2,rr,sqen,probks 
d1=0.0 
do 11 j=1,n1                                                          // First, use points in the first sample as origins. 
call quadct(x1(j),y1(j),x1,y1,n1,fa,fb,fc,fd) 
call quadct(x1(j),y1(j),x2,y2,n2,ga,gb,gc,gd) 
d1=max(d1,abs(fa-ga),abs(fb-gb),abs(fc-gc),abs(fd-gd)) 
enddo 11 
d2=0.0 
do 12 j=1,n2                                                    // Then, use points in the second sample as origins. 
call quadct(x2(j),y2(j),x1,y1,n1,fa,fb,fc,fd) 
call quadct(x2(j),y2(j),x2,y2,n2,ga,gb,gc,gd) 
d2=max(d2,abs(fa-ga),abs(fb-gb),abs(fc-gc),abs(fd-gd)) 
enddo 12 
d=0.5*(d1+d2)                                                                                    // Average the K-S statistics. 
sqen=sqrt(float(n1)*float(n2)/float(n1+n2)) 
call pearsn(x1,y1,n1,r1,dum,dumm)        // Get the linear correlation coefficient for each sample. 
call pearsn(x2,y2,n2,r2,dum,dumm) 
rr=sqrt(1.0-0.5*(r1**2+r2**2))       
 // Estimate the probability using the K-S probability function probks. 
prob=probks(d*sqen/(1.0+rr*(0.25-0.75/sqen))) 
return 
END 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177 
 
Appendix C. Outlier Data in Wholesale Price Contract Experiments 
 
Table 0.1. Outlier Data in Wholesale Price Contract Experiments 
 
Exp.  Period Manufacturer  Retailer 
Wholesale 
Price 
Time to 
Ship 
Stock 
Level 
1a 3 7 1 4 100 400 
1b 6 5 2 6 300 270 
2a 30 0 1 4 300 600 
2b 20 2 7 6 300 400 
2b 21 7 5 6 300 330 
3a 3 3 2 2 500 10 
4a 23 3 2 2 600 500 
 
4b 
1 11 5 3 550 350 
4b 8 1 7 3 1000 415 
4b 13 10 0 3 324 234 
4b 20 3 8 3 400 200 
5a 16 5 3 3 350 345 
5a 29 5 1 3 350 250 
5b 27 2 3 3 300 333 
5b 22 7 5 3 1 369 
5b 21 7 6 3 0 340 
5b 20 6 5 3 0 777 
5b 20 7 1 3 0 250 
5b 19 6 7 3 0 300 
6b 10 1 3 4 300 100 
6b 18 1 0 4 240 300 
7b 1 3 4 6 0 0 
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Appendix D. Main Script Code in BCE 
 // Define Player List 
 Players p1, p2; 
 Integer nplayer = 2; 
// Declare variables 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-model.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-dummy.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-state.cfg"); 
// Set parameter value 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\dat-parameter.dat"); 
// Define inputs 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\def-input.cfg"); 
// Stage logon  
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-logon.cfg"); 
// Game stages 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-start.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-setgrid.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-predisplay.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-fetchdata.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-exchange.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-results.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-periodend.cfg"); 
//Creating  database log file 
Stage writedb { 
  // no db write statements in debug 
  Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-dblog-period.cfg"); 
  if (stage=1) 
  { 
   End; 
  } 
  else 
  { 
   Goto start; 
  } 
}  
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Appendix E. The Script of dat-parameter.dat in BCE 
stage setparameter  
{ 
 if (period=1 & stage=1) 
 {   
 // parameters setting 
 wholesalegiven = 0; //wholesale price is not given 
 buybackgiven = 0;  // buyback price is not given 
 
 value = 10; 
 price = 6;  
 searchcost = 2; 
 wholesale = 0; 
 buyback = 0; 
 shippingcost = 100000; 
 mindemand = 0; 
 maxdemand = 1000; 
 proximityfactor = 2; 
      
 // manufacturer's stage description 
  stagedesc[0,1] = "Wholesale and buyback price selection"; 
  stagedesc[0,2] = "Shipping time decision"; 
  stagedesc[0,3] = "Period results"; 
 
 // reatiler's stage description 
  stagedesc[1,1] = "Waiting for manufacturer";  
  stagedesc[1,2] = "Stock quantity decision"; 
  stagedesc[1,3] = "Period results"; 
   
  numman = int(nplayer/2); 
  numret = nplayer - numman; 
 } 
  
 if (stage = 1)  
 {  
 // assign match first 
  matched = 0; 
  pos = 0; 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer; i=i+1) 
  { 
   allocation[i] = -1; 
  } 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer; i=i+1) 
  { 
   pos = int(nplayer*random); 
   if (pos = nplayer) 
   { 
    pos = nplayer-1; 
   } 
   if (allocation[pos] = -1) 
   { 
    allocation[pos] = i; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    while (allocation[pos] <> -1) 
    { 
     pos = (pos + 1) % nplayer; 
    } 
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    allocation[pos] = i; 
   } 
  } 
   
  for (j=0; j<nplayer; j=j+2) 
  { 
   p1 = allocation[j]; 
   p2 = allocation[j+1]; 
   match[p1] = p2; 
   match[p2] = p1; 
 if ((lastrole[p1] < lastrole[p2]) | ((lastrole[p1] = lastrole[p2])& random <= 0.5)) 
   { 
    role[p1] = 0; // manufacturer 
    role[p2] = 1; // retailer 
  demand[p1] = mindemand + int((maxdemand - mindemand)*random); 
    demand[p2] = 0; 
    lastrole[p1] = lastrole[p1] + 1; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    role[p1] = 1; // retailer 
    role[p2] = 0; // manufacturer  
    demand[p1] = 0; 
    demand[p2] = mindemand + int((maxdemand - mindemand)*random  
    lastrole[p2] = lastrole[p2] + 1; 
   } 
  } 
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) //wholesale  and buyback price are given 
  { 
   for (i=0; i<nplayer; i=i+1) 
   { 
    if (role[i] = 0) 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = wholesale; //set given w 
     buybackset[i] = buyback; //set given b 
    } 
    else 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = -1; // w is not given 
     buybackset[i] = -1; // b is not given 
    } 
   } 
  }  
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) 
  { 
   stage = 2;     // advance to stage 2 right away 
  } 
 } 
} 
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Appendix F. Instructions for Buyback Contract Experiments 
Scenario 
 
We consider two independent firms: a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer 
produces a product, which is sold to customers through two channels: 
1) The direct channel: The manufacturer sells directly to customers through a web 
site. 
2) The retailer channel (or “the retailer” for short): The retailer buys and stocks 
products from the manufacturer and sells them to customers in his physical 
store. 
The two channels compete for customers. The total demand is distributed uniformly 
between 0 and 1000. 
 
Stages of the Game 
 
Stage I:   The manufacturer determines the following two contract terms: 
• The wholesale price, w: The retailer pays this price to the manufacturer per 
product he orders. The wholesale price must be less than or equal to the given 
sales price  p  of the product. 
• The buyback price, b:  This is the price the manufacturer pays to the retailer to 
buy back unsold products at retailer’s store. The buyback price must be less than 
or equal to the wholesale price.  
The retailer does not make any decision at this stage.  
Stage II:   Given the wholesale price and the buyback price decisions from stage I, at 
this stage, the firms make the following decisions: 
• Stock quantity in the retailer channel, q: The retailer determines how many 
products to order and stock from the manufacturer. Customers prefer higher 
stock quantity, because this increases product availability at the retailer’s store. 
The stock quantity must be less than 1000, which is the maximum total demand. 
• Shipping time in the direct channel, t: The manufacturer determines how fast 
the direct channel will ship products to customers. Customers prefer shorter 
shipping times. The shipping time must be at least 1.  
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These two decisions affect how the customers choose between the two channels. If the 
retailer’s demand is less than its stock quantity, there will be unsold (leftover) units. The 
manufacturer buys back these units from the retailer by paying the buyback price per 
unit. If the retailer’s demand is more than its stock quantity, the retailer loses customers. 
The direct channel, on the other hand, can satisfy all demand.  
 
Retailer’s Payoff  
 
Retailer’s payoff  =  p * Sr    -    w * q   +   b*(q- Sr ) 
 
• The first term denotes the retailer’s sales revenue from customers (where p is the 
sales price and Sr is the retailer’s sales quantity).  
• The second term denotes the retailer’s payment to the manufacturer for the 
products he bought.  
• The third term denotes the manufacturer’s buyback payment to the retailer for 
unsold products. 
Retailer’s sales quantity Sr is a function of the retailer’s stock quantity q decision; 
manufacturer’s shipping time t decision, and the realization of the random total demand. 
The retailer determines q without knowing t and the total demand realization. We do not 
provide the exact formula for the calculation of Sr . 
 
Retailer’s Trade-off:  
 
Primarily, the retailer faces the standard “newsvendor” trade off: 
• If the retailer’s demand turns out to be lower than his stock quantity, some 
products will be unsold. The retailer loses money on unsold products because 
the buyback price that the manufacturer will pay to the retailer is less than or 
equal to the wholesale price.  
• If the retailer’s demand turns out to be higher than his stock quantity, he loses 
potential sales.  
In addition to this, the stock quantity also affects the demand that the retailer faces. In 
general, a higher stock quantity means higher chances of finding the product in stock 
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(that is, higher “product availability”) for customers, which increases the share of total 
demand that goes to the retailer.  
If the retailer stocks less than a certain quantity, no customer visits his store, 
because customers fear they will not be able to find the product available there. This 
“certain quantity” depends on the manufacturer’s shipping time, which complicates the 
retailer’s decision. At the extreme, if the manufacturer chooses a very short t, no 
customer visits the retailer even if he stocks very high quantity.  
 
Manufacturer’s Payoff 
 
Manufacturer Payoff = w *q   +   p* Sd    -   m/t
2  - b* (q- Sr ) 
 
• The first term denotes manufacturer’s revenue from selling q products to the 
retailer. 
• The second term denotes the manufacturer’s revenue from selling Sd    products 
in the direct channel. 
• The third term denotes the cost of the direct channel, where parameter m is a 
given constant. Note that offering a shorter shipping time t becomes increasingly 
costly as t approaches 1.  
• The fourth term denotes the manufacturer’s payment to the retailer due to 
buying back his unsold products.  
Sd is a function of the manufacturer’s t decision, retailer’s q decision, and the realization 
of the random total demand. The manufacturer determines t without knowing q and the 
total demand. We do not provide the exact formula for the calculation of Sd. Note that 
the manufacturer does not incur a per unit production cost.  
 
Manufacturer’s Trade-off:  
 
Stage II decision:  When determining the shipping time t: 
• A low t makes the direct channel more attractive to customers. The manufacturer 
earns more money when a product is sold in his direct channel than when it is 
sold through the retailer (because p>=w). However, the cost of the direct 
channel m / t2 may become very high for short t values. In addition, if the retailer 
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is left with many unsold products, the manufacturer may need to make him a 
high buyback payment (depending on the buyback price b).  
• A high shipping time t costs less, but results in a weaker direct channel.  
Stage I decisions: When determining the wholesale price w and buyback price b: 
• If w is high, and b is low, it becomes risky for the retailer to buy products. The 
retailer may order and stock a low quantity, even zero products. This might 
leave the direct channel as the only strong alternative for customers. However, 
in this case, some customers may be lost because they would not buy from the 
direct channel unless the shipping time is sufficiently short.  
• If w is low, and b is relatively high (it cannot exceed w), the retailer will 
probably order more products. However, the manufacturer will not make much 
money when selling to the retailer (due to low w), and may need to buy back 
unsold products at a high price (due to high b). 
 
Experiment Preparation 
 
• The experiments will take place at the CAFÉ (Center for Applied Finance 
Education) computer lab at the G-floor of the FMAN building. 
• Please come to the experiments on time so that we can start and finish on time.  
• You will pass through a short quiz to make sure that you understand the rules of the 
experiment. 
• You will play a pilot experiment to solidify your understanding of the software. 
• Please do not open any other program, including other browser windows, during the 
experiments. 
• Please enter “integer values” for all decisions, and pay attention to the entry rules. 
 
The Experiment 
 
• In the experiments, you will play the roles of manufacturer and retailer for a number 
of “periods”. 
• The periods are independent of each other. For example, inventory is not carried 
from one period to the next. Only your payoff will accumulate over periods.  
185 
 
• In each period, the server computer will determine your role randomly. The server 
will also randomly match each manufacturer with a retailer. You will not know with 
whom you are matched.  
 
A Sample Screenshot 
 
The following figure illustrates how the retailer’s screen will look like at stage II: 
 
 
 
Figure 0.1. Sample Retailer Screen Shot 
 
 
• The large table in the middle of the screen is your “decision support tool” (to be 
explained). 
• The yellow box on the upper left presents general information including the period 
number, your current role, and the wholesale price and buyback prices that were set 
at stage I. The box also presents three game parameters that are given and fixed 
throughout all periods (value of product, sales price to customers, and the search 
cost). We use these parameters to characterize the business environment and product 
characteristics. You do not need to be concerned about their meaning. Their effect 
on how consumers choose between the channels is reflected in the decision support 
tool.  
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• The blue box in the upper right presents information on the last period. Not very 
important. 
• The pink box in the bottom is where you “submit” your decision to the server. You 
enter your decision value into the related gray box, hit “enter” and then click on the 
green “Submit” button at the bottom (that will be visible during experiment). The 
submit button is activated only after you enter a valid decision and hit enter (or, 
click somewhere in the screen).  Invalid entries will cause warnings. 
• Note that the cells in which you can enter values are the ones with “gray” 
background. 
• You can check the results of previous periods by clicking the “Historical Results” 
tab in the bottom. This will open a second worksheet with the titles seen below: 
 
 
 
Figure 0.2. Historical Results 
 
 
The Decision Support Tool 
 
Before you submit a decision, you can use the "what-if" decision support tool provided 
to you. This tool allows you to calculate the outcome for certain values of your decision, 
your opponent’s decision, and for specific realizations of the total market demand.  ote 
that the values you enter in this area are only for your temporary calculations. The only 
value that goes to the server (i.e., that is recorded) is the one you submit in the “stock 
quantity” box that you will find at the bottom of the screen.  
Pay attention to the decision support tool of the retailer for stage II, in the sample 
screenshot above. In the top two gray cells, you can enter a shipping time that you think 
the manufacturer may set, and a stock quantity that you may set.  
• If this stock quantity is too low (for the customers to come to your store), a 
warning message will pop up (to the right of that blue box), prompting you to 
enter a higher stock quantity.  
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• If you enter a very short shipping time, the program will remind you that all 
customers will go to the direct channel if the manufacturer sets such a short 
shipping time.  
To help you visualize the possible outcomes, the table in the decision support tool 
summarizes the outcome for 11 different total demand realizations (0, 100, 200… 
1000), each in a row.  
In the example above, the shipping time is entered as 15, and the retailer’s stock 
quantity is entered as 550. We observe from the table that if total demand turns out to 
be, for example, 400, the manufacturer’s direct channel will sell 61 units and you 
(retailer) will sell 339 units. You will be left with 550-339=211 units of inventory, 
which the manufacturer buys back. Since you satisfied all customer demand, you will 
not lose any customers. Also, all 400 customers will end up buying either from the 
direct channel or from you, hence total customers lost is also zero.  
Compare this with the outcome if the total demand turns out to be 800. In this case, 
the direct channel will sell 139 units; you will sell all of your 550 units and you will 
lose 128 customers because you stocked-out. Out of these 128 customers you will lose, 
111 will decide not to buy the product at all (because they find the shipping time in the 
direct channel long), whereas 128-111=17 will buy from the direct channel (which are 
among the direct channel’s 139 customers). The last two columns provide your payoff 
and the manufacturer’s payoff, which helps you guess the manufacturer’s shipping time 
decision by experimenting with different combinations. 
 
 
 
Figure 0.3. Manufacturer’s Decision Support Tool 
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If you are a manufacturer, your decision support tool at stage II will be somewhat 
similar to what we described for the retailer. At stage I, the manufacturer’s decision 
support tool will look like above in the figure.  
Because this is stage I, the decision support tool includes wholesale price and 
buyback price decisions. At this stage, you (the manufacturer) will only submit your 
wholesale price and the buyback price decisions. However, you may want to experiment 
with the stage II decisions (shipping time and stock quantity) as well. This is because 
you need to consider how the chosen wholesale price and buyback price will affect the 
stage II game between you and the retailer.  
You can enter a shipping time that you may set and a stock quantity that you think 
the retailer may set at stage II. You can observe the resulting cost of your direct channel 
in the blue cell below these gray cells. If the stock quantity that you entered is too low, 
the program will remind you that the retailer is not likely to order such low quantity 
(because if he does so, no customer will visit his store).  
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Appendix G. Outlier Data in Buyback Contract Experiments 
Table 0.2. Outlier Data in Buyback Contract Experiments 
 
Exp.  Period Manufacturer Retailer 
Wholesale 
Price 
Buyback 
Time to 
Ship 
Stock 
Level 
b1a 8 4 6 2 5 20 350 
b1a 28 3 2 5 5 300 1000 
b1a 29 3 4 5 5 350 1000 
b1a 17 8 2 5 2 400 300 
b1a 19 3 4 5 5 500 350 
b1a 20 3 2 5 5 1000 700 
b1a 22 3 1 5 5 1000 800 
b1a 24 3 1 5 5 1000 900 
b2a 23 5 7 4 3 500 374 
b4a 11 6 3 3 3 5000 1000 
b6a 6 10 9 5 5 900 1000 
b6a 28 1 5 5 4 800 600 
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Appendix H. Relationship of Variables in Buyback Contract Experiments 
Table 0.3. Relationship of Variables in Buyback Contract Experiments 
 
Exp. Variables Relationship R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
b1a 
b w + 0.24 0.00 b = -1.709 + 0.892*w 
b q + 0.25 0.00 q = 240.806 + 73.848*b 
(w-b) prom* - 0.14 0.00 prom = 2178.646 - 254.723*(w-b) 
(w-b) q - 0.53 0.00 q = 685.019 -123.829*(w-b) 
w q - 0.06 0.00 q = 724.488 - 68.801*w 
b2a 
b w + 0.14 0.00 b = -0.094 + 0.525*w 
w q - 0.12 0.00 q = 839.813 - 110.561*w 
q prom + 0.36 0.00 prom = 497.425 + 2.578*q 
b3a 
t q + 0.15 0.00 q = 579.082 + 0.206*t 
b q + 0.58 0.00 q = 280.510 + 191.630*b 
b t + 0.18 0.00 t = -179.060 + 199.221*b 
(w-b) q - 0.58 0.00 q = -191.6*(w-b) + 855.4 
b4a 
w b + 0.18 0.00 b = -0.378 + 0.474*w 
w q - 0.24 0.00 q = 819.792 -101.197*w 
q prom + 0.17 0.00 prom = 912.189 + 2.189*q 
b5a 
w q - 0.20 0.00 q = 1110.226 - 143.622*w 
b q + 0.27 0.00 q = 233.397 + 89.560*b 
(w-b) q - 0.45 0.00 q = 687.263 - 103.449*(w-b) 
b6a 
t q + 0.20 0.00 q = 444.641 + 2.877*t 
b t + 0.18 0.00 t = -41.761 + 21.181*b 
b q + 0.40 0.00 q = -301.011 + 208.605*b 
b prom + 0.10 0.00 prom = 207.504 + 423.649*b 
q prom + 0.27 0.00 prom = 792.580 + 2.076*q 
(w-b) prom - 0.10 0.00 prom = 2325.749 - 423.649*(w-b) 
(w-b) q - 0.40 0.00 q = 742.013 - 208.605*(w-b) 
b6b no relationship between parameters 
* Manufacturer’s profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
Appendix I. Information on Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression is a statistical method used to analyze the relationship between 
several independent variables (predictor variables) and a dependent variable (criterion 
variable). A dependent variable might have a relationship with a variable, more than one 
variable or none of the predictor variables. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multiple 
regression aim to explain the reason of the variance in the values of the dependent 
variable. Some of this variance is accounted for by the predictor variables that are 
identified. ANOVA shows the percentage of the variance that is accounted for by 
manipulation of the predictor variables. In multiple regression, we measure scores of the 
observed variables and try to identify which set of the observed variables predict the 
dependent variable best. In general, multiple regression procedures are used to estimate 
a linear equation of the form: 
 
    ¡ +  ! ∗ (! +  ' ∗ (' +  … +  : ∗ (:  where 
 is the dependent variable,   
(!, (', … , (:are the predictor variables, 
 ¡ is the constant or intercept, and  
 !,  ', … ,  : are the regression coefficients.  
 
The following terms need to be understood to interpret the results of a multiple 
regression study:  
Beta (Regression Coefficients): The beta is a coefficient of the predictor variable. 
The beta value shows how strongly each predictor variable affects the dependent 
variable. If the beta value is high for a predictor variable, the change in the value of this 
variable influences the dependent variable at a high level. If there is only one predictor 
variable in a model, the beta value is simply the correlation coefficient between the 
predictor and the dependent variable. If there are more than one predictor variable, the 
beta value of each predictor variable lets us to understand the contribution of each 
predictor variable to the model.  
R, R², and Adjusted R²: R is a correlation measure between the observed and the 
predicted value of the dependent variable. R² is the square of this measure and indicates 
the percentage in the variance of the dependent variable, which is explained by the 
model. This shows how good the prediction of the dependent variable can be made if 
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we know the values of the predictor variables. However, R² might be overestimating the 
success of the model, because it can be artificially increased by adding predictor 
variables. Hence, another measure called “Adjusted R²” is used. Adjusted R² takes into 
account the number of variables in the model and the number of the observations per 
each (Brace et al. 2006).  
An important issue to consider while designing a multiple regression model is to 
choose predictor variables that are highly correlated with the dependent variable but not 
strongly correlated among themselves. When two or more predictor variables are 
strongly correlated, the condition called “multi-collinearity” occurs. If multi-collinearity 
exists, it is difficult to measure the contribution of each predictor variable to the success 
of the model. Hence, strongly correlated predictor variables should not be used in the 
model together.  
Another important issue is the variable selection method. In order to measure the 
contribution of each predictor variable, one can use “simultaneous”, “backward”, 
“forward” or “stepwise” selection methods. In the “simultaneous” method (named as 
“enter” in SPSS), the set of the predictor variables are decided by the researchers and 
then the success of the model achieved by these variables is assessed. If one predictor 
variable is believed to be more important than others, “hierarchical” methods should be 
used. In such methods, the order or entrance of the variables into the model is specified 
according to some theoretical consideration or previous findings. When adding the 
variables to the model in an order, the contribution of each variable is assessed. If the 
predictive power of the model does not increase when a new variable is added, this 
variable is dropped.  
In “statistical” methods, the correlation strength of predictor variables with the 
dependent variable is used to determine the order in adding (removing) the predictor 
variables to (from) the model. There are three different versions of this method, which 
are “forward” selection, “backward” selection and “stepwise” selection. In “forward” 
selection method, the predictor variables are entered to the model one by one according 
to strength of their correlation with the dependent variable. When a new variable is 
added, the change in the success of prediction is assessed. If the contribution is not 
significant, then this predictor variable is excluded. In the “backward” selection method, 
all predictor variables are entered to the model at the beginning. The predictor variables 
are removed according to the weakness of their correlation with the dependent variable. 
In each removal, the regression is re-calculated. If the prediction power of the model is 
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decreased significantly, then this predictor variable is re-added to the model. Otherwise, 
this predictor variable is removed from the model. In the “stepwise” selection method, 
each predictor variable is entered to the model in a sequence. If adding a new variable 
increases the prediction power of the model, this variable stays in the model but all 
other variables in the model are re-tested. If an existing variable does not contribute to 
this new model anymore, it is deleted from the model. This method provides the 
smallest number of predictor variables in the model. In addition to these methods, SPSS 
provides a method called “remove” in which the variables are removed from the model 
in a block (Brace et al. 2006). 
We used SPSS as the statistical tool to conduct multiple regression analysis. SPSS 
enters all predictor variables to the “first stage model” and calculates the partial 
correlation of each variable with the dependent variable given that all other predictor 
variables are in the model. Then, the program eliminates the variable which has the 
lowest partial correlation and jumps to the second stage model. After the elimination, 
the program recalculates the partial correlation of the variables which are in the second 
stage model and continues to do the same elimination until none of the variables can be 
eliminated and a final stage model is achieved. At each stage, the t and p-values of the 
predictor variables in the “coefficients” table show the impact of each predictor variable 
in the model on the dependent variable. A large absolute t and a small p-value indicate a 
large impact. At each stage, an F test is conducted and a p-value is calculated to test if 
the overall model at the given stage is significant or not. Using the F test, the 
significance of the overall model is tested with the below stated hypothesis:  
 
Ho: β1=β2=.........=β7=β8= β9 =0 
Ha: At least one βi≠0 
Decision Rule: reject Ho at given significance level α = 0.1 if  F* > Fα,p-1,n-p or p-value ≤ 
0.1. 
 
In SPSS, multi-collinearity is controlled by the tolerance measures. The tolerance 
values are the correlation values between the predictor variables and they can take 
values between 0 and 1. If a predictor’s tolerance is close to zero, this predictor variable 
is strongly correlated with the other predictor variables. SPSS does not include a 
predictor variable in a model if its tolerance is less than 0.0001 (Brace et al. 2006). VIF 
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is an alternative statistic to measure multi-collinearity, and a predictor variable should 
have a VIF value less than 10 to stay in the model.  
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Appendix J. Subject-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision 
Table 0.4. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 1 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1a 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 yes demandt 0.224 0.164 0.075 
stock =249.852 + 
0.172*demandt 
3 no 
     
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 yes saler 0.260 0.198 0.062 
stock = 273.804 + 
0.304*saler 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes 
overage, 
demandt, 
saler 
0.717 0.623 0.008 
stock = 512.679 + 
0.947*saler - 0.534*demandt 
- 0.635*overage 
1b 
0 no 
     
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 no 
     
4 yes overage 0.368 0.297 0.048 
stock = 89.372 + 
0.762*overage 
5 yes lostrd 0.304 0.235 0.063 
stock = 237.990 - 
1.318*lostrd 
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
8 yes 
stock, lostrd, 
overage 
0.695 0.581 0.018 
stock = 362.241 - 
0.845*stock  + 1.566*lostrd + 
0.508*overage 
9 yes stock 0.469 0.415 0.014 stock = 82.106 + 0.688*stock 
1c 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 yes 
demandt, 
overage 
0.532 0.415 0.048 
stock = -86.646 + 
0.213*demandt  + 
0.537*overage 
9 no 
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Table 0.5. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 2 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
2a 
0 Discarded 
1 yes stock 0.236 0.166 0.093 stock = 662.477 - 0.469*stock 
2 yes demandt 0.217 0.151 0.094 
stock = 320.316 + 
0.127*demandt 
3 Discarded 
4 no 
     
5 yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
profitr 
0.775 0.714 0.001 
stock = 49.801 + 0.907*stock 
+ 0.047*demandt - 
0.03*profitr 
6 no 
     
7 yes 
saler, 
overage 
0.720 0.669 0.001 
stock = 45.404 + 1.043*saler 
+ 0.462*overage 
8 Discarded 
9 no 
     
2b 
0 no 
     
1 yes 
lostrd, 
demandt 
0.474 0.342 0.077 
stock = 486.112+0.433*lostrd 
- 0.175*demandt 
2 yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
overage 
0.534 0.360 0.092 
stock = 117.993 + 
0.458*stock + 0.118*demandt 
+ 0.175*overage 
3 no 
     
4 yes stock 0.805 0.786 0.000 stock= -7.199 + 0.879*stock 
5 no 
     
6 yes stock, lostrd 0.806 0.763 0.001 
stock = -2.270 + 1.069*stock 
- 0.493*lostrd 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes 
demandt, 
profitr 
0.556 0.445 0.039 
stock = 363.161 - 
0.258*demandt + 
0.094*profitr 
2c 
0 Discarded 
1 yes 
saler, 
overage 
0.899 0.874 0.000 
stock = 41.290-4.394*saler + 
0.825*overage 
2 Discarded 
3 yes saler 0.978 0.976 0.000 stock = 5.062 + 1.344*saler 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
 
 
 
197 
 
Table 0.6. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 3 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
3a 
0 yes 
overage, 
demandt 
0.455 0.318 0.088 
stock = 129.098 + 
demandt*0.619 + 
overage*0.816 
1 yes overage 0.349 0.284 0.043 
stock = 444.707 - 
0.441overage 
2 yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
overage 
0.909 0.870 0.001 
stock = -60.805 + 
0.267*stock + 
0.629*demandt + 
0.552*overage 
3 yes overage 0.395 0.327 0.038 
stock = 171.661 - 
1.726*overage 
4 Discarded 
5 yes 
lostrd, stock, 
overage 
0.534 0.360 0.092 
stock = 173.156 + 
0.735*stock - 0.383* lostrd - 
0.253*overage 
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
3b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 no 
     
4 yes 
stock, 
overage, 
lostrd 
0.493 0.324 0.093 
stock = 249.203 - 
0.383*lostrd + 0.459*stock - 
0.218*overage 
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
3c 
0 Discarded 
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 Discarded 
4 yes profitr, saler 0.768 0.717 0.001 
stock = -0.063 + 1.154*saler - 
0.129*profitr 
5 Discarded 
6 yes lostrd 0.356 0.291 0.041 stock = 70.487 + 4.919*lostrd 
7 Discarded 
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Table 0.7. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 4 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
4a 
0 yes wprice 0.523 0.491 0.001 
stock = 673.032 - 
133.026*wprice 
1 yes wprice 0.377 0.336 0.009 
stock = 653.659 - 
65.041*wprice 
2 yes wprice 0.317 0.264 0.029 
stock = 473.216 - 
61.701*wprice 
3 yes 
wprice, 
stock, 
demandt 
0.866 0.832 0.000 
stock = 975.269 -
142.269*wprice - 
0.234*prestock - 
0.141*demandt 
4 no 
     
5 yes wprice 0.640 0.615 0.000 
stock = 735.519 -
120.628*wprice 
6 yes wprice 0.513 0.478 0.002 
stock = 933.333 - 
156.667*wprice 
7 yes lostrd 0.193 0.135 0.089 
stock = 460.427 - 
0.289*lostrd 
8 yes wprice 0.865 0.856 0.000 
stock = 886.319 - 
171.436*wprice 
9 yes wprice 0.506 0.473 0.001 
stock = 464.124 - 
60.662*wprice 
10 yes wprice 0.185 0.126 0.097 
stock = 727.634 - 
103.857*wprice 
11 yes 
wprice, 
demandt 
0.399 0.314 0.028 
stock = 717.278 - 
41.973*wprice - 
0.237*demandt 
12 yes wprice 0.226 0.171 0.062 
stock = 876.839  - 
144.323*wprice 
13 yes 
wprice, 
lostrd 
0.820 0.795 0.000 
stock = 848.753 - 
139.638*wprice + 
0.331*lostrd 
4b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 yes demandt 0.397 0.346 0.016 
stock = 592.566 - 
0.186*demandt 
3 no 
     
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 yes saler 0.255 0.193 0.066 stock = 377.423 - 0.480*saler 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 no 
     
10 yes demandt 0.284 0.224 0.050 
stock=254.222 + 
0.173*demandt 
11 yes saler 0.217 0.152 0.093 stock = 510.729 - 0.352*saler 
12 yes demandt 0.290 0.231 0.047 
stock = 565.035 - 
0.224*demandt 
13 yes stock, profitr 0.908 0.891 0.000 
stock = 48.249 + 
0.871*prestock - 
0.005*profitr 
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Table 0.8. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 5 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
5a 
0 yes wprice 0.658 0.637 0.000 
stock = 901.333 - 
217.333*wprice 
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 yes wprice 0.962 0.960 0.000 
stock = 885.213 -
176.702*wprice 
4 no 
     
5 yes wprice 0.209 0.156 0.065 
stock = 468.333 - 
48.333*wprice 
6 no 
     
7 yes 
wprice, 
overage 
0.771 0.736 0.000 
stock = 1217.194 - 
274.206*wprice + 
0.196*overage 
5b 
0 yes saler 0.373 0.320 0.020 stock = 635.458 - 0.343*saler 
1 yes overage 0.258 0.191 0.076 
stock = 272.033 - 
0.274*overage 
2 no 
     
3 yes 
demandt, 
overage 
0.741 0.689 0.001 
stock = 506.668 - 
0.298*demandt + 
0.147*overage 
4 yes stock, saler 0.834 0.803 0.000 
stock = 9.798 + 0.775*stock 
+ 0.206*saler 
5 yes profitr 0.344 0.278 0.045 
stock = 518.502 - 
0.095*profitr 
6 no 
     
7 no 
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Table 0.9. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 6 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
6a 
0 yes 
profitr, 
wprice, 
lostrd 
0.637 0.565 0.001 
stock = 561.723 - 
0.061*profitr - 
88.710*wprice + 
0.646*lostrd 
1 yes 
stock, 
wprice 
0.321 0.236 0.045 
stock = 480.262 + 
0.563*prestock - 
107.075*wprice 
2 yes 
saler, profitr, 
wprice 
0.675 0.610 0.001 
stock = 644.224 + 
0.834*saler - 0.152*profitr - 
139.602*wprice 
3 yes 
stock, 
wprice 
0.666 0.624 0.000 
stock = 448.128 + 
0.606*prestock - 
111.693*wprice 
4 yes wprice 0.337 0.298 0.009 
stock = 537.769 - 
90.141*wprice 
5 yes wprice 0.371 0.334 0.006 stock = 493 -104.333*wprice 
6 Discarded 
7 yes 
stock, 
wprice, 
demandt 
0.888 0.865 0.000 
stock = 918.142 + 
0.163*stock - 0.131*demandt 
- 187.795*wprice 
8 yes 
lostrd, 
wprice 
0.469 0.402 0.006 
stock = 609.726 - 
1.888*lostrd - 
115.683*wprice 
9 yes 
wprice, 
lostrd 
0.769 0.740 0.000 
stock = 796.894 - 
160.349*wpricesale - 
5.346*lostrd 
6b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 no 
     
7 Discarded 
8 no 
     
9 Discarded 
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Table 0.10. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision in Session 7 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
7a 
0 yes wprice 0.484 0.447 0.003 
stock = 1154.875 - 
192.167*wprice 
1 yes 
wprice, 
stock, 
demandt, 
saler 
0.959 0.944 0.000 
stock = 1663.036 - 
281.272*wprice - 0.385* 
stock - 0.141*demandt + 
0.266*saler 
2 yes wprice, saler 0.478 0.398 0.015 
stock = 605.789 - 
79.120*wprice + 0.377*saler 
3 yes wprice 0.627 0.603 0.000 
stock = 860.742 - 
146.680*wprice 
4 yes wprice 0.565 0.536 0.001 
stock = 779.065 - 
95.748*wprice 
5 yes 
wprice, 
stock, saler 
0.626 0.540 0.004 
stock = 730.335 - 
129.557*wprice - 
0.505*stock + 0.705*saler 
6 yes wprice 0.920 0.914 0.000 
stock = 759.880 - 
146.324*wprice 
7 yes wprice 0.688 0.667 0.000 
stock = 707.143 - 
107.143*wprice 
8 yes wprice 0.744 0.726 0.000 
stock = 623.298 - 
88.830*wprice 
9 yes wprice 0.670 0.648 0.000 
stock = 896.226 - 
150.472*wprice 
7b 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 no 
     
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Appendix K. Subject-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision 
with Dummy Variables 
Table 0.11. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 1 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1a 
0 yes 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.426 0.321 0.047 
stock = 347.110 - 0.319*overage + 
177.553*lostrd 
1 yes 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.437 0.324 0.057 
stock = 328.490 - 0.101*overage+ 
35.377*lostrd 
2 yes demandt 0.224 0.164 0.075 stock = 249.852 + 0.172*demandt 
3 no 
     
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes overage 0.274 0.208 0.066 stock = 479.515 - 0.360*overage 
1b 
0 no 
     
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 no 
     
4 yes overage 0.368 0.297 0.048 stock = 89.372 + 0.762*overage 
5 yes 
overage, 
profitr, 
stock 
0.607 0.460 0.048 
stock = 215.362 - 1.122*stock + 
358.031*profitr + 1.425*overage 
6 yes 
stock, 
demandt, 
profitr, 
saler 
0.788 0.666 0.017 
stock = 228.077 + 0.589*stock - 
0.062*demandt - 99.591*saler + 
48.798*profitr 
7 no 
     
8 yes 
stock, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.924 0.895 0.000 
stock = 778.742 - 0.874*stock - 
435.813*lostrd + 0.611*overage 
9 yes stock 0.469 0.415 0.014 stock = 82.106 + 0.688*stock 
1c 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 yes 
stock, 
demandt 
0.553 0.441 0.040 
stock = - 63.511 + 0.437*stock + 
0.157*demandt 
9 no 
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Table 0.12. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 2 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
2a 
0 Discarded 
1 yes stock 0.236 0.166 0.093 stock = 662.477 - 0.469*stock 
2 yes demandt 0.217 0.151 0.094 
stock = 320.316 + 
0.127*demandt 
3 Discarded 
4 yes 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.472 0.376 0.030 
stock = 198.797 + 
459.383*lostrd - 0.838*overage 
5 yes 
stock, 
profitr 
0.770 0.732 0.000 
stock = 92.857 + 0.857*stock - 
50.000*profitr 
6 no 
     
7 yes stock 0.498 0.456 0.005 stock = 155.709 + 0.597*stock 
8 Discarded 
9 yes 
profitr, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.580 0.465 0.019 
stock = 340.544 - 
249.661*profitr + 316.052*lostrd 
- 1.102*overage 
2b 
0 no 
     
1 yes 
saler,    
profitr 
0.560 0.450 0.037 
stock = 350.000 + 12.000*saler - 
76.250*profitr 
2 yes 
stock, saler, 
profitr 
0.892 0.852 0.000 
stock = 172.681 + 0.725*stock - 
107.216*saler + 26.168*profitr 
3 no 
     
4 yes stock 0.805 0.786 0.000 stock = -7.199 + 0.879*stock 
5 no 
     
6 yes 
stock, 
overage 
0.756 0.701 0.002 
stock = -0.841 + 0.901*stock + 
0.229*overage 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes overage 0.287 0.208 0.090 stock = 300.962 - 0.650*overage 
2c 
0 Discarded 
1 yes stock 0.565 0.516 0.008 stock = 10.718 + 0.676*stock 
2 Discarded 
3 yes 
stock, saler, 
profitr, 
overage 
0.995 0.992 0.000 
stock = 0.830 + 1.182*stock + 
70.522*saler - 55.064*profitr - 
1.186*overage 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Table 0.13. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 3 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
3a 
0 yes saler 0.487 0.430 0.017 
stock = 305 + 
322.778*saler 
1 yes overage 0.349 0.284 0.043 
stock  = 444.707 - 
0.441*overage 
2 yes 
demandt, saler, 
overage 
0.926 0.894 0.000 
stock  = -331.186 + 
0.926 *demandt + 
235.626*saler + 
0.896*overage 
3 yes lostrd 0.476 0.418 0.019 
stock = 500 - 
357.143*lostrd 
4 Discarded 
5 yes stock, profitr 0.493 0.380 0.047 
stock = 75.689 + 
0.665*stock + 
101.575*profitr 
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
3b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 yes saler 0.481 0.429 0.012 
stock = 240 + 
174.286*saler 
3 no 
     
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 yes saler 0.231 0.161 0.096 
stock = 283.333 + 
86.667*saler 
3c 
0 Discarded 
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 Discarded 
4 yes stock 0.714 0.686 0.001 
stock  = -5.36E-14 + 
0.833*stock 
5 Discarded 
6 no 
     
7 Discarded 
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Table 0.14. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 4 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
4a 
0 yes wprice 0.523 0.491 0.001 
stock = 673.032 - 
133.026*wprice 
1 yes wprice 0.377 0.336 0.009 
stock = 653.659 - 
65.041*wprice 
2 yes wprice 0.317 0.264 0.029 
stock = 473.216 - 
61.701*wprice 
3 yes 
wprice, stock, 
demandt 
0.866 0.832 0.000 
stock = 975.269 - 
142.269*wprice -0.234*stock - 
0.141*demandt 
4 no 
     
5 yes wprice 0.640 0.615 0.000 
stock = 735.519 - 
120.628*wprice 
6 yes wprice 0.513 0.478 0.002 
stock = 933.333 - 
156.667*wprice 
7 no 
     
8 yes wprice 0.865 0.856 0.000 
stock = 886.319 - 
171.436*wprice 
9 yes wprice 0.506 0.473 0.001 
stock = 464.124 - 
60.662*wprice 
10 yes wprice, saler 0.344 0.244 0.064 
stock = 488.571 - 
103.857*wprice + 
273.214*saler 
11 yes 
wprice, 
demandt 
0.399 0.314 0.028 
stock = 717.278 - 
41.973*wprice -0.237*demandt 
12 yes saler, profitr 0.395 0.302 0.038 
stock = 600 - 392.800*saler + 
237.244*profitr 
13 yes 
wprice, 
overage, 
profitr 
0.878 0.850 0.000 
stock = 968.669 - 
137.276*wprice -
0.309*overage - 
118.159*profitr 
4b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 yes demandt 0.397 0.346 0.016 
stock = 592.566 - 
0.186*demandt 
3 no 
     
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 no 
     
10 yes profitr 0.338 0.283 0.029 
stock = 236.667 + 
116.606*profitr 
11 no 
     
12 yes demandt 0.290 0.231 0.047 
stock = 565.035 - 
0.224*demandt 
13 yes stock, profitr 0.907 0.890 0.000 
stock = 46.698 + 0.897*stock -
11.079*profitr 
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Table 0.15. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 5 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
5a 
0 yes wprice 0.658 0.637 0.000 
stock = 901.333 - 
217.333*wprice 
1 yes wprice 0.250 0.192 0.058 
stock = 788.393 - 
113.393*wprice 
2 yes wprice 0.313 0.264 0.024 stock = 644.000 - 99.333*wprice 
3 yes wprice 0.962 0.960 0.000 
stock = 885.213 - 
176.702*wprice 
4 no 
     
5 yes wprice 0.209 0.156 0.065 stock = 468.333 - 48.333*wprice 
6 no 
     
7 yes 
wprice, 
stock, saler, 
overage 
0.851 0.797 0.000 
stock = 1380.234 - 
341.446*wprice - 0.420*stock + 
236.818*saler + 0.191*overage 
5b 
0 yes demandt 0.359 0.305 0.024 stock = 628.326 - 0.224*demandt 
1 yes lostrd 0.317 0.255 0.045 stock = 355.455 - 180.455*lostrd 
2 no 
     
3 yes 
demandt, 
lostrd 
0.786 0.744 0.000 
stock = 479.914 - 0.330*demandt 
+ 86.380*lostrd 
4 yes stock 0.765 0.746 0.000 stock = 32.149 + 0.815*stock 
5 yes profitr 0.370 0.307 0.036 
stock = 777.000 - 
368.636*profitr 
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Table 0.16. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 6 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
6a 
0 yes 
stock, saler, 
wprice 
0.519 0.423 0.010 
stock = 608.175 - 0.726*stock 
+ 267.464*saler - 
109.392*wprice 
1 yes 
wprice, 
overage 
0.263 0.170 0.087 
stock = 576.149 - 
82.693*wprice + 
0.339*overage 
2 yes wprice 0.502 0.473 0.001 stock = 830 - 154*wprice 
3 yes stock, wprice 0.666 0.624 0.000 
stock = 448.128 + 0.606*stock 
- 111.693*wprice 
4 yes wprice 0.337 0.298 0.009 
stock = 537.769 - 
90.141*wprice 
5 yes wprice 0.371 0.334 0.006 stock = 493 - 104.333*wprice 
6 Discarded 
7 yes 
stock, wprice, 
demandt 
0.888 0.865 0.000 
stock = 918.142 + 0.163*stock 
- 0.131*demandt - 
187.795*wprice 
8 yes wprice, lostrd 0.483 0.418 0.005 
stock = 385.498 - 
101.083*wprice + 
187.156*lostrd 
9 yes 
demandt, 
profitr, 
wprice, lostrd 
0.757 0.687 0.000 
stock = 757.871 - 
0.280*demandt + 
175.956*profitr - 
190.860*wprice + 
156.903*lostrd 
6b 
0 no 
     
1 no 
     
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 no 
     
7 Discarded 
8 no 
     
9 Discarded 
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Table 0.17. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Stock Level Decision with Dummy 
Variables in Session 7 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
7a 
0 yes 
wprice, 
profitr 
0.591 0.528 0.003 
stock = 868.447 - 162.789*wprice + 
176.263*profitr 
1 yes 
wprice, 
stock, 
saler 
0.960 0.950 0.000 
stock = 1513.254 - 306.627*wprice -
0.299*stock + 227.190*saler 
2 yes wprice 0.289 0.238 0.032 stock=800 - 100*wprice 
3 yes wprice 0.627 0.603 0.000 stock = 860.742 - 146.680*wprice 
4 yes wprice 0.565 0.536 0.001 stock = 779.065 - 95.748*wprice 
5 yes wprice 0.401 0.361 0.006 stock = 572.520 - 92.806*wprice 
6 yes wprice 0.920 0.914 0.000 stock = 759.880 - 146.324*wprice 
7 yes wprice 0.688 0.667 0.000 stock = 707.143 - 107.143*wprice 
8 yes 
wprice, 
demandt, 
profitr, 
lostrd 
0.859 0.808 0.000 
stock = 485.980 - 67.750*wprice + 
0.205*demandt - 62.526*profitr + 
53.435*lostrd 
9 yes 
wprice, 
profitr, 
lostrd, 
overage 
0.827 0.770 0.000 
stock = 891.658 - 151.066*wprice + 
82.682*profitr - 109.182*lostrd + 
0.150*overage 
7b 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 yes saler 0.454 0.412 0.006 stock = 100 - 85.286*saler 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Appendix L. Autocorrelation Analysis Results for Stock Level Decision 
Table 0.18. Autocorrelation Analysis Results for Stock Level Decision 
 
Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
1a 
0 -0.355 -0.016 0.194 0.130 
1 0.114 0.326 0.081 0.637 
2 -0.09 -0.088 0.248 0.694 
3 0.128 0.145 0.003 0.584 
4 0.179 -0.139 -0.074 0.445 
5 0.304 0.251 -0.043 0.195 
6 0.346 0.089 0.036 0.139 
7 Discarded 
8 0.222 0.059 -0.268 0.344 
9 -0.005 0.171 0.178 0.982 
1b 
0 0.298 -0.013 0.027 0.229 
1 0.107 -0.145 -0.151 0.676 
2 Discarded 
3 -0.12 -0.073 0.012 0.638 
4 0.152 0.336 -0.324 0.551 
5 -0.017 0.248 0.355 0.946 
6 0.397 -0.073 -0.226 0.109 
7 0.183 0.359 0.415 0.329 
8 -0.149 0.068 -0.067 0.419 
9 0.697 0.379 0.082 0 
1c 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 0.068 0.468 -0.049 0.785 
8 0.771 0.754 0.589 0 
9 0.384 0.231 0.092 0.038 
2a 
0 Discarded 
1 -0.469 0.127 -0.233 0.052 
2 -0.210 0.025 0.068 0.380 
3 Discarded 
4 0.015 -0.107 0.149 0.950 
5 0.697 0.395 0.203 0.002 
6 0.259 0.308 0.144 0.268 
7 0.552 0.023 -0.109 0.018 
8 Discarded 
9 0.174 -0.147 -0.692 0.446 
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Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
2b 
0 0.357 0.453 -0.066 0.162 
1 0.454 0.28 0.077 0.076 
2 0.52 0.364 0.103 0.036 
3 -0.048 -0.115 -0.068 0.852 
4 0.8 0.538 0.354 0.001 
5 0.149 0.107 0.086 0.572 
6 0.725 0.444 0.164 0.003 
7 -0.049 -0.203 -0.097 0.847 
8 -0.197 -0.047 -0.032 0.428 
9 0.012 -0.146 -0.019 0.963 
2c 
0 Discarded 
1 0.64 0.373 0.132 0.012 
2 Discarded 
3 0.61 0.287 -0.1 0.014 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
3a 
0 0.498 -0.037 -0.089 0.052 
1 0.07 0.114 -0.181 0.777 
2 0.146 0.027 0.03 0.569 
3 0.255 -0.148 -0.207 0.319 
4 Discarded 
5 0.499 0.159 -0.136 0.044 
6 -0.174 -0.174 0.43 0.497 
7 0.112 -0.048 0.233 0.652 
3b 
0 -0.093 0.138 0.13 0.699 
1 0.007 -0.057 -0.071 0.978 
2 0.295 -0.091 -0.122 0.235 
3 -0.188 0.629 -0.143 0.436 
4 0.422 0.322 0.172 0.08 
5 0.199 -0.304 -0.331 0.409 
6 -0.094 -0.308 -0.057 0.689 
7 0.224 -0.09 0.004 0.353 
3c 
0 Discarded 
1 0.1 0.033 -0.019 0.696 
2 0.077 -0.199 -0.011 0.757 
3 Discarded 
4 0.767 0.535 0.302 0.002 
5 Discarded 
6 0.235 -0.176 -0.047 0.343 
7 Discarded 
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Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
4a 
0 0.108 0.23 -0.044 0.62 
1 0.252 -0.004 0.045 0.247 
2 0.025 -0.264 -0.417 0.914 
3 -0.034 0.031 -0.15 0.879 
4 0.179 -0.41 -0.26 0.411 
5 -0.137 -0.183 -0.18 0.538 
6 -0.136 -0.022 0.047 0.541 
7 0.24 -0.36 -0.488 0.282 
8 -0.54 0.221 0.033 0.013 
9 -0.098 -0.31 -0.019 0.653 
10 0.127 0.034 -0.33 0.569 
11 0.045 0.493 0.077 0.835 
12 -0.288 0.187 0.055 0.196 
13 -0.277 -0.064 0.096 0.203 
4b 
0 0.016 -0.085 -0.266 0.948 
1 -0.153 -0.297 0.092 0.514 
2 0.183 -0.001 -0.19 0.436 
3 -0.033 -0.185 -0.096 0.888 
4 0.173 0.016 0.06 0.448 
5 -0.109 -0.146 0.046 0.661 
6 -0.19 -0.161 0.071 0.418 
7 0.387 0.025 -0.05 0.108 
8 0.372 -0.097 -0.236 0.122 
9 -0.267 -0.178 0.187 0.254 
10 0.238 0.144 -0.129 0.309 
11 0.104 0.07 0.021 0.658 
12 -0.011 0.253 -0.142 0.962 
13 0.741 0.46 0.334 0.002 
5a 
0 0.336 0.129 0.005 0.268 
1 0.077 -0.008 -0.02 0.736 
2 -0.087 0.037 0.066 0.697 
3 0.046 0.007 0.022 0.836 
4 -0.133 -0.308 0.139 0.542 
5 -0.083 -0.048 0.167 0.703 
6 -0.153 0.09 0.203 0.493 
7 0.431 -0.181 -0.497 0.053 
5b 
0 -0.096 0.116 -0.146 0.682 
1 0.047 -0.262 -0.188 0.847 
2 0.286 0.001 -0.026 0.223 
3 0.415 0.283 0.309 0.085 
4 0.778 0.537 0.284 0.001 
5 0.187 -0.189 -0.292 0.452 
6 0.031 0 -0.124 0.897 
7 0.203 -0.357 0.22 0.399 
212 
 
Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
6a 
0 -0.018 -0.115 -0.173 0.912 
1 0.284 0.032 0.202 0.087 
2 0.145 -0.14 -0.077 0.382 
3 0.596 0.589 0.36 0 
4 0.016 0.065 -0.116 0.922 
5 0.165 -0.062 0.055 0.32 
6 Discarded 
7 0.202 -0.27 0.032 0.225 
8 -0.078 0.118 -0.148 0.637 
9 -0.236 -0.192 0.112 0.156 
6b 
0 0.469 0.492 0.229 0.012 
1 0.073 0.02 0.158 0.698 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 0.22 -0.119 -0.267 0.241 
7 Discarded 
8 0.106 -0.222 0.073 0.668 
9 Discarded 
7a 
0 0.27 0.079 0.042 0.224 
1 0.013 -0.333 0.151 0.953 
2 0.256 0.084 0.34 0.25 
3 -0.029 -0.177 -0.169 0.895 
4 -0.202 -0.198 0.06 0.353 
5 -0.233 -0.037 -0.01 0.284 
6 0.057 -0.165 -0.101 0.8 
7 -0.001 0.079 -0.002 0.995 
8 0.057 -0.328 -0.19 0.798 
9 0.372 0.238 0.062 0.087 
7b 
0 Discarded 
1 Discarded 
2 -0.212 -0.057 -0.127 0.353 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Appendix M. Subject-based Multiple Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time 
Decision 
Table 0.19. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 1 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
1a 
0 yes 
time, 
salem, 
profitm 
0.790 0.727 0.001 
time = 16.750 - 0.450*time - 
0.023*salem + 0.004*profitm 
1 yes time, salet 0.381 0.268 0.072 
time = 3.885 + 0.630*time + 
0.004*salet 
2 Discarded 
3 yes salem 0.500 0.459 0.005 time = 12.897 + 0.005*salem 
4 no 
     
5 yes demandt 0.214 0.148 0.096 time = 10.275 + 0.008*demandt 
6 yes time 0.473 0.429 0.007 time = 5.575 + 0.715*time 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 no 
     
1b 
0 yes 
time, 
salet, 
profitm 
0.579 0.398 0.093 
time = 57.904 + 0.008*profitm - 
0.069*salet - 0.574*time 
1 Discarded 
2 yes time 0.610 0.571 0.003 time = 6.590 + 0.722*time 
3 yes time 0.343 0.277 0.045 time = 11.467 + 0.503*time 
4 yes demandt 0.255 0.180 0.094 time = 25.309 - 0.008*demandt 
5 yes time 0.353 0.273 0.070 time = 8.697 + 0.586*time 
6 yes 
demandt, 
salet, 
profitm 
0.891 0.844 0.001 
time  = 27.004 + 0.004*profitm  - 
0.018*salet - 0.006*demandt 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes profitm 0.357 0.286 0.052 time  = 58.003 - 0.007*profitm 
1c 
0 Discarded 
1 yes time 0.532 0.485 0.007 time =  4.481 + 0.423*time 
2 Discarded 
3 yes time 0.424 0.360 0.030 time = 4.134 + 0.417*time 
4 yes time 0.801 0.779 0.000 time = 1.414 + 0.856*time 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 no 
     
9 no 
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Table 0.20. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 2 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
2a 
0 yes time 0.729 0.706 0.000 time=2.653 + 0.823*time 
1 yes 
salet, 
profitm 
0.356 0.239 0.089 
time = 13.488 - 0.010*salet + 
0.002*profitm 
2 no 
     
3 yes salem 0.251 0.194 0.057 time = 18.566 - 0.014*salem 
4 yes time 0.800 0.784 0.000 time = 2.972 + 1.052*time 
5 no 
     
6 yes time 0.743 0.722 0.000 time = 3.745 + 0.764*time 
7 no 
     
8 Discarded 
9 yes demandt 0.247 0.178 0.084 time = 12.986 + 0.003*demandt 
2b 
0 Discarded 
1 yes time 0.692 0.661 0.001 time = 7.381 + 0.742*time 
2 yes 
salem, 
demandt 
0.661 0.564 0.023 
time = 27.234 - 0.257*salem + 
0.109*demandt 
3 no 
     
4 yes time 0.550 0.500 0.009 time = 10.164 + 0.893*time 
5 no 
     
6 yes time 0.630 0.589 0.004 time = 5.398 + 0.763*time 
7 yes 
time, 
profitm, 
demandt 
0.690 0.534 0.057 
time = 23.506 + 0.474*time + 
0.003*profitm - 0.023*demandt 
8 yes 
demandt, 
salet 
0.693 0.616 0.009 
time = 24.247 + 0.042*demandt - 
0.074*salet 
9 no 
     
2c 
0 Discarded 
1 no 
     
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 yes time 0.711 0.678 0.001 time = 1.653 + 0.549*time 
5 Discarded 
6 yes time 0.617 0.574 0.004 time = 3.706 + 0.631*time 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Table 0.21. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 3 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
3a 
0 yes time 0.620 0.582 0.002 time = 4.351 + 0.786*time 
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 Discarded 
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
3b 
0 yes demandt 0.234 0.165 0.094 time = 93.617 - 0.105*demandt 
1 yes time 0.513 0.468 0.006 time = 22.888 + time*0.482 
2 no 
     
3 yes 
salem, 
demandt 
0.807 0.769 0.000 
time = 59.452 + 0.039*demandt - 
0.467*salem 
4 yes demandt 0.270 0.203 0.069 time = 23.050 - 0.007*demandt 
5 no 
     
6 no 
     
7 Discarded 
3c 
0 yes profitm 0.457 0.403 0.016 time = 26.949 - 0.006*profitm 
1 yes demandt 0.263 0.190 0.088 time = 38.791 - 0.028*demandt 
2 yes time 0.859 0.843 0.000 time = 0.353 + 0.820*time 
3 yes salem 0.434 0.377 0.020 time = 8.621 - 0.006*salem 
4 yes 
demandt, 
salem 
0.750 0.688 0.004 
time = -1.291 + 0.050*demandt - 
0.037*salem 
5 yes 
time, 
demandt 
0.791 0.739 0.002 
time = 3.032 + 0.756*time - 
0.003*demandt 
6 no 
     
7 Discarded 
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Table 0.22. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 4 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
4a 
0 yes 
profitm, 
time, 
wprice 
0.881 0.852 0.000 
time = 2.1 + 3.352*wprice + 
0.68*time - 0.003*profitm 
1 yes 
demandt, 
salem 
0.787 0.755 0.000 
time = 27.813 + 0.018*demandt - 
0.146*salem 
2 no 
     
3 Discarded 
4 yes time 0.374 0.329 0.012 time = 7.608 + 0.649*time 
5 no 
     
6 Discarded 
7 no 
     
8 yes 
time, 
profitm 
0.353 0.253 0.059 
time = 14.899 + 0.404*time + 
0.003*profitm 
9 yes time 0.345 0.298 0.017 time = 13.704 + 0.587*time 
10 yes demandt 0.180 0.125 0.090 time = 34.699 - 0.019*demandt 
11 yes wprice 0.224 0.169 0.064 time = 20.673 + 4.264*wprice 
12 no 
     
13 yes 
time, 
profitm 
0.368 0.271 0.051 
time = 8.137 + 0.660*time - 
0.002*profitm 
4b 
0 no 
     
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 yes 
time, salem, 
salet 
0.654 0.539 0.018 
time = 55.979 - 0.605*time + 
0.087*salem - 0.015*salet 
4 no 
     
5 yes demandt 0.289 0.235 0.039 time = 17.565 - 0.004*demandt 
6 no 
     
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 no 
     
10 yes salet 0.252 0.184 0.080 time = 44.736 - 0.036*salet 
11 no 
     
12 no 
     
13 Discarded 
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Table 0.23. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 5 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
5a 
0 yes time 0.438 0.398 0.005 time = 5.317 + 0.747*time 
1 yes time, salem 0.540 0.479 0.003 
time = 4.992 + 0.024*salem + 
0.751*time 
2 no 
     
3 no 
     
4 yes 
demandt, 
salem 
0.322 0.218 0.080 
time = 42.650 + 0.319*salem - 
0.030*demandt 
5 no 
     
6 yes 
demandt, 
salet 
0.348 0.255 0.050 
time = 33.332 + 0.035*salet - 
0.026*demandt 
7 no 
     
5b 
0 Discarded 
1 no 
     
2 no 
     
3 no 
     
4 yes 
time, 
profitm 
0.566 0.488 0.010 
time = 3.691 + 1.126*time - 
0.006*profitm 
5 yes profitm 0.260 0.198 0.063 time = 19.806 + 0.002*profitm 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
Table 0.24. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 6 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
6a 
0 yes wprice 0.180 0.132 0.070 time = 20.000 - 0.5*wprice 
1 yes 
time, salem, 
salet 
0.715 0.658 0.000 
time=3.935 + 0.685*time - 
0.006*salem + 0.004*salet 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 yes 
salet, 
profitm, 
wprice 
0.578 0.493 0.004 
time = 23.721 + 0.012*salet - 
0.004*profitm - 0.964*wprice 
5 yes 
salem, 
profitm 
0.262 0.169 0.088 
time = 18.904 - 0.017*salem + 
0.002*profitm 
6 yes 
profitm, 
wprice 
0.323 0.239 0.044 
time = 19.634 - 0.002*profitm + 
1.212*wprice 
7 yes time 0.371 0.334 0.006 time = 8.137 + 0.459*time 
8 yes time 0.315 0.274 0.012 time = 9.979 + 0.415*time 
9 yes 
profitm, 
salet, 
wprice 
0.557 0.468 0.006 
time = 16.482 - 0.004*profitm + 
0.013*salet+ 1.561*wprice 
6b 
0 yes salem 0.419 0.354 0.031 time = 11.558 + 0.005*salem 
1 no 
     
2 Discarded 
3 yes 
time, 
demandt, 
profitm 
0.702 0.574 0.030 
time = 32.231 - 0.980*time + 
0.023*demandt - 0.006*profitm 
4 no 
     
5 no 
     
6 yes salet 0.429 0.372 0.021 time = 20.305 - 0.005*salet 
7 no 
     
8 no 
     
9 yes salem 0.339 0.272 0.047 time = 20.587 - 0.006*salem 
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Table 0.25. Subject-based Regression Analysis of Delivery Lead Time in Session 7 
 
Exp. Subject Response 
Response 
variables 
R² 
Adj. 
R² 
p-
value 
Equation 
7a 
0 no 
     
1 Discarded 
2 no 
     
3 yes wprice 0.248 0.194 0.050 time = 33.563 - 5.125*wprice 
4 no 
     
5 Discarded 
6 yes wprice 0.462 0.426 0.003 time = 38.000 - 5.000*wprice 
7 yes 
wprice, 
time, 
demandt, 
salet, 
profitm 
0.879 0.818 0.000 
time = 10.362 - 1.895*wprice + 
0.711*time + 0.012*demandt - 
0.030*salet + 0.003*profitm 
8 Discarded 
9 yes 
wprice, 
time 
0.752 0.714 0.000 
time = 9.996 - 1.826*wprice + 
0.775*time 
7b 
0 Discarded 
1 yes salet 0.430 0.383 0.011 time = 7.288 - 0.005*salet 
2 yes 
salem, 
time 
0.582 0.498 0.013 
time = 4.238 + 0.226*time - 
0.002*salem 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 yes time 0.776 0.757 0.000 time = 1.061 + 0.781*time 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
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Appendix ". Autocorrelation Analysis Results for Delivery Lead Time Decision 
Table 0.26. Autocorrelation Analysis Results for Delivery Lead Time Decision 
 
Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
1a 
0 -0.288 0.219 0.019 0.219 
1 0.34 0.379 0.093 0.146 
2 Discarded 
3 -0.113 -0.085 0.125 0.571 
4 0.385 0.051 0.129 0.1 
5 0.121 -0.168 -0.131 0.604 
6 0.586 0.182 0.028 0.012 
7 0.085 0.068 0.05 0.723 
8 0.389 0.195 0.415 0.097 
9 -0.029 -0.186 -0.231 0.898 
1b 
0 -0.032 -0.141 0.186 0.9 
1 Discarded 
2 0.722 0.218 -0.282 0.004 
3 0.502 0.171 0.071 0.043 
4 0.281 -0.032 -0.211 0.257 
5 0.55 0.455 0.043 0.038 
6 0.113 0.312 0.046 0.659 
7 0.162 -0.117 -0.027 0.513 
8 0.356 0.207 -0.002 0.164 
9 0.371 -0.257 -0.445 0.147 
1c 
0 0.312 0.25 0.187 0.208 
1 0.39 0.306 0.222 0.115 
2 Discarded 
3 0.41 -0.181 -0.174 0.109 
4 0.796 0.547 0.298 0.002 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
8 0.332 -0.208 -0.321 0.181 
9 0.116 -0.229 -0.303 0.651 
2a 
0 0.788 0.546 0.364 0.001 
1 0.115 0.029 0.141 0.624 
2 Discarded 
3 0.225 0.532 0.178 0.325 
4 0.693 0.43 0.256 0.003 
5 0.36 0.067 0.048 0.135 
6 0.687 0.474 0.256 0.003 
7 -0.113 0.264 -0.011 0.63 
8 Discarded 
9 -0.119 -0.26 0.066 0.622 
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Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
2b 
0 Discarded 
1 0.722 0.603 0.256 0.004 
2 0.258 0.039 -0.073 0.329 
3 0.408 0.331 0.158 0.1 
4 0.554 0.319 0.212 0.031 
5 0.376 -0.221 -0.234 0.129 
6 0.641 0.225 0.136 0.012 
7 0.265 0.025 -0.005 0.316 
8 0.577 0.281 -0.068 0.024 
9 0.217 0.014 -0.369 0.381 
2c 
0 Discarded 
1 0.313 -0.32 -0.116 0.207 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 0.528 0.033 -0.055 0.039 
5 Discarded 
6 0.605 0.276 0.009 0.018 
7 Discarded 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
3a 
0 0.757 0.475 0.156 0.002 
1 0.148 0.245 -0.005 0.564 
2 -0.003 -0.197 -0.435 0.991 
3 Discarded 
4 0.299 -0.267 -0.336 0.229 
5 0.248 0.379 0.197 0.333 
6 0.015 0.1 0.224 0.951 
7 -0.227 0.244 0.063 0.374 
3b 
0 0.353 -0.106 -0.08 0.143 
1 0.471 0.246 0.23 0.051 
2 0.098 -0.258 -0.118 0.677 
3 0.682 0.364 0.282 0.005 
4 -0.457 0.091 -0.026 0.005 
5 -0.316 0.317 -0.302 0.189 
6 -0.157 0.343 0.014 0.526 
7 Discarded 
3c 
0 0.576 0.11 -0.15 0.02 
1 0.222 0.29 0.086 0.371 
2 0.668 0.445 0.269 0.009 
3 0.139 0.092 0.046 0.576 
4 0.538 0.282 -0.044 0.035 
5 0.698 0.432 0.181 0.006 
6 0.316 0.399 0.155 0.216 
7 Discarded 
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Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
4a 
0 0.75 0.521 0.273 0.001 
1 0.722 0.444 0.167 0.001 
2 0.285 0.061 0.173 0.189 
3 Discarded 
4 0.57 0.381 0.067 0.01 
5 -0.248 -0.056 -0.202 0.255 
6 Discarded 
7 -0.033 0.23 0.28 0.879 
8 0.22 -0.088 -0.169 0.324 
9 0.581 0.333 0.277 0.009 
10 0.079 -0.346 -0.168 0.716 
11 -0.153 -0.333 0.029 0.493 
12 0.267 -0.219 -0.288 0.219 
13 0.411 0.281 0.045 0.065 
4b 
0 0.401 0.14 0.099 0.087 
1 Discarded 
2 Discarded 
3 -0.535 0.297 -0.042 0.026 
4 0.022 -0.273 -0.18 0.927 
5 0.49 -0.105 -0.434 0.032 
6 -0.273 0.246 -0.186 0.244 
7 -0.186 0.047 0.415 0.426 
8 -0.24 -0.08 0.018 0.306 
9 -0.248 0.265 -0.257 0.29 
10 0.06 -0.32 -0.02 0.802 
11 -0.006 -0.127 -0.061 0.981 
12 0.055 -0.073 -0.315 0.813 
13 Discarded 
5a 
0 0.587 0.338 0.327 0.008 
1 0.543 0.546 0.292 0.011 
2 0.003 0.094 -0.045 0.99 
3 -0.022 -0.274 -0.22 0.92 
4 -0.195 0.143 0.238 0.381 
5 0.403 0.085 -0.255 0.086 
6 0.426 0.241 0.222 0.05 
7 -0.029 0.042 0.143 0.895 
5b 
0 Discarded 
1 -0.122 -0.471 0.068 0.603 
2 0.233 0.077 -0.221 0.333 
3 0.123 -0.209 -0.376 0.6 
4 0.391 0.317 -0.15 0.095 
5 -0.198 -0.479 0.243 0.398 
6 Discarded 
7 Discarded 
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Exp. Subject Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 p-value 
6a 
0 -0.227 0.141 -0.046 0.275 
1 0.728 0.696 0.554 0 
2 Discarded 
3 Discarded 
4 -0.071 -0.216 0.248 0.731 
5 0.205 -0.362 -0.258 0.325 
6 0.224 -0.012 -0.067 0.28 
7 Discarded 
8 0.39 0.126 -0.04 0.061 
9 -0.031 -0.347 -0.062 0.88 
6b 
0 0.066 -0.576 0.039 0.797 
1 0.033 -0.105 -0.146 0.901 
2 Discarded 
3 -0.205 -0.29 0.258 0.423 
4 0.065 -0.163 0.081 0.794 
5 0.104 -0.187 0.207 0.675 
6 0.227 0.162 -0.085 0.359 
7 0.158 0.23 0.005 0.537 
8 -0.417 -0.083 0 0.103 
9 Discarded 
7a 
0 0.25 -0.208 -0.329 0.103 
1 Discarded 
2 0.216 -0.124 0.028 0.321 
3 0.244 -0.017 -0.02 0.274 
4 0.182 -0.034 0.038 0.414 
5 Discarded 
6 0.134 -0.047 -0.016 0.538 
7 0.545 0.468 0.32 0.014 
8 Discarded 
9 0.627 0.387 0.271 0.005 
7b 
0 Discarded 
1 0.123 0.073 0.104 0.599 
2 0.331 -0.042 0.008 0.169 
3 Discarded 
4 Discarded 
5 Discarded 
6 Discarded 
7 0.74 0.353 0.135 0.002 
8 Discarded 
9 Discarded 
 
 
 
 
 
